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ABSTRACT 
 
DYNAMICS OF DISINTEGRATION: 
THE LATER HAN EMPIRE (25-220CE) & ITS NORTHWESTERN FRONTIER 
 
Wai Kit Wicky Tse 
 
Paul R. Goldin 
 
As a frontier region of the Qin-Han (221BCE-220CE) empire, the northwest was a new 
territory to the Chinese realm. Until the Later Han (25-220CE) times, some portions of 
the northwestern region had only been part of imperial soil for one hundred years. Its 
coalescence into the Chinese empire was a product of long-term expansion and conquest, 
which arguably defined the region’s military nature. Furthermore, in the harsh natural 
environment of the region, only tough people could survive, and unsurprisingly, the 
region fostered vigorous warriors. Mixed culture and multi-ethnicity featured 
prominently in this highly militarized frontier society, which contrasted sharply with the 
imperial center that promoted unified cultural values and stood in the way of a greater 
degree of transregional integration. As this project shows, it was the northwesterners who 
went through a process of political peripheralization during the Later Han times played a 
harbinger role of the disintegration of the empire and eventually led to the breakdown of 
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the early imperial system in Chinese history.  
In this study, the author adopts a regional perspective by focusing on the role of the 
northwestern frontier region vis-à-vis the imperial center to explain the collapse of the 
Later Han empire. The author emphasizes the role that regional conflicts played in the 
decline and fall of the dynasty, and paid particular attention to the incompatibility 
between the militarized culture of the northwest and the civil values promoted by the 
imperial center, which was dominated by the eastern-based scholar-officials. Through this 
analysis, the author provides a case study of the relationship between the imperial center 
and the regions with different cultures and identities, and the variations of the conception 
of such a relationship in the period of early imperial China. 
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1  
 
Introductory Orientations: 
A Northwestern Frontier in Early Imperial China 
 
In the spring of 190 CE, having taken de facto control of the imperial court and 
replaced one boy emperor with another, Dong Zhuo 董卓 (d. 192CE), a warlord from 
the northwestern region, was planning to raise a large army against his opponents, who 
were mainly heads of regional governments in the eastern part of the empire. When Dong 
put forward his plan at a court meeting, nobody but one courtier named Zheng Tai 鄭泰 
(ca. 152-192CE) held a different opinion. Zheng, as a partisan of the eastern alliance, 
tried to thwart the warlord’s plan of enlarging his military forces and persuaded him that 
his enemies were not worth sending any troops over. To answer Dong’s query, Zheng 
gave his reasons as follows, 
 
Now, the provinces and commanderies to the east of the mountains have collaborated 
and formed alliances. Their people have been mobilized. One cannot say that they are 
not strong. However, since the reign of Emperor Guangwu [founding emperor of the 
dynasty], there was no military alert in the Central Country, the populace has long been 
enjoying peaceful lives and has forgotten war-fighting. As Confucius said, “To send the 
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people to war without prior training is equal to throwing them away.” Even they are 
numerous, they are unable to cause any harm… Your Excellency is a man from the 
western province and has been the imperial general since a young age. You have 
profound knowledge of military affairs and have engaged in battlefield frequently. 
Your name bangs on the whole realm and everyone is awed by Your reputation. Yuan 
Benchu [Yuan Shao 袁紹 (d. 202CE)] is a descendent of grand ministers and was 
born and grew up at the imperial capital; Zhang Mengzhuo [Zhang Miao 張邈 
(d.195CE)] is a gentleman from Dongping, who strictly follows the principles of 
courtesy; Kong Gongxu [Kong Zhou 孔伷 (fl. 160s-190s CE)] is good at pure 
conversation and abstruse talk that he is able to bring withered things to life and living 
things to die by his impressive speech. None of them have the ability of commanding 
armies. They are no match with Your Excellency in terms of wielding arms and facing 
enemies in decisive moment… It is a commonplace that there is no well-trained and 
brave soldier in the east of the mountain (Shandong)… Even if they have capable 
people, however, their ranks are in disorder and without legitimate authority given by 
the emperor. Each of them will rely on his own strength and end up in a stalemate, in 
which everyone will just wait for the results of others’ actions and will not agree on 
coordinating their pace of advance or retreat. [People of] The various commanderies to 
the west of the pass have been accustomed to military affairs. Since they have long 
been fighting with the Qiang, even women and girls can carry and use halberds, spears, 
bows and arrows. How could the ignorant [eastern] people resist the strong and brave 
soldiers [of the west]? The victory [of the west] is assured… The men of Bing and 
Liang, as well as [alien people] the Xiongnu, the Tuge, the voluntary followers from 
the Huangzhong area, and the eight stocks of the Western Qiang are the most vigorous 
fighters all under Heaven and are feared by the people. They are all under the 
command of Your Excellency and serve as [your] teeth and claws. It will be like 
driving tigers and rhinoceros against dogs and sheep… Moreover, Your military 
officers are as intimate as [your] heart and stomach; they have gotten along with You 
for a long time and established mutual trust; their loyalty can be counted on and their 
wisdom can be relied upon. By employing such a solid group against the loose alliance, 
who oppose them will be swept away like dead leaves before a violent wind…1           
今山東合謀，州郡連結，人庶相動，非不強盛。然光武以來，中國無警，百姓優
 
1 Fan Ye 范曄, comp., Hou Hanshu 後漢書 (hereafter HHS), (Beijing: Zhonghua shuju, 2003), 70: 
2258-59.  
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逸，忘戰日久。仲尼有言：『不教人戰，是謂弃之。』其眾雖多，不能為害…明公
出自西州，少為國將，閑習軍事，數踐戰場，名振當世，人懷懾服。袁本初公卿
子弟，生處京師。張孟卓東平長者，坐不闚堂。孔公緒清談高論，噓枯吹生。並
無軍旅之才，執銳之幹， 臨鋒決敵，非公之儔…山東之士，素乏精悍…就有其人，
而尊卑無序，王爵不加，若恃眾怙力，將各棊峙，以觀成敗，不肯同心共膽，與
齊進退…關西諸郡， 頗習兵事，自頃以來，數與羌戰，婦女猶戴戟操矛，挾弓負
矢，況其壯勇之士，以當妄戰之人乎！其勝可必…且天下彊勇，百姓所畏者，有
并、涼之人，及匈奴、屠各、湟中義從、西羌八種，而明公擁之，以為爪牙，譬
驅虎兕以赴犬羊…又明公將帥，皆中表腹心，周旋日久，恩信淳著，忠誠可任，
智謀可恃。以膠固之眾，當解合之埶，猶以烈風掃彼枯葉… 
 
Zheng then concluded that, with these advantages, Dong Zhuo would easily vanquish 
his rivals. Unnecessary levying of troops would only frighten the people and force those 
who were afraid of being conscripted to rebel, which would undermine Dong’s prestige. 
Dong was flattered and thus halted his plan. Shortly afterwards, facing the threat posed 
by his eastern enemies, Dong transferred the imperial capital westwards from Luoyang 
洛陽 to Chang’an 長安. He forced all residents of Luoyang to move, let his troops 
looted and finally burnt down the city.2 The fire not only destroyed the splendid imperial 
capital but also marked the breakdown of the imperial rule. While the young emperor was 
held in captivity by Dong, Dong’s rivals in the east forcefully turned the situation to their 
advantage and dismembered the empire into various warlord domains, which unveiled a 
chaotic period of incessant warfare in Chinese history. Therefore, although the last 
 
2 The most detailed English-language survey on the Later Han capital is Hans Bielenstein, “Lo-yang in 
Later Han Times,” Bulletin of the Museum of Far Eastern Antiquities (hereafter BMFEA) 48 (1976): 1-147. 
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emperor of Later Han dynasty (also known as the Eastern Han dynasty, 25-220CE) 
formally abdicated in 220CE, the dynasty actually ended with Dong Zhuo’s control over 
the imperial court in 190CE. 
Zheng Tai’s speech is of critical importance in analyzing the factors contributed to the 
collapse of the Later Han dynasty. It provides a contemporaneous account of certain 
people’s perception of what befell the empire. Although the speech primarily aimed to 
flatter (and implicitly obstruct) Dong Zhuo, it should not be merely treated as hyperbole. 
It must be telling the truth to some degree and was credible to Dong and his followers. 
Zheng depicted a vivid picture that the empire was divided into two halves: East and 
West. Dong Zhuo and his men were from the militarized west and represented a coalition 
of fierce Han and non-Han fighters; on the other hand, people of the east generally feared 
the westerners and were weak and slack in war preparation, the leaders of the eastern 
alliance were cultured but military inferior to their western counterparts. There was an 
obvious regional confrontation existed in the empire. 
This is a study aims to describe and explain how and why such an East-West 
confrontation came into existence in the Later Han period, and to examine the regional 
confrontation as a dynamics in the process of empire collapse. It is my first step of 
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understanding the Later Han world as an axial or transitional period between the 
establishment of the first unified imperial system nominally began in 221BCE and the 
failure of the system in the late second century which ensued a period of political division 
for 400 years. Since it was the warlord Dong Zhuo and his men from the northwest who 
dealt the final blow to the imperial authority by desecrating the throne and the imperial 
capital, the questions of why the northwesterners but not other groups and what attitudes 
toward the imperial center they held constitute the main subjects of the present 
investigation. By adopting a longue durée approach, this study will not be confined to the 
Later Han period but will be extended to the preceding centuries in order to trace the 
cultural and social development of the northwestern frontier region, which greatly 
differed from that of the imperial center.  
I hope this study as a case will shed some light on the relationship between the 
imperial center and the regions with different cultures and the variations of the 
conceptions of such a relationship in Chinese history. 
   As an introduction, this chapter will be divided into three sections (though they are 
uneven in length): The first gives my reasons of investigating the Later Han period, 
provides an overview of the Later Han studies, and situates this project in modern 
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scholarship; the second sketches the role of the northwestern frontier region in early 
China and introduces the militarized nature of this frontier society; the third section 
introduces the main sources used in this work and provides an outline of the chapters. 
 
Studying the Later Han3 
The original span of time in Chinese history I chose to study was the period from the 
third through sixth century, which is commonly called “Early Medieval”4 (also known as 
“Six Dynasties”) in English-language literature or Wei-Jin-Nanbeichao 魏晉南北朝 
(Wei, Jin and the Southern and Northern Dynasties) in Chinese historical tradition. It is a 
period roughly corresponding to the last years of the Later Han dynasty, which unveiled a 
long-term political disunion since the beginning of the first centralized empire in 221BCE, 
and the early years of the Sui dynasty (589-618CE), which marked the re-establishment 
of a unified and centralized Chinese empire. In the course of my studying of the early 
medieval Chinese sources, I realized that I could not fully understand the origins and 
 
3 Limited by the space, this section cannot provide detailed narrative of the Later Han political history, for 
details, see Hans Bielenstein, “Wang Mang, the restoration of the Han dynasty, and Later Han,” in Denis 
Twitchett and Michael Loewe eds., The Cambridge History of China vol. 1: The Ch’in and Han Empires, 
221 B.C.–A.D. 220. (hereafter CHOC v.1)(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986), 223-290; 
Michael Loewe, “The Conduct of Government & the Issues at Stake A.D. 57-167,” in CHOC v.1, 291-316; 
B. J. Mansvelt Beck, “The Fall of Han,” in CHOC v.1, 327-330. 
4 The term “early medieval” is borrowed from European history and is now commonly accepted by 
historians of Chinese history. For the nature of “medieval” in Chinese history, see Keith Knapp, “Did the 
Middle Kingdom have a Middle Period? The Problem of ‘Medieval’ in China’s History,” Education about 
Asia 12.3 (2007): 1-32. 
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trajectory of the period of disunion without reference to the history of the Later Han. My 
central concern of exploring the dynamics underpinning the drastic changes in early 
medieval China led me to start on a new front, examining the process of decline and fall 
of the Later Han, and investigating the factors contributed to the process. Thus began 
what started as the present study. 
Emperor Guangwu 光武 (r. 25-57CE), founder of the Later Han dynasty, and his 
supporters proudly proclaimed that their empire was Han and that it was the continuation 
and heir of the Former Han dynasty (also known as the Western Han dynasty, 
206BCE-8CE), which was said to be usurped by Wang Mang 王莽 (d. 23CE) whom 
named his own dynasty Xin 新 (9-23CE). The founding fathers of the Later Han 
claimed that their victory in the civil war during the 20s and 30s CE and their re-conquest 
of the realm of the Former Han were divinely ordained.5 Therefore, they had achieved a 
rightful restoration of the Han after the interregnum of Wang Mang.6 Historians of the 
 
5 For the theories employed by the Later Han rulers to legitimize their succession to the Former Han, see 
Yang Quan 楊權, Xin wude lilun yu liang Han zhengzhi: "Yaohou huode" shuo kaolun 新五德理論與兩
漢政治──「堯後火德」說考論  (Beijing: Zhonghua shuju, 2006). A general English-language 
introduction of those theories can be seen in Hok-lam Chan, Legitimation in Imperial China: Discussions 
under the Jurchen-Chin Dynasty (1115-1234) (Seattle and London: University of Washington Press, 1984), 
30-33. 
6 A comprehensive study on the reasons for Wang Mang’s fall is Homer H. Dubs trans., The History of the 
Former Han Dynasty, Volume Three (Baltimore: Waverly Press, 1955), 112-124. For detailed research on 
the revolts against Wang Mang and the civil war between the two Han dynasties, see Hans Bielenstein, 
“The Restoration of the Han Dynasty: with Prolegomena on the Historiography of the Hou Han shu,” 
BMFEA 26 (1954): 82-165, and “The Restoration of the Han Dynasty, volume II: the Civil War,” BMFEA 
31 (1959): 11-256. On the background of the civil war contenders and the founding members of the Later 
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Later Han have commonly accepted this claim and therefore treated the history of Later 
Han as a sequel to the Former Han. The dynastic title “Han” is usually used as a 
synecdoche for the two Han dynasties.7 However, the two Han regimes do not receive 
equal treatment in modern scholarship. Academic works under the name of Han history 
are generally assumed to cover both dynasties but, in fact, a lion’s share is devoted to the 
Former Han. 8  As one eminent Japanese scholar on Han history pointed out that, 
 
Han, see Yü Ying-shih 余英時, “Dong Han zhengquan zhi jianli yu shizu daxing zhi guanxi” 東漢政權之
建立與士族大姓之關係, in idem, Zhongguo zhishi jieceng shilun: gudaipian 中國知識階層史論：古代篇 
(Taipei: Lianjing chuban shiye gongsi, 1980), 109-203; Kojima Shigetoshi 小嶋茂稔, Kandai kokka tōchi 
no kōzō to tenkai: gokan kokkaron kenkyū josetsu 漢代国家統治の構造と展開：後漢国家論研究序說 
(Tōkyō: Kyūko Shoin, 2009), 73-123. 
7 In fact, the role of the Later Han as a continuation or restoration of the Former Han was not beyond any 
question. Considering the backgrounds of the founding members of the Later Han, they were very different 
from the ruling elites of the Former Han and lacked direct connection with the Former Han imperial court. 
When the Former Han was replaced by Wang Mang’s regime, it was both nominally and substantively 
ended. The very fact that all the plotted coups d’état and revolts in the name of the Han against Wang Mang 
lacked popular support and were easily suppressed reveals that Wang had received significant support to 
replace the Han. It was only when natural disasters, external warfare, and maladministration, inter alia, 
caused popular unrest that brought down the Xin regime. Meanwhile, certain contenders for imperial power 
made use of the name of the Han for political propaganda. Among them, Emperor Guangwu was a distant 
member of the Former Han imperial household, but he was indeed an outsider of the Former Han 
government. Furthermore, the members who constituted the Later Han ruling cohort were either regional 
magnates who did not occupy important positions in the Former Han or incumbent regional officials of the 
Xin dynasty. The case of the Later Han ruling elites was totally different from those of the Eastern Jin 晉 
(317-420CE) and the Southern Song 宋  (1127-1279CE) dynasties. These, in turn, are best understood as 
continuations of their predecessors, namely the Western Jin (265-316CE) and the Northern Song 
(960-1127CE), respectively.  
8 To list only a few examples will suffice to show the imbalance of the studies on the two dynasties: Qian 
Mu 錢穆 ended his work on Qin-Han history in the Xin dynasty, and without any entries of the Later Han, 
see his Qin Han Shi 秦漢史 (Taipei: Lianjing chubanshiye gongsi, 1994); Nishijima Sadao 西嶋定生 
spent nearly 300 pages on the Former Han but only less than 100 pages on the Later Han in his Shikan 
teikoku 秦漢帝国 (Tōkyō: kōdansha, 1974); although its title indicates that it is a study on Qin-Han 
empire, Yoshinami Takashi 好並隆司, Shikan teikoku shi kenkyū 秦漢帝国史研究 (Tōkyō: Miraisha, 
1978) has no single chapter for the Later Han; in his two-volume work on Han China Chun-shu Chang 
rarely mentioned the Later Han, see his The Rise of the Chinese Empire, Volume One: Nation, State, & 
Imperialism in Early China, ca. 1600 B.C.-A.D. 8. and The Rise of the Chinese Empire, Volume Two: 
Frontier, Immigration, & Empire in Han China, 130 B.C.-157 A.D. (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan 
Press, 2007); in his recently published general history of the Qin-Han period, Mark Edward Lewis spilled 
more ink over the Former Han than the Later Han, see his The Early Chinese Empires: Qin and Han 
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comparatively speaking, studies on Former Han are both quantitatively and qualitatively 
higher than that of Later Han, which is a rather underexplored field.9 Among the studies 
on the Later Han per se, it is the works of Japanese scholars contributed greatly in 
expanding the field and laying the theoretical framework for further studies. I have no 
ambition for this section to chart every contour of the Japanese scholarship, as this would 
need a specific review article; I will only provide an overview of three main themes of 
Japanese scholarship, as well as relevant Chinese and Western literature. 
A Regime of Powerful-families. The nature of the Later Han state and society is a core 
topic in the field. Ever since the foremost Sinologist Yang Lien-sheng’s 楊聯陞 seminal 
article on the powerful families (haozu 豪 族  in Chinese and gōzoku 豪 族  in 
Japanese)10 of the Later Han in 1936,11 numerous Chinese and Japanese scholars have 
 
(Cambridge, Mass.: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2007). 
9 Goi Naohiro 五井直弘, “Gokan ōchō to gōzoku” 後漢王朝と豪族, in idem, Kandai no gōzoku shakai 
to kokka 漢代の豪族社会と国家 (Tōkyō: Meicho Kankōkai, 2001), 228. Although Goi made his 
comment in 1970 and works on the Later Han has increased thereafter, his comment is still valid today if 
comparing the studies on the two Han dynasties. Examples can be found in the bibliography on Han studies 
in Tonami Mamoru 礪波護, Kishimoto Mio 岸本美緒 and Sugiyama Masaaki 杉山正明 eds., Chūgoku 
rekishi kenkyū nyūmon 中国歴史研究入門 (Nagoya: Nagoya Daigaku Shuppankai, 2006), 371-377. 
10 The “Powerful Families” were never a single and unified group. There are various terms in the Han texts 
to name those powerful families. Also, different types of powerful families can be seen in the sources. 
However, for the purpose of simplicity, I will follow the customary usage of most Chinese and Japanese 
scholars and adopt the term haozu/gōzoku 豪族 in a broad and encompassing sense, with “powerful 
family” as its equivalent in English. On different names and types of powerful families in Han history, see 
Utsunomiya Kiyoyoshi 宇都宮淸吉, “kandai gōzoku kenkyū” 漢代豪族研究, in his Chūgoku kodai 
chūseishi kenkyū 中囯古代中世史硏究 (Tōkyō: Sōbunsha, 1977), 376-382; Lai Ming-Chui 黎明釗, 
“Handai haozu daxing de yanjiu huigu” 漢代豪族大姓的研究回顧, in Zhou Liangkai 周樑楷 ed., 
Jiewang erbian 結網二編 (Taipei: Dongda tushu gufenyouxiangongsi, 2003), 93-133; Patricia Buckley 
Ebrey, “Toward a Better Understanding of the Later Han Upper Class,” in Albert E. Dien ed., State and 
10 
 
                                                                                                                                                
followed Yang’s path on studying the development of Later Han powerful families and 
their relationship with the state.12 A powerful family, according to Yang’s definition, was 
a strong local based family that commanded numerous dependent households and 
individuals. Yang’s article suggests that the origins of the political elites of the Jin and 
Northern and Southern Dynasties (265-581CE) could be traced back to the powerful 
families of the two Han dynasties. During the Later Han, the powerful families that 
sprouted in the Former Han reached their zenith and became the dominant power in both 
political and social arenas. Emperor Guangwu and most, if not all, of his supporters were 
from powerful families. In other words, the Later Han was a regime established and 
dominated by powerful families. Their members occupied central, regional, and local 
government posts, owned tremendous amounts of landed property, acted as leaders of 
their own communities, and commanded various kinds of retainers and dependents. Some 
of them expanded their economic benefits through wielding their political power, while 
 
Society in Early Medieval China (Hong Kong: Hong Kong University Press, 1990), 49-72. 
11 Yang Lien-sheng 楊聯陞, “Donghan de haozu” 東漢的豪族, Qinghua xuebao 清華學報 11:4 (1936): 
1007-1063; an English version is “Great Families of the Eastern Han,” in E-Tu Zen Sun and John de 
Francis eds., Chinese Social History: Translations of Selected Studies (Washington, DC.: American Council 
of Learned Societies, 1956), 103-136. 
12 The literature on the Han powerful families is vast. For a detailed review of the twentieth century 
Chinese studies on the topic, see Lai, “Handai haozu daxing de yanjiu huigu,” 93-133; for overview of 
Japanese studies, see Momiyama Akira 籾山明, “kandai gōzokuron he no ichi shikaku” 漢代豪族論への
一視角, Tōyōshi kenkyū 東洋史研究 43.1 (1984): 165-173 and Kojima, Kandai kokka tōchi no kōzō to 
tenkai, 11-15. 
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others acquired political positions by using their abundant economic resources. They not 
only constituted the mainstream of the bureaucracy but also acted as leaders of local 
communities. The development of and struggles among powerful families became the 
main thread runs through Yang’s analysis.13 
Yang’s basic arguments have widely been accepted by academic circles and 
especially echoed in the writings of his Japanese colleagues. Utsunomiya Kiyoyoshi 宇
都宮淸吉 , albeit questioning Yang’s classification of powerful families, held that 
powerful families constituted the dominant power of the Later Han. His studies greatly 
advanced scholars’ knowledge of powerful families in terms of socio-economic history.14 
Yoshikawa Mitsuo 吉川美都雄  found fault with Yang’s view on the relationship 
between Emperor Guangwu and powerful families in the early years of the dynasty but 
also agreed that powerful families gradually penetrated into and became important 
stakeholders of the regime.15 Japanese scholars even coined the term Gōzoku rengō 
seiken 豪族連合政権 (Powerful-family coalition regime) to characterize the Later Han 
 
13 Yang, “Donghan de haozu,” 1007-1063 and “Great Families of the Eastern Han,” 103-136. 
14 Utsunomiya, “Dōyaku kenkyū” 僮約研究, “Ryōshū to nanyō” 劉秀と南陽, and “Kandai niokeru ka to 
gōzoku” 漢代における家と豪族, in idem, Kandai shakai keizai shi kenkyū 漢代社會經濟史硏究 
(Tōkyō: Shibundō, 1967), 256-374, 375-404, and 405-472, respectively; also idem, “Kandai gōzoku 
kenkyū” and “Kandai kenkyū gūkan” 漢代研究偶感, in Chūgoku kodai chūseishi kenkyū, 351-388 and 
389-401, respectively.  
15 Yoshikawa Mitsuo 吉川美都雄, “Gokan shoki niokeru gōzoku taisaku nitsuite” 後漢初期に於ける豪
族対策に就いて, Rekishigaku kenkyū 歴史学研究 7.9 (1939): 644-668. 
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state as a regime constituted and controlled by powerful families. Another term Gōzoku 
kyōdōtai 豪族共同体 (Powerful-family community) was coined to describe the local 
communities dominated by powerful families.16     
Although the important role played by powerful families is generally recognized, not 
every Japanese scholar is satisfied with the thesis of Gōzoku rengō seiken. Criticisms 
have been raised against this line of interpretation. Taking a perspective different from his 
colleagues who emphasize socio-economic factors, Goi Naohiro 五井直弘 has diverted 
scholars’ attention to the political aspect of the relationship between state and powerful 
families. He stressed that state power was absolutely over the powerful families, whose 
political positions and social prestige were at the imperial mercy. Hence, the powerful 
families, albeit resourceful and influential, were not as powerful and equal as the emperor. 
They were no more than the privileged subjects of the emperor.17 In a recent study, 
Kojima Shigetoshi 小嶋茂稔 has challenged the thesis of Gōzoku rengō seiken as an 
overstatement of the influence of powerful families and a serious underestimation of state 
power. With a meticulous examination of the various participants of the civil war, Kojima 
 
16 A recent review of Japanese scholarship on these two concepts is Kojima, Kandai kokka tōchi no kōzō to 
tenkai, 6-35. The discussion over the concept of kyōdōtai (community) is especially intense among 
Japanese scholarship on the Six Dynasty period, for a concise English-language overview of the debate till 
1970s, see Tanigawa Michio, Medieval Chinese Society and the Local “Community” translated, with an 
introduction by Joshua A. Fogel (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1985), xv-xxix. 
17 Goi, “Ryōkan kōtaiki no hanran” 両漢交替期の叛乱, in idem, Kandai no gōzoku shakai to kokka, 
141-160; “Gokan ōchō to gōzoku,” 228-281. 
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has argued that the success of Emperor Guangwu was greatly due to the collaboration of 
incumbent regional and local officials and Guangwu’s capacity for controlling the state 
machine rather than the cooperation of powerful families.18 However, both Goi’s and 
Kojima’s analyses only explain the relationship between the emperor and powerful 
families in the formative years of the dynasty; for the situations of the succeeding years, 
further research is needed.  
Among the English-language literature, the Sinologist Hans Bielenstein spent great 
efforts in studying the saga of the formation of the Later Han and produced a series of 
book-length papers under the title of “The Restoration of the Han Dynasty,”19 in which 
he analyzes the role that powerful families, or what he terms “influential clans,” played in 
the process of toppling the Xin dynasty and establishing the Later Han.20 In Han Social 
Structure, Ch’ü T’ung-tsu 瞿同祖 pieces together from the extant documentary evidence 
the history of powerful families during the Later Han period and provides detailed 
translations of the extant sources.21 Following the studies by Yang and Utsunomiya, Ch’ü 
 
18 Kojima, Kandai kokka tōchi no kōzō to tenkai,73-123. 
19 Bielenstein, “The Restoration of the Han Dynasty: with Prolegomena on the Historiography of the Hou 
Han shu”; “The Restoration of the Han Dynasty: volume II, the Civil War”; “The Restoration of the Han 
Dynasty: volume III, the People,” BMFEA 39 (1967): 1-198; “The Restoration of the Han Dynasty: volume 
IV, the Government,” BMFEA 51 (1979): 1-300. 
20 Bielenstein, “The Restoration of the Han Dynasty: with Prolegomena on the Historiography of the Hou 
Han shu,” 94-98. 
21 Ch'ü T'ung-tsu, Han Social Structure (Seattle and London: University of Washington Press, 1972), 
160-247 and 393-506. 
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also holds that powerful families “dominated the government to such an extent that the 
history of the Later Han may be seen as the history of powerful families.”22 However, he 
reminds his readers that the emperor was the only source of political and military power 
and was able to remove any powerful family from the power hierarchy.23 Patricia Ebrey 
has depicted a vivid picture of the development of an “aristocratic family” from the Han 
times to the Tang dynasty (618-907CE).24 Although her book focuses mainly on the Six 
Dynasties and the period of Later Han only occupies a small portion, it echoes the 
conventional theme that the roots of Six Dynasties society should be traced to the Later 
Han. Furthermore, in an article on the Later Han upper class, Ebrey points out the cultural 
aspect of the powerful families and the stratification within them.25 The cultural attributes 
of powerful families will bring us to the next topic.  
Confucian State (Jukyō kokka 儒教国家). 26  As the eighteenth century Chinese 
 
22 Ch'ü, Han Social Structure, 202. 
23 Ibid., 212. 
24 Patricia Buckley Ebrey, The Aristocratic Families of Early Imperial China: A Case Study of the Po-ling 
Ts’ui Family (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1978). 
25 Ebrey, “Toward a Better Understanding of the Later Han Upper Class,” 49-72. Another work focuses on 
the cultural background of Han powerful family is Chen Chi-yun, Hsun Yueh (AD 148-209): The Life and 
Reflections of an Early Medieval Confucian (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1975). 
26 Here, the term “Confucian State” is an English translation of the Japanese term Jukyō kokka 儒教国家, 
by which the Japanese scholars refer the rubric Ju 儒 (Ru 儒 in Chinese) to the school of Confucius, his 
disciples, and later generations of followers, and Jukyō kokka is to coin the state which upholds the 
teachings and classics of the Confucian school as orthodoxy and is also filled up by officials with 
Confucian educational background. In short, the English terms “Confucian” and “Confucianism” used in 
this context is in the most conventional way as the self-identified followers of Confucius and the teachings 
of Confucius, his disciples, and the later thinkers who regarded themselves and/or were regarded by others 
as followers of this tradition. 
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scholar Zhao Yi 趙翼 acutely pointed out that many founding members of the Later Han 
had Confucian educational background,27 modern scholars also pay close attention to the 
relationship between the Later Han state and Confucianism. Such a relationship is 
indispensable for understanding the development of powerful families in the Han times.  
By the last decades of the Former Han, Confucianism had already its status as a 
crucial component of the state-sanctioned education curriculum and political orthodoxy. 
The Later Han inherited and advanced this tradition.28 Training of Confucian education 
became a key to attain government positions. With their economic and intellectual 
resources, members of powerful families gained easy access to Confucian education and 
 
Some Western scholars, with Michael Nylan as the foremost proponent, suggest that the rubric 
“Confucian” is not a suitable English translation of the Chinese term Ru 儒 in the context of Han times, as 
Ru was a heterogeneous group with different intellectual orientations in the Han dynasty and there was no 
necessary connections between Ru and Confucius. According to Nylan, Ru could refer to three groups of 
people: classicists, Confucians, and bureaucrats, with distinct intellectual orientations and diverse political 
views. Ru is thus a category broader than “Confucian.” For detailed discussions, see Michael Nylan, “A 
Problematic Model: The Han ‘Orthodox Synthesis,’ Then and Now,” in Kai-wing Chow, On-cho Ng, and 
John B. Henderson eds., Imagining Boundaries: Changing Confucian Doctrines, Texts, and Hermeneutics 
(Albany: State University of New York Press, 1999), 17-56, and idem, The Five “Confucian” Classics 
(New Heaven: Yale University Press, 2001), 1-41; Nicolas Zuferey, To the Origin of Confucianism: The Ru 
in Pre-Qin Times and During the early Han Dynasty (New York: Peter Lang Pub Inc, 2003); Anne Cheng, 
“What Did It Mean to Be a Ru in Han Times?” Asia Major 14.2 (2001): 101-118. For brief review of and 
questions about the relevant discussions, see Liang Cai, “In the Matrix of Power: A Study of the Social and 
Political Status of Confucians (Ru 儒) in the Western Han Dynasty (206 BCE-8 CE).” (Ph.D. dissertation, 
Cornell University, 2007), 7-10; Paul R. Goldin, Confucianism (Berkeley: University of California Press, 
2011), 4-5. 
I agree with Nylan that those people who claimed themselves and were regarded as Ru in the Han times 
were not necessarily Confucians. However, as this section aims mainly to review the works of Japanese 
scholars, the conventional rubrics “Confucian” and “Confucianism” will be suitable for the translation 
purpose. 
27 Zhao Yi 趙翼, Nianershi zhaji xiaozheng 廿二史箚記校證, annotated by Wang Shumin 王樹民 
(Beijing: Zhonghua shuju, 2001), 90-91. 
28 For the growth of Confucian education in the Later Han times, see Higashi Shinji 東晋次, Gokan jidai 
no seiji to shakai 後漢時代の政治と社会 (Nagoya: Nagoya Daigaku Shuppankai, 1995), 143-193. 
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then official posts. Meanwhile, individuals without strong family background would still 
try to access Confucian education and make themselves eligible for official appointments. 
Once entered government service, no matter who they were, office-holders would invest 
their descendants in the required education in order to attain, preserve, and extend 
political influence, economic privilege, and social status, which would accumulate as 
invaluable asset to their families.29 Against this backdrop, powerful families gradually 
monopolized the main source of Han official recruitment system and transformed 
themselves into hereditary official families.30 
It is no doubt that Confucianism played a significant role in shaping Later Han culture 
and politics and germinating powerful families. Japanese scholar Watanabe Yoshihiro 渡
邉義浩 coined the term Jukyō kokka 儒教国家 (Confucian state) to characterize the 
Later Han state as a regime highly integrated with state sanctioned/canonized 
Confucianism.31 According to Watanabe, the Confucian state fully developed during the 
first two reigns of Later Han when Confucianism was canonized under the imperial 
 
29 For the Later Han official recruitment system and its relation to powerful families, see Higashi Shinji, 
“Gokan jidai no senkyo to chihō shakai” 後漢時代の選挙と地方社会, Tōyōshi kenkyū 東洋史研究 46.2 
(1987): 33-60. 
30 On the relationship between Confucian officials and powerful families, see Higashi, Gokan jidai no seiji 
to shakai, 143-193 and 247-290; Watanabe Yoshihiro 渡邉義浩, Gokan kokka no shihai to jukyō 後漢囯
家の支配と儒敎 (Tōkyō: Yūzankaku Shuppan, 1995), 124-142. 
31 Watanabe’s two books focus on this topic: Gokan ni okeru "Jukyō kokka" no seiritsu and Gokan kokka no 
shihai to jukyō and Gokan ni okeru "Jukyō kokka" no seiritsu 後漢における「儒教国家」の成立 (Tōkyō: 
Kyūko Shoin, 2009). 
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auspices and was institutionalized as the orthodox ideology; Confucians dominated 
different levels of government positions and Confucianism permeated down to local 
communities.32 Although Watanabe’s definition of “Confucian state” is not generally 
accepted by scholars,33 it fashions another perspective on investigating the relationships 
between politics and culture as well as state and society in the Later Han times.34 
The Collapse of Early Empire. As the short-lived Qin dynasty (221-206BCE) marked 
the establishment of the first unified empire in Chinese history and the Former Han 
basically inherited the imperial system and further consolidated it, scholars always 
examine the two dynasties as a unit for understanding the formation of ancient Chinese 
empire; on the other hand, the failure of the Later Han showcase the demise of the 
ancient Chinese empire, and the study on this topic is called Kodai teikoku hōkai ron 古
代帝国崩壊論 (Thesis of the collapse of the ancient empire) by Japanese scholars. 
Following the logic of development of powerful families, scholars suggest that 
powerful families were the force not only founded the Later Han but also undermined the 
regime. Yang Lien-sheng asserted in his pioneering survey that the political chaos during 
the last decades of Later Han was caused by the infighting among great families, 
 
32 Watanabe, Gokan kokka no shihai to jukyō, 422-425; Gokan ni okeru "Jukyō kokka" no seiritsu, 23-25. 
33 Kojima, Kandai kokka tōchi no kōzō to tenkai, 39-44. 
34 Miranda Brown, The Politics of Mourning in Early China (Albany: State University of New York Press, 
2007) also focuses on the relationship between politics and culture in the Later Han times. 
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including imperial consort families, eunuchs and their dependents, and scholar-officials.35 
Vicious political struggles finally resulted in the two Great Proscriptions (danggu 黨錮, 
166 and 169CE), which Yang called “internal strife among the great families” (haozu 
neizheng 豪族內爭),36 imposed by the eunuch-dominated imperial court in order to 
purge and proscribe the anti-eunuch officials, scholars, and their followers in the imperial 
academy to access government office. The Later Han imperial court thus frustrated many 
scholar-officials, who in turn chose to preserve their power for familial rather than 
imperial interests. Ch’ü T’ung-tsu held the same point of view.37 Utsunomiya Kiyoyoshi, 
although criticized Yang for including consort families and eunuchs into the category of 
powerful family, agreed that powerful families contributed to the downfall of the 
empire.38 Focusing on the socio-economic aspect, he made the point that the growing 
strength of powerful families undermined the imperial power as they gradually became 
autonomous or semi-autonomous forces and encroached upon the economic base of the 
empire by grabbing taxpayer households from state control.39  
Later scholars basically follow the above theses, albeit there is no agreement on 
 
35 Yang, “Donghan de haozu,” 1042-1063; “Great Families of the Eastern Han,” 122-136. 
36 Yang, “Donghan de haozu,” 1052 and 1056; “Great Families of the Eastern Han,” 129 and 131. 
37 Ch'ü, Han Social Structure, 210-229 and 232-243. 
38 For Utsunomiya’s critique of Yang’s article, see his “Kandai kenkyū gūkan,” 389-401. 
39 Utsunomiya, “Kandai niokeru ka to gōzoku,” 405-472 and “Kandai gōzoku kenkyū,” 395-401. 
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whether the entire ruling class should be included in the category of powerful families as 
Yang suggested.40 Both Hsu Cho-yun 許倬雲 and Rafe de Crespigny concern the role of 
powerful families played in the rise of regionalism, which finally caused the 
fragmentation of the Later Han.41  Hsu has clearly stated that regionalism was “a 
significant factor in causing members of the Han elite to place local interest above the 
imperial interest.”42 It was the political and social elites with strong sense of regionalism 
who gave up their loyalty to the imperial house that brought the dynasty to an end. 
Closely related to the attitudes of powerful families toward the imperial center, the 
two Great Proscriptions especially attracted scholarly attention since they are said to be 
greatly undermined imperial authority and shattered the scholar-officials’ confidence and 
loyalty towards the imperial court.43 In addition, being regarded as the struggles between 
 
40 For studies on the Later Han consort families and eunuchs, see Ch'ü, Han Social Structure, 210-229 and 
232-243; Watanabe, Gokan kokka no shihai to jukyō, 271-366. 
41 Hsu Cho-yun, “The Roles of the Literati and of Regionalism in the Fall of the Han dynasty,” in Norman 
Yoffee and George L. Cowgill eds., The Collapse of Ancient States and Civilizations (Tucson: University of 
Arizon Press, 1988), 176-195; Rafe de Crespigny, “Provincial Gentry and the End of Later Han,” in 
Schmidt-Glintzer, hrsg. von Helwig ed., Das andere China - Festschrift für Wolfgang Bauer zum 65. 
Geburtstag (Wiesbaden: Harrassowitz, 1995), 533-558. 
42 Hsu, “The Roles of the Literati and of Regionalism in the Fall of the Han dynasty,” 190. 
43 For analyses of the two Great Proscriptions, see Masubuchi Tatsuo 増淵龍夫, “Gokan tōko jiken no 
shihyō ni tsuite” 後漢党錮事件の史評について, in idem, Chūgoku kodai no shakai to kokka 中囯古代
の社会と囯家 (Tōkyō: Iwanami Shoten, 1996), 296-317; Watanabe, Gokan kokka no shihai to jukyō, 
367-418; Higashi, Gokan jidai no seiji to shakai, 291-326; Rafe de Crespigny, “Political Protest in Imperial 
China: The Great Proscription of Later Han, 167-184,” Papers in Far Eastern History 11 (1975): 1-36 and 
“Politics and Philosophy under the Government of Emperor Huan 159-168 A.D.” T’oung Pao 66 (1980): 
41-83; Mansvelt Beck, “The Fall of Han,” 327-330. Christopher Leigh Connery, however, has questioned 
to what extent did the two proscriptions contribute to the collapse of the Later Han, see his The Empire of 
the Text: Writing and Authority in Early Imperial China (Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc., 
1998), 86-92. 
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corrupted political power and protesters mainly formed by intellectuals, the two incidents 
generally earn sympathy of historians, ancient and modern. By examining the proscribed 
scholar-officials, some Japanese scholars argue that a certain number of powerful families 
survived the two crises and expanded and transformed themselves. Their descendants 
successfully overcame dynastic changes and kept their positions as leading elites in the 
successive centuries, which constituted the ruling class of the “Six Dynasties aristocratic 
society” (Rikuchō kizokusei shakai 六朝貴族制社会).44  
Compared with the two Great Proscriptions, the widespread religious-colored Yellow 
Turban Rebellion, another significant incident in the late Later Han, has received lesser 
attention from scholars. The Yellow Turbans rose up in a large-scale revolt in 184CE and 
once posed a serious threat to the empire, but the rebellion lasted only one year and failed 
abruptly since the imperial state was still capable of gathering support from the powerful 
families, whose members contributed great efforts in suppressing the rebels. The Yellow 
Turbans were therefore a sign of the dynasty’s decline rather than a cause of its 
collapse.45 In fact, it is not the rebellion per se, but its impact of devolution of military 
 
44 One of the well-known proponents of this theory was the late Kawakatsu Yoshio 川勝義雄, see his 
“Kizokuseiji no seiritsu” 貴族政治の成立 and “Kanmatsu no rejisutansu undō” 漢末のレジスタンス運
動, in idem, Rikuchō kizokusei shakai no kenkyū 六朝貴族制社会の研究 (Tōkyō: Iwanami shoten, 2000), 
3-22 and 23-56, respectively. 
45 Hsu, “The Roles of the Literati and of Regionalism in the Fall of the Han dynasty,” 194. 
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power during the campaigns of suppression and the message of widespread popular 
discontent more threatened the existence of the dynasty, and hence deserve scholarly 
attention.46  
Apart from internal factors such as political infighting among powerful families and 
popular rebellions resulted from official corruption, maladministration, and natural 
disasters, external factors also interest scholarly investigation in the decline of the Later 
Han. Compared with the Former Han, which was an expansionist empire, the Later Han 
showed a defensive mode of dealing with its neighbors. In fact, the Later Han faced a 
much more complicated situation than its predecessor. Beside the Xiongnu 匈奴, which 
was the prime rival of the Former Han, the Later Han had to spend a vast amount of 
resource to cope with the Qiang 羌, the Wuhuan 烏桓, and the Xianbei 鮮卑. To what 
extent did the threats posed by non-Han peoples contribute to the downfall of the Later 
Han? Rafe de Crespigny has provided the hitherto most detailed study on the subject, 
suggesting that the failure of the Later Han was greatly due to its inefficient frontier 
policies that single-mindedly pursued the destruction of the Xiongnu confederacy without 
 
46 For an overview of Japanese works on this topic, see Wantanabe Yoshihiro, Sangokushi Kenkyū nyū mon 
三国志研究入門  (Tōkyō: Nichigai Asoshietsu, 2007), 146. Among Western scholarship, for 
comprehensive survey of the Yellow Turbans, see Paul Michaud, “The Yellow Turbans,” Monumenta 
Serica XVII (1958): 41-127, also Mansvelt Beck, “The Fall of Han,” 334-340; for the ideological 
background of the rebellion, see Barbara Hendrischke, The Scripture on Great Peace: the Taiping Jing and 
the Beginnings of Daoism (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2006), 3-38, especially 16-24. 
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thorough consideration and well preparation for the ensuing power vacuum along the 
northern frontier, which finally let other alien peoples took advantage of invading the 
Chinese realm and left heavy political and financial burden to the Later Han empire.47  
Benefit from the aforementioned scholarly research, we know that infighting of 
powerful families, popular rebellions, and warfare with non-Han peoples culminated in 
serious political, social, and economic malaise and the Later Han empire was in shambles 
in the second century CE. Against this backdrop, the present study attempts to provide a 
new perspective in regional context to answer why it is the northwesterners played the 
role of harbinger of destroying the empire.     
Numerous scholars have shown the significant role played by powerful families in the 
Later Han politics and society; nevertheless, it is not beyond doubt that powerful families 
could represent all the political elites of the empire. Some scholars have already pointed 
out that powerful families were largely concentrated in certain areas of the empire. 
Although local powerful families might exist everywhere in the imperial territories, the 
ones had empire-wide influences and close connections with the imperial center were 
 
47 Rafe de Crespigny, Northern Frontier: The Policies and Strategy of the Later Han Empire (Canberra: 
Faculty of Asian Studies, Australian National University, 1984). Yü Ying-shih has three works on the 
foreign relations of the Han dynasties, see Trade and Expansion in Han China: A Study in the structure of 
Sino-barbarian economic relations (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1976); “Han Foreign 
Relations,” in CHOC v. 1, 377-462; “The Hsiung-nu,” in Denis Sinor ed., Cambridge History of Early 
Inner Asia (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986), 118-149. 
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mainly found in the central and eastern regions where the political, cultural, and 
economic cores of the empire located. The powerful families appeared in the extant 
historical sources were mainly from those areas.48 Unlike the powerful families rooted in 
the areas of prosperous and “advanced” economy and culture, Dong Zhuo and his 
followers were from a frontier society with comparatively “backward” culture and 
economy in the eyes of the contemporaries. Eastern-based powerful families usually 
provided well-educated scholar-officials for the imperial state; on the other hand, the 
northwestern frontier region where Dong and his men came from was a land well-known 
for breeding warriors, with multi-ethnic background. Dong and his men was a 
conglomeration of Han and non-Han soldiers and were outsiders of the refined culture 
prevailing among the eastern elites. The contrast between the east and the northwest 
marked the conflict between the imperial center and its periphery.  
Needless to say, the so-called “Confucian state” was mainly confined in the imperial 
center and other Confucian cultural prosperous regions but not covered the whole empire. 
 
48 For the regional variation of the powerful families, see Utsunomiya, “Kandai gōzoku kenkyū,” 383-388; 
Masubuchi Tatsuo, “Gokan gunkensei no chiiki betsuteki kōsatsu” 後漢の郡県制の地域別的考察, in 
idem, Chūgoku kodai no shakai to kokka, 537-566; Ueda Sarae 上田早苗, “Gokan makki no sōyō no 
gōzoku” 後漢末期の襄陽豪族, Tōyōshi kenkyū 東洋史研究 28.4 (1970): 283-305; Tsuruma Kazuyuki 
鶴間和幸, “Kandai gōzoku no chiikiteki seigaku” 漢代豪族の地域的性格, Shigaku zasshi 史学雑誌 
87.12 (1978): 1-38; Satake Yasuhiko 佐竹靖彥, “Kandai jyūsanshū no chiikisei ni tsuite” 漢代十三州の
地域性について, Rekishi hyōron 歴史評論, 357 (1980): 37-65 and 79; Tada Kensuke 多田狷介, “Kōkin 
no ran zenshi” 黄巾の乱前史, in idem, Kan Gi Shin shi no kenkyū 漢魏晋史の研究 (Tōkyō: Kyūko 
Shoin, 1999), 49-76.   
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As Chapter Three will show, while the eastern-based elites with Confucian educational 
background triumphed in the official recruitment system, the “barbarous” and 
“backward” Northwesterners would have no hope to compete with them on political 
advancement,49 which triggered the estrangement between the two sides. 
This work does not aim to study the powerful families and “Confucian state,” but 
focuses on the group of people who were in the frontier society outside the orbit of the 
“Confucian state” and were in conflict with the powerful families dominated imperial 
center. This work can therefore supplement past scholarship by expanding our horizons 
beyond the powerful families and Confucian scholar-officials, and fashion a different 
view for understanding the processes and factors of the decline and fall of the Later Han 
empire. It can be aligned with the theme of Kodai teikoku hōkai ron. 
Why the relationship between the northwesterners and the imperial center matters in 
the decline and fall of the Later Han empire? To distinguish the “decline” and “fall” of an 
empire, Arther Ferrill points out in his book on the fall of the Roman empire that “the 
reasons for decline need not be the same as the reasons for the fall, which can be sought 
in a somewhat different and more immediate context.” Hence, “many problems can be 
 
49 Higashi, “Gokan jidai no senkyo to chihō shakai,” 33-60; Hsing I-tien 邢義田, “Dong Han xiaolian de 
shenfen beijing” 東漢孝廉的身分背景, in idem, Tianxia ijia: Huangdi,guanliao yu shehui 天下一家：皇
帝、官僚與社會 (Beijing: Zhonghua shuju, 2011), 285-354. 
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avoided by keeping the distinction between decline and fall sharp.”50 When investigating 
the collapse of ancient states and civilizations, anthropologist Norman Yoffee draws a 
concise distinction between the two concepts that “terms such as decline, decay, and 
decadence on the one hand and, on the other hand, terms such as fall, collapse, 
fragmentation, and death [italics in original]” are different in meanings. “Those in the 
former group imply changes that are somewhat for the worse, especially morally or 
aesthetically inferior, but are not necessarily the end of anything. Those in the latter group, 
however, imply that some meaningful entity ceased to exist.”51 It is clear that although 
corrupted government, power struggles at the imperial court, popular rebellions, and 
foreign invasions all deteriorated the situations, they only marked the decline of the Later 
Han which was still staggering forward. Here, I adopt Yoffee’s definition of collapse as “a 
drastic restructuring of social institutions in the absence of a political center,”52 and it 
was after Dong Zhuo and his northwestern fellows controlling the imperial court that 
various regional power-holders refused to recognize the imperial center and unveiled the 
disintegration of the empire. Therefore, I will argue that the regional conflict between the 
 
50 Arther Ferrill, The Fall of the Roman Empire: The Military Explanation (London: Thames and Hudson, 
1986), 8. 
51 Norman Yoffee, “Orienting Collapse,” in Norman Yoffee and George L. Cowgill eds., The Collapse of 
Ancient States and Civilizations, 14. 
52 Ibid, 7. 
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northwest and the imperial center not only precipitated the decline but, most importantly, 
brought the empire to an end. This is the reason why the present study focuses on the 
northwestern region. 
 
Studying a Militarized Frontier Society 
It is erroneous to look at a map of modern China and then assume that its national 
boundaries are consistent with that of the ancient times. In fact, the physical space of 
what we called “China” today is the product of a long and irregular process of conquest 
and coalescence inherited from an enduring imperial tradition. The boundaries of 
historical China were ever-changing and China itself resembles a jigsaw puzzle that is 
formed by different regions (as diverse as the whole of Europe in terms of culture and 
ethnicity) and took a long time to complete the full picture.  
The invention of national boundaries is a modern apparatus comes with the birth of 
nation-state,53 scholars who are interested in the nation/state-building process of modern 
China are also obliged to study how different regions at the eastern tip of the Eurasian 
landmass have coalesced into being China, especially during the last half millennium, and 
 
53 Peter Sahlins, Boundaries: The Making of France and Spain in the Pyrenees (Berkeley and Los Angeles: 
University of California Press, 1989), 2; Michiel Baud and Willem van Schendel, “Toward a Comparative 
History of Borderlands,” Journal of World History, 8.2 (Fall 1997): 216-217. 
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how the modern political boundaries have been demarcated.54 In recent decades, with 
frontier studies as a growing field,55 there are quite a number of English-language works 
focus on the period of late imperial or early modern China (roughly from the tenth or 
fourteenth to the eighteenth century)56 and study how have various frontier areas been 
conquered by and coalesced into the Chinese empires, such as the modern provinces of 
 
54 Peter Sahlins has pointed out that the pre-modern European regimes were something less than a 
territorial one. The rulers envision sovereignty in terms of jurisdiction over subjects, not over a delimited 
territory. Territorial sovereignty and delimited political boundaries are products owe much to modern 
political nationalism. See Sahlins, Boundaries, 2-6. While Sahlins’ conclusion is based on his research on 
the formation of national boundary between France and Spain, it also provide insight for examining the 
Chinese case. 
   During the imperial period, what we call “Chinese empire” refers mainly to the peoples subject to the 
Chinese imperial state. The empire was not a territorial entity exactly likes modern countries. Within the 
empire, different levels of administrative units could be geographically well defined as the boundaries 
delimited jurisdictions. However, the territorial limits of the empire were kind of vague. In the Han empire, 
although people clearly knew the existence of political boundaries between the Han and its neighbors in 
certain areas, as the Han texts contain many entries mention the borders (bian 邊/sai 塞) and areas outside 
the borders (saiwai 塞外), it could in fact hardly define a clear border line surrounded the whole empire. 
Most of the time, the boundary of the empire is actually the boundary of the people under the imperial rule. 
It is a very complex and multifaceted problem that I cannot discuss here, but we will return to it in the 
succeeding chapters. For reference, Nicolas Tackett has a recent case study of the Northern Song’s 
conception of territorial borders, see his “The Great Wall and Conceptualizations of the Border under the 
Northern Song,” Journal of Song-Yuan Studies 38(2008): 99-138. 
55 “Frontier Studies” as a field can be traced back to late nineteenth century when American historian 
Frederick Jackson Turner delivered his famous article on American western frontier and established what 
has been until relatively recently the dominant paradigm in frontier studies of the U.S. and even other 
countries. See Frederick Jackson Turner, “The Significance of the Frontier in American History,” in idem, 
The Frontier in American History (New York: Henry Holt and Company, 1920), 1-38. For a brief summary 
of Turner’s influence on the field and later historians’ critiques of his theory, see James Reardon-Anderson, 
Reluctant Pioneers: China’s Expansion Northward, 1644-1937 (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2005), 
3-6. 
For a general overview of the field in Chinese studies, see James A. Millward, “New Perspectives on 
the Qing Frontier,” in Gail Hershatter et al., eds., Remapping China: Fissures in Historical Terrain 
(Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1996), 113-129. For the traditional Chinese political theories on the 
relationship between the center and frontiers, see Alexander Woodside, “The Center and the Borderlands in 
Chinese Political Theory,” in Diana Lary ed., The Chinese State at the Borders (Vancouver: UBC Press, 
2007), 11-28. 
56 For example, Peter Lorge’s War, Politics and Society in Early Modern China, 900-1795 (London: 
Routledge, 2005), spans the tenth to the eighteenth century. However, not every historian find the notion of 
“early modern” appropriate for drawing timeline, for example, see Jack A. Goldstone, “The Problem of the 
‘Early Modern’ World,” Journal of the Economic and Social History of the Orient 41.3 (1988): 249-284.  
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Yunnan 雲南 and Guizhou 貴州 in the southwest,57 Taiwan in the east,58 Manchuria in 
the northeast,59 and modern province of  Xinjiang 新疆 (officially named Xinjiang 
Uyghur Autonomous Region) in the northwest.60 Most, if not all, of these works study 
how the frontier areas became Chinese through the processes of territorial expansion, 
migration, and colonization. They encompass topics including political economy, 
nation-building, empire-building, and ethnicity.  
With scholars’ efforts, the scope of Chinese frontier studies have been greatly 
expanded and have no longer been confined to the “Inner Asian Frontiers” (which refer to 
Manchuria, Mongolia, Xinjiang, and Tibet) model set by Owen Lattimore, the pioneer of 
the field. In his work, Lattimore points to differences in topography, climate, economy, 
 
57 For example, David G. Atwill, The Chinese Sultanate: Islam, Ethnicity, and the Panthay Rebellion in 
Southwest China, 1856-1873 (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2005); Laura Hostelter, Qing Colonial 
Enterprise: Ethnography and Cartography in Early Modern China (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 
2005); Charles Patterson Giersch, Asian Borderlands: The Transformation of Qing China’s Yunnan Frontier 
(Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2006); Leo Kwok-yueh Shin, The Making of the Chinese 
State: Ethnicity and Expansion on the Ming Borderlands (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006); 
John Herman, Amid the Clouds and Mist: China's Colonization of Guizhou, 1200-1700 (Cambridge, Mass.: 
Harvard University Asia Center, 2007). Two recent works draw attention to the Sichuan-Tibet frontier, see 
Dai Yingcong The Sichuan Frontier and Tibet: Imperial Strategy in the Early Qing (Seattle and London: 
University of Washington Press, 2009) and Wang Xiuyu, China’s Last Imperial Frontier: Late Qing 
Expansion in Sichuan’s Tibetan borderlands (Lanham: Lexington Books, 2011).  
58  For example, John Robert Shepherd, Statecraft and Political Economy on the Taiwan Frontier, 
1600-1800 (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1993); Emma Teng, Taiwan’s Imagined Geography: 
Chinese Colonial Travel Writing and Pictures, 1683-1895 (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Asia 
Center, 2004); Tonio Andrade, How Taiwan Became Chinese: Dutch, Spanish, and Han Colonization in the 
Seventeenth Century (New York: Columbia University Press, 2008). 
59 For example, Reardon-Anderson, Reluctant Pioneers; Christopher Mills Isett, State, Peasant, and 
Merchant in Qing Manchuria, 1644-1862 (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2007). 
60 For example, James A. Millward, Beyond the Pass: Economy, Ethnicity, and Empire in Qing Inner Asia, 
1759-1864 (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1998); Perdue, Peter C. China Marches West: The Qing 
Conquest of Central Eurasia (Cambridge and London: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 
2005). 
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languages, and ethnicities to argue that what he called “the general line of the Great Wall” 
was “one of the most absolute frontiers in the world.”61 Under the influence of Lattimore, 
it has once been widely accepted that the so-called “Great Wall of China” marked a linear 
dividing line in Chinese history between the Chinese sedentary peoples and its Inner 
Asian nomadic neighbors.62 However, as recent studies have shown that the frontiers of 
historical China were not limited to the line along the so-called “Great Wall,” but varied 
over time and also included other peripheral areas. If we put the temporal factor into 
consideration, we will have a slightly different picture. In fact, the “Great Wall” was not 
always the boundary between China and its neighbors.63 For example, during the Qing 
dynasty (1644-1912CE), the “Great Wall” zone was no longer a political frontier of 
China as the imperial territories had greatly extended beyond it. 
Nevertheless, by considering the temporal (late imperial/early modern China) and 
 
61 Owen Lattimore, Inner Asian Frontiers of China (Boston: Beacon Press, 1962), 21. 
62 Millward made a sharp criticism that “most Western historians of China automatically equate the 
concept of frontier with the Chinese-Inner Asian frontier-the Great Wall line, which as Owen Lattimore 
argued influentially, demarcated the zone of interaction between steppe and sown.” See his “New 
Perspectives on the Qing Frontier,” 115. 
63 Arthur Waldron has unveiled the myth of the “Great Wall” in Chinese history, see his The Great Wall of 
China: From History to Myth (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990). His critique of Lattimore’s 
theories and responses to some recent studies can also be seen in “The ‘Great Wall of China’: An Author’s 
Reflections after Twenty Years,” in Roger Des Forges et al., eds., Chinese Walls in Time and Space: A 
Multidisciplinary Perspective (Ithaca: East Asia Program, Cornell University, 2009), 3-36. On the other 
hand, Tackett has made a point in a recent article that even the Northern Song dynasty did not build long 
walls along the northern boundaries, the remnants of the “Great Wall” survived were still seen as a natural 
boundary between the Song and its northern neighbors. See Tackett, “The Great Wall and 
Conceptualizations of the Border under the Northern Song,” 99-138. 
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spatial (the frontier areas mentioned above) frameworks of these frontier studies, it is 
clear that there is a common premise that a “China proper” is at the center, mainly 
inhabited by the ethnic Han Chinese, and expands outward to the frontier areas. The 
words of one researcher of modern Chinese frontiers can tell us such kind of 
understanding, 
 
The core of the empire, or China proper, bounded by oceans on the east and south, the 
Tibetan Plateau on the west, and the Great Wall on the north, came together more than 
two millennia ago. Territories of equal size, including Manchuria, Inner and Outer 
Mongolia, Xinjiang, Tibet, and Taiwan, were attached to this core in the seventeenth 
and eighteenth century.64 
  
Hence, the formation of late imperial Chinese empire is a China proper plus Manchuria, 
Mongolia, Xinjiang, and Tibet, as well as Taiwan, Yunnan, and Guizhou. This process of 
conquering and integrating frontier areas is an outward expansion from the center 
towards the peripheries. Also, it is a process of colonization mainly marked by the ethnic 
Han presence (or, to a certain degree, a process of Sinification/Sinicization).65 
It is true that the ethnic Han Chinese people have long held the notion that a Central 
 
64 Reardon-Anderson, Reluctant Pioneers, 2. 
65 During the Qing dynasty, it was the Manchu people who brought Manchuria and even Mongolia to 
China, or more precisely, the Manchu conquered China. However, after the Manchu rulers consolidated 
their empire and started expanding outward, it was not only the Manchus but also the ethnic Han people 
participated in the imperial expansion. The Han Chinese were the backbone of the settlements on the 
frontier regions to take up the colonization function. As Emma Teng has pointed out that “an important 
aspect of Qing imperialism was the implanting of Han Chinese settlements on distant frontier territories.” 
See Taiwan’s Imagined Geography, 9. 
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Country/State/Province/Plain was the origin or cradle of Chinese civilization and thus the 
center of Chinese empires.66 Since the notion of centrality has been ingrained in the mind 
of ethnic Han Chinese by the late imperial period, it is therefore feasible to employ this 
center-and-periphery model in explaining the process of incorporating new territories into 
the existing Chinese regimes.67  
   However, the frontiers of Chinese empires advanced and receded, and were not 
necessarily consistent. For example, neither the area of the modern provinces of Gansu 
甘肅 and Ningxia 寧夏 in the northwest nor the northern part of modern Hebei 河北 
province in the north was the territories of a centralized ethnic Han Chinese regime 
 
66 For the making of the notion of Central Province or so, see Roger V. Des Forges, Cultural Centrality and 
Political Change in Chinese History: Northeast Henan in the Fall of the Ming (Stanford: Stanford 
University Press, 2003), 1-14. The concept of Central Country itself is changing in Chinese history, for 
detailed analysis, see Peter Bol, “Middle-Period Discourse on the Zhong Guo: The Central Country,” on 
Digital Access to Scholarship at Harvard http://www.ceps.com.tw/ec/ecJnlIntro.aspx?Jnliid=3243 (2009): 
1-31.   
67 Did the Mongol rulers of the Yuan dynasty (1271-1386CE) and the Manchu rulers of the Qing dynasty 
share the Han notion of centrality? It is a very complicated and multifaceted question that beyond my direct 
scope of research and cannot be answered here. For a general overview of the question, see Bol, 
“Middle-Period Discourse on the Zhong Guo,” 1-30. For the territorial concept of the Mongol Yuan, one 
can refer to David M. Robinson, Empire’s Twilight: Northeast Asia under the Mongols (Cambridge: 
Harvard University Asia Center, 2010). The case of the Manchu Qing is also related to the discussions of 
the “New Qing History” on the ethnicity of the Manchu people. For further information on the topic, see 
Mark C. Elliott, The Manchu Way: The Eight Banners and Ethnic Identity in Late Imperial China (Stanford: 
Stanford University Press, 2001) and Pamela Kyle Crossley, A Translucent Mirror: History and Identity in 
Qing Imperial Ideology (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2002). Michael G. Chang, A Court on 
Horseback: Imperial Touring & the Construction of Qing Rule, 1680-1785 (Cambridge: Harvard University 
Asia Center, 2007) sheds light on the Manchu emperors’ attitudes toward the “China proper.” R. Kent 
Guy’s new study on Qing regional administration also provides insight for the Manchu rulers’ perception of 
the imperial territories, see Qing Governors and Their Provinces: The Evolution of Territorial 
Administration in China, 1644-1796 (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 2010).   
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between the tenth and thirteenth century.68 They were frontiers between the ethnic Han 
and non-Han regimes at that time, although being regarded as part of China proper in the 
Ming (1368-1644CE) and Qing times.  Although some parts of modern Sichuan 四川 
province have long been regarded as portion of China Proper since its conquest by the 
Qin state during the first millennium BCE,69 still other parts of the province were treated 
as frontiers in the thirteenth century.70 
Therefore, if we extend the observation to the early imperial period—the Qin-Han 
times, the aforementioned center-and-periphery model has to be adjusted. It was a time 
when the Chinese empire was newly born, the entity of China proper was still under the 
course of formation and smaller than which recognized by the late imperial Chinese, and 
the Inner Asian and southwestern frontiers have not yet been or were too remote to be 
 
68 During the Song dynasty, the area of northwest was the territory of the Tangut Xi-Xia 西夏 State 
(1032-1227CE), while the area of the north was under the Khitan Liao (916-1123CE) and Jurchen Jin 
(1115-1234CE) successively. For a recent study on the frontiers of the Northern Song, see Tackett, “The 
Great Wall and Conceptualizations of the Border under the Northern Song.” For a general survey of those 
non-Han regimes, see F. W. Mote, Imperial China, 900-1800 (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 
1999), 49-71, 168-190, and 193-221. For the specific studies on the questions of the political boundaries 
and ethnic identity of the Liao and Xia, see Naomi Standen, Unbounded Loyalty: Frontier Crossings in 
Liao China ((Honolulu: University of Hawai’i Press, 2007) and Ruth W. Dunnell, The Great State of White 
and High: Buddhism and State Formation in Eleventh-Century Xia (Honolulu: University of Hawai’i Press, 
1996). 
69 A detailed account of the incorporation of ancient Sichuan into the Chinese regime is Steven F. Sage, 
Ancient Sichuan and the Unification of China (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1992). 
70 For Sichuan region during the Song dynasty, see Richard von Glahn, The Country of Streams and 
Grottoes: Expansion, Settlement, and the Civilizing of the Sichuan Frontier in Song Times (Cambridge, 
Mass: Council on East Asian Studies, Harvard University, 1987) and Ruth Mostern, “Dividing the Realm in 
Order to Govern”: The Spatial Organization of the Song State (960-1276 CE) (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard 
University Asia Center, 2011). 
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part of the Chinese empire. Hence, by considering the temporal factor, there is a 
two-layer division of the frontier zones of historical China: the Inner Asian Frontiers, 
Yunnan, Guizhou, and Taiwan are the modern, newer, and outer frontiers, whereas 
regions like modern Gansu, Ningxia, Sichuan, and certain areas in south China are the 
ancient, former, and inner frontiers. This classification should not be a strict one as those 
frontier zones would be overlapped in certain time and space in history; nevertheless, it is 
basically compatible with the process of imperial territorial expansion and the transition 
of frontiers in Chinese history.  
From the vantage point of the present, we can see how the Chinese empires from the 
Qin-Han period onwards expanded outward from the center to the inner frontiers and 
finally conquered the outer frontiers in modern times. We can borrow the American 
historian Frederick Jackson Turner’s words from his seminal article on the frontier in 
American history to describe the frontier in Chinese history as “a continually advancing 
frontier line.”71  
What is called China proper in Chinese historical tradition is a product of gradual 
development that was initially based on the realm of the Zhou 周 dynasty (ca. 11th -3th 
 
71 Frederick Jackson Turner, “The Significance of the Frontier in American History,” 2. 
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c.BCE), which largely corresponded to the area from the North China Plain in the east to 
the Wei 渭 River valley west of the bend of the Yellow River. The Zhou was a political 
entity very different from the territorial empires of the Qin and Han. Radiating from the 
dominion of the Zhou king, it is claimed in the ancient texts that there were something 
like hundreds of regional states (or what some scholars called “City-states”)72 widely 
distributed on the area which is roughly equivalent to the central and eastern parts of 
modern China. Under the Zhou Fengjian 封建 system,73 the regional polities were 
subjects of the Zhou king (even though some of them were only nominally under the 
authority of the Zhou royal house), basically shared the same rituals, government 
structure and other institutions, and surrounded by peoples who did not. With a common 
cultural background, a new and common identity was gradually forged among the 
regional states.74 This common identity allowed the concept of centrality to emerge and 
 
72 See Du Zhengsheng 杜正勝, Zhoudai chengbang 周代城邦 (Taipei: Lianjing chuban shiye gongsi, 
1979); Robin D. S. Yates, “The City-State in Ancient China,” in Deborah L. Nichols and Thomas H. 
Charlton eds., The Archaeology of City-States: Cross-Cultural Approaches (Washington and London: 
Smithsonian Institution Press, 1997), 71-90; also Yates, “Early China,” in Kurt Raflaub and Nathan 
Rosenstein eds., War and Society in the Ancient and Medieval Worlds: Asia, The Mediterranean, Europe, 
and Mesoamerica. (Washington D.C.: Center for Hellenic Studies, 1999), 7-46. 
73 The Fengjian system has commonly been translated as “Feudalism” and regarded as something 
resembles the feudal society of medieval Europe. Li Feng has made a detailed comparison between the 
Zhou Fengjian system and the European feudalism and has persuasively shown the differences in nature, 
concept, and practices of the two institutions. See Feng Li, “‘Feudalism’ and Western Zhou China: A 
Criticism,” Harvard Journal of Asiatic Studies 63.1 (Jun, 2003): 115-144.    
74 For a recent study on the topic with extensive amounts of archaeological evidence, see Lothar von 
Falkenhausen, Chinese Society in the Age of Confucius (1000-250 BC): The Archaeological Evidence (Los 
Angeles: Cotsen Institute of Archaeology, University of California, Los Angeles, 2006). 
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endure, which became the embryonic form of China proper. 
While the power of the Zhou king declined and some regional states became much 
stronger, the king’s role vis-à-vis the regional states and the relationships among the 
regional polities gradually changed. During this process of transformation, a kind of 
political Darwinism was at work with the politically fit surviving at the expense of the 
weak, the number of states continuously declined until there were only a handful of them 
survived in the Warring States period (475-221BCE). The weaker states were being 
swallowed up by the stronger ones that had undergone successful political and economic 
reforms and territorial expansion. Among those expanding states, it was the Qin at the 
westernmost that successfully strengthened itself through drastic reforms and finally 
overcame all rivals and established the first centralized empire in Chinese history.75 The 
establishment of the Qin empire and the ensuing expansion launched by the Qin and the 
succeeding Former Han dynasty brought new meaning to what is “China” by basically 
delimited and demarcated the essential part of the Chinese empire.76 The conception of 
 
75 For the reforms of the Qin state during the Warring States period and its transformation from a regional 
state to an empire, see Derk Bodde, “The State and Empire of Ch’in,” in CHOC v. 1, 20-102; Martin Kern, 
The Stele Inscriptions of Ch’in Shih-Huang: Text and Ritual in Early Chinese Imperial Representation 
(New Haven: American Oriental Society, 2000); Gideon Shelach and Yuri Pines, “Secondary State 
Formation and the Development of Local Identity: Change and Continuity in the State of Qin (770-221 
B.C.),” in Miriam T. Stark ed., Archaeology of Asia (Oxford: Blackwell Publishing, 2006), 202-230; Ōta 
Yukio 太田幸男, Chūgoku kodai kokka keiseishi ron 中国古代国家形成史論 (Tōkyō: Kyūko Shoin, 
2007), 127-187. 
76 On the Qin-Han conquest and its consequential formation of the concept of empire, see Kudō Motoo 工
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China proper was mostly shaped by the existence of such an integral core area, which 
became a place that ancient Chinese people believed where empire building began and 
from which the empire extended its territory.      
The Qin state rose to power in stages. It first established itself on the west of the Zhou 
realm and then gradually penetrated to the east. Not only expanded eastward, the Qin also 
directed its military might to other directions. In the fourth century BCE, the Qin 
marched southwards and finally conquered the regions of Ba 巴 and Shu 蜀, in modern 
Sichuan province.77 On its northwestern front, the Qin incessantly struggled with the 
various Rong 戎 peoples,78 who were the western neighbors of the Zhou court and were 
regarded as barbarians in Chinese historical tradition. In 771BCE, the Rong sacked the 
Zhou capital, brought down the Zhou rule in the west, and forced the royal court move to 
the east.79 The Qin, initially a small regional polity in the Zhou Fangjian hierarchy, filled 
the vacuum left by the Zhou court, engaged into long-term battles with the Rong, and 
gradually seized lands from them.80 As the next chapter will show, the territories that the 
 
藤元男, Suikochi Shinkan yorimita Shindai no kokka to shakai 睡虎地秦簡よりみた秦代の國家と社會 
(Tōkyō: Sōbunsha, 1998), 85-118. 
77 Sage, Ancient Sichuan and the Unification of China, 83-119. 
78 Shelach and Pines, “Secondary State Formation and the Development of Local Identity”, 205-219. 
79 For the war between the Zhou court and its northwestern enemies, see Li Feng, Landscape and Power in 
Early China: The Crisis and Fall of the Western Zhou 1045-771 BC (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 2006), 141-232. 
80 Shelach and Pines, “Secondary State Formation and the Development of Local Identity,” 205-219. 
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Qin conquered from the Rong constituted the northwestern region of the Han dynasties.81 
Based on the northwestern frontier, the Han empires further projected power to the 
Western Regions (Xiyu 西域, roughly an equivalent to the present-day Xinjiang).82  
Before turning to the historical account of the formation of the northwestern region of 
the Han dynasties in the next chapter, it behooves us to define the meanings of the terms 
“border,” “boundary,” “frontier,” and “borderland” used in this study. “Border” is a linear 
dividing line or line of partition that clearly demarcated boundary between polities or 
peoples;83 “boundary” is used in the same meaning as a well establish limit or border line 
of the given political unit.84 Therefore, these two terms will be used interchangeably. In 
 
81 The Qin-Han empire also extended to other directions and explored many new frontiers. For a general 
survey of the Han frontiers, see Nicola Di Cosmo, “Han Frontiers: Toward an Integrated View,” Journal of 
the American Oriental Society 129.2 (2009): 199-214. On the Han southern frontier, see Sophia-Karin 
Psarras, “The Han Far South,” Asiatische Studien Etudes Asiatiques LI.3 (1997): 757-778; Francis Allard, 
“Frontiers and Boundaries: The Han Empire from Its Southern Periphery,” in Archaeology of Asia, 233-254; 
John Herman, “The Kingdoms of Nanzhong: China’s Southwest Border Region Prior to the Eighth 
Century,” T’oung Pao 95 (2009): 241-286. On the northern frontier, see Di Cosmo, Ancient China and Its 
Enemies: The Rise of Nomadic Power in East Asian History (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
2005), 161-252; Chang, The Rise of the Chinese Empire 2 vols.; de Crespigny, Northern Frontier. 
82 For the Former Han’s enterprise in the Western Regions, see A. F. P. Hulsewé, with an introduction by M. 
A. N. Loewe, China in Inner Asia: The Early Stage: 125 B.C- A.D. 23. An Annotated Translation of 
Chapters 61 and 96 of the History of the Former Han Dynasty (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1979); for the Later Han 
and the Western Regions, see John E. Hill, Through the Jade Gate to Rome: A Study of the Silk Routes 
During the Later Han Dynasty 1st to 2nd Centuries CE (John E. Hill, 2009).  
The Western Regions was in fact a “sphere of influence” of the Han empires and was different from 
other territories of under direct imperial administration, although some Chinese historians held that it was 
part of the Han empire. James A. Millward has sharply pointed out that “the impression that all Xinjiang 
was Chinese territory throughout the Han dynasty is a distortion arising from later historians’ emphasis on 
certain aspects of this mixed record.” See his Eurasian Crossroads: A History of Xinjiang (New York: 
Columbia University Press, 2007), 24.  
83 Michael Khodarkousky, Russia’s Steppe Frontier: The Making of a Colonial Empire, 1500-1800 
(Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2002), 47. 
84 Ladis K. D. Kristof, “The Nature of Frontiers and Boundaries,” Annals of the Association of American 
Geographers, 49(1959): 269-282. 
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contrast, “frontier” differs from boundary and border by virtue of its flexibility and 
diversity. Frontier refers to a much more loosely defined area, a zone of transition, and “a 
region that forms the margin of a settled or developed territory, a politico-geographical 
area lying beyond the integrated region of the political unit.”85 Hence, frontier forms an 
outer edge or peripheral zone of a polity. It is also a zone of interaction as Lattimore 
pointed out that, in the Chinese case, the Inner Asian frontier was not “fully homogenous 
with China or the steppe” and could influence or be influenced by both.86 As a zone 
in-between and full of uncertainty, frontier is usually an area in which expansion can take 
place by either side and through which boundaries are drawn. Both “frontier” and 
“borderland” has zonal quality,87 but slight differences still exist between the usages of 
the two terms in certain circumstances.88 Frontier emphasizes the imperial territorial limit 
and is usually subject to the imperial military presence, as we will see the Han 
northwestern frontier advanced and receded depended upon the balance of power with 
 
85 Khodarkousky, Russia’s Steppe Frontier, 47. 
86 Lattimore, Inner Asian Frontiers of China, 423. 
87 Sahlins, Boundaries, 4; Baud and van Schendel, “Toward a Comparative History of Borderlands,” 213. 
88 Some scholars of American history suggest that it is necessary to disentangle frontiers from borderlands 
and reformulate the concept of borderland as frontier is a meeting place of peoples in which geographic and 
cultural borders were not clearly defined whereas borderlands are the contested boundaries between 
colonial domains, and there was a process of transition that borderlands turned into clearly defined borders. 
However, such view mainly resonate well with the history of eighteenth and nineteenth century when the 
empires were gradually replaced by nation-states. It is a rather recent phenomenon that we have become 
used to in the modern world but may not suitable for the analysis in this study, since there was hardly case 
of borderlands transformed into clearly demarcated borders in the Han times. See Jeremy Adelman and 
Stephen Aron, “From Borderlands to Borders: Empires, Nation-States, and the Peoples in between in North 
American History,” The American Historical Review 104.3 (Jun, 1999): 814-841. 
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neighbors. On the other hand, borderland refers to the newly conquered area with the 
existence of autochthonous societies after the frontier has pushed forward. Hence, there 
will be a process of transformation of frontiers into borderlands.89 Nevertheless, due to 
various reasons, frontier customs and cultures would persist even after the region went 
through such a transformation. The northwestern region in this study, no matter it was a 
frontier zone or borderland, was distinct from the imperial center in terms of culture and 
customs. This phenomenon meshes with what a frontier historian pointed out that “each 
frontier leaves its traces behind it, and when it becomes a settled area the region still 
partakes of the frontier characteristics.”90 
When regarding the northwestern frontier zone of the Han dynasties, most studies 
center on a vast stretch of land called “Hexi 河西 Corridor” in present-day northern 
Gansu province. Hexi, literally “west of the river,” lies for the most part west of the 
Yellow River. It is a long shaped area located in the mountainous terrain which connects 
China proper and the Western Regions. Several points on the Hexi Corridor formed 
transportation and commercial hubs for pre-modern Inner Asian economic and cultural 
exchange. With the groundbreaking excavation of Han period wooden and bamboo strips 
 
89 Baud and van Schendel have classified different types of borderlands and their different paths of 
development, see idem, “Toward a Comparative History of Borderlands,”220-229. 
90 Turner, “The Significance of the Frontier in American History,” 4. 
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in the area named Juyan 居延 (also known as the Edsen-gol region) at the northern tip 
of Hexi Corridor in the early twentieth century and the subsequent decades, which 
provide new information of the local government functionaries and livelihood of people 
within the enclave,91 the role of the region in Han history is highly emphasized. For 
example, in his two-volume work on the development and expansion of the Han empire, 
Chang Chun-shu 張春樹 focuses mainly on the Han penetration into and establishment 
on the Hexi Corridor. In a similar tone of Frederick Jackson Turner, Chang highly praised 
the achievement of the Han expansion to the “new world”—Hexi region and its 
contribution to the development of Chinese civilization.92  
   However, the geographic focus of the present study is the whole northwestern region 
of the Han dynasties, which is largely commensurate with largely correspond to 
present-day provinces of Gansu and Ningxia, with the addition of small portions of 
northeastern Qinghai 青海 province and western and southern Inner Mongolia; the Hexi 
Corridor in northern Gansu is only a piece of the whole jigsaw. As the subsequent 
chapters will show, the northwestern region of the Han times went through a process of 
 
91 The literature on this topic is vast, for general overview, see Momiyama Akira, Kan teikoku to henkyō 
shakai: chōjō no fūkei 漢帝国と辺境社会：長城の風景 (Tōkyō: Chūō Kōron Shinsha, 1999); Chang, 
The Rise of the Chinese Empire 2 vols.; Michael Loewe, Records of Han Administration 2 volumes 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1967).  
92 Chang, The Rise of the Chinese Empire vol. 2, 173-177. For Turner’s view on how the frontier shaped 
American history, see his “The Significance of the Frontier in American History,” 1-38.  
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expansion and coalescence to bring together several areas that sharing common 
topographical, ethnic, socio-economic, and cultural features but differing considerably 
from the imperial center; the geographic concept of Han northwest should not be 
confined to the Hexi Corridor. Focus of this study lies especially in the area corresponds 
to present-day southern Gansu, where Dong Zhuo and many other northwestern military 
elites of the two Han dynasties flourished. 
   To study the relationship between the northwestern region and China proper in the 
Han times and to investigate how the early Chinese empire dealt with regions with 
different cultural tradition and ethnic composition, some models for regional studies 
merit particular emphasis as points of departure for the present study. The most famous 
and influential regional system for studying China is the one devised by G. William 
Skinner. Skinner first applied the analytical methods of central place theory to study the 
marketing system and social interactions of nineteenth-century China.93 Later, he devised 
a macroregional system in a panoramic survey to explain the socio-economic 
transformation of late imperial China.94 Skinner divided China into nine “macroregions”, 
namely Northeast China, Northwest China, Upper Yangzi, Middle Yangzi, Lower Yangzi, 
 
93 G. William Skinner, Marketing and Social Structure in Rural China (Ann Arbor: Association for Asian 
Studies, 2001). 
94 G. William Skinner, “Presidential Address: The Structure of Chinese History,” Journal of Asian Studies, 
44.2 (Feb., 1985): 271-292. 
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Gan Yangzi, Southeast Coast, Lingnan, and Yungui, 95  and explained that “each 
macroregional economy took shape in and was wholly contained within a physiographic 
macroregion that can be defined in terms of drainage basins. Each was characterized by 
the concentration in a central area of resources of all kinds.”96 Skinner focused not only 
on the macroregions but also on the subregional systems within macroregions and 
adopted the concept of center and periphery to understand the evolution of a region over 
time. He pointed out that “the integral wholeness of Chinese history cannot be 
approached by generalizing across diversity or by striking an average of the various 
regional systems. Rather, a history of the civilizational whole must rest on 
comprehension and reconciliation of the distinct but contingently interrelated histories of 
its component parts.”97 Inspired by Skinner’s research, the historian Robert Hartwell also 
applied the concepts of center-periphery and subregion in producing a very important 
study on the transformation of various aspects of Chinese society during the 800 years 
between the ninth and sixteenth century.98 
   To employ regional system in studying the Han period, Hsu Cho-yun has made a 
 
95 Ibid., 273. 
96 Ibid., 280. 
97 Ibid., 289. 
98 Robert Hartwell, “Demographic, Political, and Social Transformation of China, 750-1550,” Harvard 
Journal of Asiatic Studies 42 (1982): 365-442. For a brief criticism of Skinner’s and Hartwell’s approaches 
in the perspective of Chinese studies, see Von Glahn, The Country of Streams and Grottoes, 215-216. 
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significant contribution.99 Hsu adopted the concept of core and periphery to construct his 
network model of the Han empire, in which he divided Han China into the core areas, the 
peripheries, and the borderlands. He described the network of nodes, routes, markets, and 
patterns of circulation that channeled the movement of people, goods, and information 
within the empire and contributed to political unity. However, he also pointed out that the 
Han exchange network was built upon a fragile balance of regional interdependence, 
which could be easily upset by disturbances such as war and natural disasters and led to 
the breakdown of the national network into regional networks.100  
   The aforementioned models offer insightful understanding of the processes of 
empire-building and, even, empire-destroying in ancient China. The diversity of regions 
shows that the Chinese empire was built on a diverse foundation. Different regions have 
their own paths of development and serve different functions in the empire.101  
 
99 Japanese scholars such as Satake Yasuhiko also provides a regional model for Han China, see his 
“Kandai jyūsanshū no chiikisei ni tsuite,” 37-65 and 79. 
100 See Hsu Cho-yun 許倬雲, “Handai Zhongguo tixi de wangluo” 漢代中國體系的網絡, in idem et al., 
eds., Zhongguo lishi lunwen ji 中國歷史論文集. (Taipei: Taiwan shangwu yinshuguan, 1986), 1-28; Han 
Agriculture: The Formation of Early Chinese Agrarian Economy (206 B.C.-A.D. 220) (Seattle and London: 
University of Washington Press, 1980), in which Chapter 6 supports Skinner’s observation. For a recent 
evaluation of Hsu’s network model, see Wang Dequan 王德權, “Gudai Zhongguo tixi de tuancheng” 古代
中國體系的摶成, Xin Shixue 新史學 14.1 (March, 2003): 143-201; for Hsu’s response to Wang, see his 
“Dui Wang Dequan xiansheng ‘Gudai Zhongguo tixi de tuancheng’ de huiying,” Xin Shixue 14.1 (March, 
2003): 203-208. For a criticism of Hsu’s interpretation of the Han society and economy in Han Agriculture, 
see Chen Chi-yun, “Han Dynasty China: Economy, Society, and State Power, a Review Article,” T’oung 
Pao 70 (1984): 127-148.  
101 For the regional cultural differences in the Warring States-and Qin-Han periods, see Yan Gengwang 嚴
耕望, “Zhanguo shidai lieguo minfeng yu shengji: jianlun Qin tongyi tianxia zhi beijing” 戰國時代列國民
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This study aims to explore how the regional diversity served as a dynamics of 
disintegration of the empire. Skinner has noticed how the regional diversity badly 
affected political unity that “in practice policies were often spatially differentiated or 
regionally specific, and in any case policy implementation varied radically from one 
region to another. Within regions, moreover, policy differences declined as one moved 
from inner core to far periphery.”102 As this study on the northwestern frontier zone will 
show, not only policies and regulations but also political culture and vision of empire 
were not always in a uniform manner everywhere in the empire as the imperial center 
would expect. Compared with the imperial court, perspectives were different in a frontier 
region and moved at a regional tempo that regional interests and conditions determined. 
Cohesion was desirable from the center, but loose and slow implementation, delayed 
responses, discordant practices, and centrifugal inclination were often the realities. 
Furthermore, the Han northwestern frontier region in our case was mostly incorporated 
 
風與生計──兼論秦統一天下之背景, in idem, Gengwang shixue lunwen xuanji 嚴耕望史學論文選集 
(Taipei: Lianjing chubanshiye gongsi, 1991), 95-112; Wang Zijin 王子今, “Qin Han wenhua de tongyi 
fengge yu quyu tese” 秦漢文化的統一風格與區域特色, in idem, Qin Han quyu wenhua yanjiu 秦漢區
域文化研究 (Chengdu: Sichuan renmin chubanshe, 1998), 1-23; Zhou Zhenhe 周振鶴, “Qin Han fengsu 
dili quhua” 秦漢風俗地理區劃, in idem ed., Zhongguo lishi wenhua quyu yanjiu 中國歷史文化區域研
究 (Shanghai: Fudan daxue chubanshe, 1997), 107-128; Hu Baoguo 胡寶國, “Handai zhengzhi wenhua 
zhongxin de zhuanyi” 漢代政治文化中心的轉移, in idem, Han Tang jian shixue de fazhan 漢唐間史學
的發展 (Beijing: Shangwu yinshuguan, 2003), 214-229; Kudō, Suikochi Shinkan yorimita Shindai no 
kokka to shakai; Fujita Katsuhisa 藤田勝久, Shiki Sengoku shiryō no kenkyū 史記戰囯史料の硏究 
(Tōkyō: Tōkyō Daigaku Shuppankai, 1997). 
102 Skinner, “Presidential Address: The Structure of Chinese History,” 281. 
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through conquest and, once became part of the empire, was highly militarized to serve 
military purposes; on the other hand, the central and eastern parts of the empire mainly 
served as the major sources of fiscal and material supplies. Therefore, they produced 
distinctive forms of regional culture and spatial organization. To borrow the sociologist 
Charles Tilly’s words, there is a distinction between military and fiscal geographies.103  
   The militarized nature of the northwestern region was commonly recognized by the 
Han contemporaries. During the Han times, the region was set to be a highly militarized 
zone to serve three strategic functions. First, for offensive, it was a military base to 
launch attack against the western sector of the Xiongnu empire; for defensive, it posed a 
threat to the western flank of the Xiongnu and therefore deterred them from invading the 
imperial realm from northwest. Second, it served as a bridgehead for supporting the 
imperial ventures to the Western Regions, which was also a crucial part of the grand 
strategy against the Xiongnu since the Han statesmen believed that controlling over the 
Western Regions would “cut off the right arm of the Xiongnu.” Third, it acted as a wedge 
between the Xiongnu and Qiang and hence fended off any possible contact and coalition 
between the two peoples, which would otherwise threaten the security of the Han.  
 
103 Charles Tilly, Coercion, Capital and European States: AD 990–1992. (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1990), 
125. 
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   As will be discussed in detail in later chapters, the natural geography and composition 
of population all ushered militarization of the region. In such a frontier zone, only the 
tough could survive, and not surprisingly it came to have the largest concentration of men 
of martial background. The autochthonous population was composed of various groups of 
non-Han peoples who were regarded by the Han statesmen as natural-born warriors. The 
ethnic Han people in there were also good at military skill. The northwest was the main 
source of providing cavalry and military talents in the Han times. Beside garrison soldiers, 
the majority of Han population in the area was composed of re-settled refugees, convicts, 
and other people whom were regarded by the officials as would-be social harm. They 
were sent to the northwest to take up colonization duties and lessen the pressure they 
would exert on the interior of the empire. The influx of ethnic Han people, on one hand, 
intensified ethnic conflict and resource competition among different groups and finally 
led to the outbreak of large-scale armed confrontation; on the other hand, for various 
reasons, the process of assimilation took place between the Han colonizers and 
autochthonous peoples and consequently forged a new identity of northwesterner, which 
finally fostered a military force to challenge the imperial center. No matter it was due to 
state sponsorship or for the pursuit of survival, people of the northwest were willing and 
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able to resort to military means to dissolve their problems and hence accelerated the 
militarization of such a frontier society. 
   Militarization is in fact not only a military process but also a social phenomenon.104 
In this study, militarization refers to the condition that most institutions and sectors of a 
society are shaped to support the exigencies of war and the preparation of war and all 
kinds of resources are appropriated for military purposes. Militarization can be divided 
into two types: “sanctioned militarization” and “spontaneous militarization.” 105  
Sanctioned militarization is a top-down process, which is initiated and controlled by the 
state to transform society into an efficient military force to serve its military purposes. It 
represents the strengthening of state authority over society and constitutes a centripetal 
force. By contrast, spontaneous militarization is a bottom-up process, which is initiated 
by local armed communities to serve their own purposes and will act as a centrifugal 
force to undermine the state authority and military monopoly. Both processes can be 
 
104 In his study of militarism, Emilio Willems has shed light on understanding the process of militarization, 
see A Way of Life and Death: Three Centuries of Prussian-German Militarism: An Anthropological 
Approach (Nashville: Vanderbilt University Press, 1986), 1-13. Militarization and militarism are not 
necessarily the same thing, for the differences between the two concepts, see Michael Szonyi, Cold War 
Island: Quemoy on the Front Line (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008), 247-248.  
105 My definition and classification of militarization is benefited from the relevant discussions in Willems, 
A Way of Life and Death; Philip A. Kuhn, Rebellion and Its Enemies in Late Imperial China (Cambridge: 
Harvard University Press, 1970), especially 32-35 and 64-65; Szonyi, Cold War Island; Huang Jinlin 黃金
麟, Zhanzheng, shenti, xiandaixing : jindai Taiwan de junshi zhili yu shenti, 1895-2005 戰爭、身體、現代
性 : 近代臺灣的軍事治理與身體, 1895-2005 (Taipei: Lianjing chuban shiye gufen youxiangongsi, 
2009). 
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found in Chinese history and the nature of their relationship is in relative terms as strong 
sanctioned militarization would keep the spontaneous one in bay and vice versa. For 
instance, the Qin state adopted various political and social measures to militarize its 
population and finally achieved the conquest of its rival states.106 In contrast, when the 
spontaneous militarization of the northwest grew stronger than the sanctioned effort of 
the Later Han state, it became the harbinger of dismembering the empire.  
   As a frontier zone, the northwest was doubtlessly being militarized under the imperial 
sponsorship. However, the mixed demographic composition and the ensuing struggles 
among the inhabitants unavoidably enhanced locally initiated militarization. Especially 
after the outbreak of the Qiang wars in the second century CE, most of the northwest 
turned into battlefield; violence was widely spread and became an integral part of 
everyday life, which fostered rapid militarization among the northwestern people.107 
Worse still, when the Qiang got the upper hand in the confrontations, the desperate 
imperial court was tempted to give up the northwest and let the local people to defend 
 
106 For the militarization initiated by the state in the Warring States period in general and the Qin state in 
particular, see Mark Edward Lewis, Sanctioned Violence in Early China (Albany: State University of New 
York Press, 1990), 53-96; Robin McNeal, “Acquiring People: Social Organization, Mobilization, and the 
Discourse on the Civil and the Martial in Ancient China,” Ph.D. Dissertation (University of Washington, 
2000) ; Du Zhengsheng 杜正勝, Bianhu qimin: chuantong zhengzhi shehui jiegou zhi xingcheng 編戶齊
民：傳統政治社會結構之形成 (Taipei: Lianjing chuban shiye gongsi, 1990), 49-96 and 373-391. 
107 David M. Robinson has a recent study on spreading violence led to rapid militarization during the 
transition of the Yuan and Ming dynasties, see his Empire’s Twilight, 81-82 and 269-271. Diana Lary’s 
work on modern China also discusses the relationship between violence and militarization, see her Warlord 
Soldiers: Chinese Common Soldiers 1919-1937. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985), 4-5. 
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themselves if they did not evacuate with the local functionaries. While facing the chronic 
violence without adequate support from the imperial center, local communities could 
only rely on themselves. As a result, the war-ridden northwest became a hotbed of 
spontaneous militarization, which in turn de-legitimized the imperial court and gave rise 
to ambitious men like Dong Zhuo. 
 
Sources and Organization  
In recent decades, studying archaeological findings, unearthed wooden and bamboo strips 
in particular, has become the mainstream of Qin-Han scholarship. In many recent studies, 
the role of new findings even overshadows that of the traditional textual sources. 
However, in order to have a big picture of the Qin-Han history, both received textual 
sources and archaeological findings have to be used. For certain topics such as the 
present study, traditional textual sources still play the primary role while excavated 
sources only provide supplementary information.    
This study depends primarily on received Chinese textual sources, especially three 
traditional Chinese “standard histories,” namely (1) Shiji 史記, compiled by the official 
historians of the Former Han Sima Tan 司馬談 (d. 110BCE) and his son Sima Qian 司
馬遷 (ca. 145-86BCE). It spans from the mythical period to the early first century BCE, 
50 
 
                                                
covering the reigns of the first five emperors of the Former Han; (2) Hanshu 漢書, a 
work collectively compiled by a famous Later Han literati family of which Ban Gu 班固 
(32-92CE) as representative. It records history of the Former Han dynasty; (3) Hou 
Hanshu 後漢書, compiled by Fan Ye 范曄 (398-445CE), and contains the treatises by 
Sima Biao 司馬彪 (240-306CE). It is the history of the Later Han dynasty. Needless to 
say, Hou Hanshu is the most essential one in studying the history of Later Han.108 
Besides, Sanguozhi 三 國 志 , a standard history compiled by Chen Shou 陳 壽 
(233-297CE), which covers the last decades of the Later Han and the ensuing Three 
Kingdoms period (220-265CE) provides important information of the men who took part 
in the turmoil happened in the last years of Later Han and witnessed the demise of the 
empire. 
A wide span of other traditional textual sources also serve important function in the 
present study, to name only a few, such as Jijiu pian 急就篇, a primer of the Han times; 
Qianfu lun 潛夫論, a collection of essays written by a Later Han scholars in the midst of 
the dynasty; Fengsu tongyi 風俗通義, a work compiled by a scholar-official in the last 
years of the Later Han; and Dushi Fangyu jiyao 讀史方輿紀要, a seventeenth century 
 
108 For the value of Hou Hanshu in the field, see Bielenstein, “The Restoration of the Han Dynasty: with 
Prolegomena on the Historiography of the Hou Han shu”; B. J. Mansvelt Beck, The Treatises of Later Han: 
Their Author, Sources, Contents and Place in Chinese Historiography (Leiden and Boston: Brill, 1990).  
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geographical work. 
Apart from the above received textual sources, epigraphic sources, especially stone 
steles and epitaphs, are critical body of evidence for studying the Later Han world.109 
Modern collections compiled by Chinese and Japanese scholars such as Hanbei jishi 漢
碑集釋 and Kandai sekkoku shūsei 漢代石刻集成 provide extremely valuable help in 
using those sources. This study also takes into account relevant archaeological sources 
from the period and region under question as possible; in certain cases, some unearthed 
bamboo and wood strips will be used to support my arguments. 
This Introduction, as Chapter One, has provided an overview of the themes and lays 
out the general framework that guides this study. 
Chapter Two focuses on the natural and political landscapes of the northwestern 
region. It adopts a longue durée approach of tracing the trajectory of development of the 
region since the pre-Han period and stretches how the northwestward expansion of 
Chinese regimes re-structured the region in various aspects.  
 
109 For using epigraphic sources in the study of Later Han history, see Bielenstein, “Later Han Inscriptions 
and Dynastic Biographies: a Historiographical Comparison,” in Proceedings of the International 
Conference on Sinology: Section on History and Archaeology (Taipei: Academia Sinica, 1981), 571-586; 
Patricia Ebrey, “Later Han Stone Inscriptions,” Harvard Journal of Asiatic Studies 40:2 (1980): 325-353; 
Brown, The Politics of Mourning in Early China. On the cultural meaning of stone inscriptions in the Later 
Han context, see K. E. Brashier, “Text and Ritual in Early Chinese Stelae,” in Martin Kern ed., Text and 
Ritual in Early China (Seattle and London: University of Washington Press, 2005), 249-284. For the 
origins and developments of the Later Han steles, see Tomiya Itaru 冨谷至, Mokkan, chikukan no kataru 
Chūgoku kodai: shoki no bunkashi 木簡・竹簡の語る中国古代：書記の文化史 (Tōkyō: Iwanami 
Shoten, 2003), 28-56. 
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While Chapter Two focuses on the land, Chapter Three centers on the people. It 
analyzes both the elites and common people of the northwest and their political and social 
status during the two Han dynasties. Special attention is given to the changing status of 
the northwestern military elites and their deteriorating relationship with the imperial 
center during the Later Han. 
Chapter Four first investigates the background and course of the protracted military 
confrontation between the Later Han and the so-called Qiang people and its devastating 
impact on the empire; then analyzes the debates over abandoning the northwestern region 
and the ensuing forcible withdrawals, which intensified the estrangement and conflict 
between the northwesterners and the scholar-officials at imperial center. 
The final chapter summarizes the main themes of this study, provides a full picture of 
the role that the northwestern region played in the Later Han empire, and considers the 
implications of this work to our understanding of early medieval Chinese history.  
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2 
  
Opening New Territory & Partitioning the Space: 
 Natural and Administrative Geographies of the  
Han Northwest 
 
When Zhang Qian 張騫 (fl. 140s-110s BCE) first set foot on the soil of Longxi 隴西, 
then the westernmost commandery (jun 郡; one level of Han administrative divisions; 
the whole empire was divided into dozens of commanderies) of the Former Han dynasty, 
sometime during the 130s BCE, he must have seen a scenery very different from that of 
Chang’an, the imperial capital, and Hanzhong 漢中, his native commandery in the 
southwest. As Zhang traveled northwestward through Longxi, he left the Former Han 
territory and entered the Xiongnu dominated Hexi region. Zhang was captured by the 
Xiongnu and detained for over a decade until he was able to flee and continue his journey 
to Inner Asia.  
Zhang Qian was well known in Chinese history as a pioneer and explorer in 
establishing official diplomatic relationship between the Han empire and various Inner 
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Asian states. His saga of exploration was set against the backdrop of the Han-Xiongnu 
confrontation.1 When Emperor Wu 武 (r. 140-87BCE) of the Former Han learned that 
the Yuezhi 月氏2 people were defeated and expelled by the Xiongnu from the Hexi 
Corridor, he called for volunteers to take up a mission to the Yuezhi, in the hopes of 
forming an alliance with them and launching joint attack on the Xiongnu. Zhang, an 
attendant of the imperial court, responded to the emperor’s call with others. By recruiting 
volunteers instead of appointing officials to lead a formal emissary, it reveals that the 
mission was a secret diplomacy in its nature. Crossing boundaries to conduct a diplomatic 
mission without Xiongnu authorization was obviously an act violated contemporary 
“international” norms, as the Xiongnu Chanyu 單于3 questioned Zhang Qian when the 
latter was under custody, “The Yuezhi is to our north, how could the Han send mission to 
there? If I want to send mission to the Yue [the southern neighbor of the Han], would the 
 
1 For the war and peace between the Han and Xiongnu, see Di Cosmo, Ancient China and Its Enemies, 
206-252; Chang, The Rise of the Chinese Empire, vol. 1, 161-184; Sophia-Karin Psarras, “Han and 
Xiongnu: A Reexamination of Cultural and Political Relations (I),” Monumenta Serica 51 (2003): 55-236. 
2 As Sophia-Karin Psarras points out in her article that “Yuezhi” is the uniform Western pronunciation, 
given in Chinese as “Rouzhi” or “Ruzhi,” reading 月 (Yue) as 肉 (Rou). I follow her practice and adopt 
Western convention in this work. See Sophia-Karin Psarras, “Han and Xiongnu: A Reexamination of 
Cultural and Political Relations (I),” 74. Also, for the origins and history of the Yuezhi, see Craig Benjamin, 
“The Origin of the Yuezhi,” in Craig Benjamin and Samuel N. C. Lieu eds., Walls and Frontiers in Inner 
Asian History (Sydney: Ancient History Documentary Research Centre, Macquarie University, 2002), 
101-130. 
3 “Chanyu” is the transcription for the title of the supreme leader of the Xiongnu confederacy. Most 
English-language literature adopt the term “Shanyu.” In fact, according to the ancient Chinese lexicon 
Guangyu 廣韻, Chanyu is preferable to Shanyu. For the explanation of this title, see E. G. Pulleyblank, 
“The Hsiung-nu Language,” Asia Major (New Series) IX.2 (1963): 256; Psarras, “Han and Xiongnu: A 
Reexamination of Cultural and Political Relations (I),” 127-128. 
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Han let me to do so?”4 月氏在吾北，漢何以得往使？吾欲使越，漢肯聽我乎？ Also, 
such a stealth mission only played an auxiliary role in the Han’s grand strategy against 
the Xiongnu (as Zhang’s long-term detention in the Xiongnu and then his failure of 
reaching agreement with the Yuezhi did not hinder the Han military campaigns against 
the Xiongnu); the main thrust that the Han relied on was military forces. Although Zhang 
Qian failed his mission, the knowledge about Inner Asia that he acquired during the 
journey contributed valuable information to the Han westward expansionist policy. 
Not long afterwards did the situation change. Within two decades after the Chanyu 
questioned Zhang Qian, the Former Han conquered the Hexi Corridor and the Xiongnu 
was forced to retreat from the region. When Zhang proceeded to Inner Asia for his second 
mission in 119BCE, he was safe from the Xiongnu to travel through the Hexi Corridor. 
The Former Han gradually set up garrisons and administrative units in the Hexi Corridor.    
The northwestern region, which included the newly conquered Hexi region and the 
neighboring commanderies, formed a unit called Liang province (Liangzhou涼州) in the 
late years of Emperor Wu when the whole empire was divided into thirteen inspectoral 
jurisdictions called province (zhou 州; each includes several commanderies), which 
 
4 Sima Qian 司馬遷, comp., Shiji 史記 (hereafter SJ), (Beijing: Zhonghua shuju, 2002), 123:3157. 
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gradually transformed into full-fledged administrative region equipped with its own 
military forces in the Later Han times.5 The word Liang literally means “cool” or “chilly” 
and the province was designated as “Liang” because “it is located in the west and [its 
weather] is always severely chilly.”6 地處西方，常寒涼也. Such a description sheds 
light on the Han people’s perception of Liang province in terms of its natural 
geographical characteristics. 
Climatic and topographical features provide us a geographical setting for 
understanding the character and development of this northwestern borderland. Beside the 
physical landscape, the political landscape of Liang province also constitutes an integral 
part of our studying of this frontier society. As most geographers and geographical 
historians would agree, “Administrative geography─the way a state divides space─can 
also tell us much about conceptions of political community and its modes of inclusion 
and exclusion.”7 Such is the case of Liang province. The establishment and evolution of 
 
5 For recently published comprehensive studies on the evolution of the function of province in the Han 
dynasties, see Kojima, Kandai kokka tōchi no kōzō to tenkai, 167-243; Zhou Changshan 周長山, Handai 
difang zhengzhishi lun: dui junxian zhidu ruogan wenti de kaocha 漢代地方政治史論 : 對郡縣制度若干
問題的考察 (Beijing: Zhongguo shehui kexue chubanshe, 2006), 76-93; Xin Deyong 辛德勇, “Liang Han 
zhouzhi xinkao” 兩漢州制新考, in idem, Qin Han zhengqu yu bianjie dili yanjiu 秦漢政區與邊界地理
研究 (Beijing: Zhonghua shuju, 2009), 93-177. Xin has proposed a new theory that the province system 
and the inspectoral jurisdictions were two separate institutions and not until the last decades of the Former 
Han did the two systems merge.   
6 Fang Xuanling 房玄齡, et al., comp., Jinshu 晉書 (hereafter JS), (Beijing: Zhonghua shuju, 1974), 
14:432. 
7 Justin Tighe, Constructing Suiyuan: The Politics of Northern Territory and Development in Early 
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administrative jurisdictions in the Qin-Han northwest tell us not only the increased 
penetration or retrenchment of the imperial state in the region but also the imperial 
conceptions of territory and political community over the region. On the other hand, the 
creation of administrative space also influenced the identity of the members of local 
society and their attitudes toward the imperial center. After introducing the natural 
geography, the remainder of this chapter will provide a chronological account of the 
formation of political landscape of the northwestern borderlands in a longue durée 
perspective from the pre-Han period to the Later Han times.  
 
Physical Landscape 
In terms of both natural environment and culture, the northwestern borderland is a 
transitional or intermediate zone linking up China proper and Inner Asia. With such 
background, the northwestern region was never fully integrated with China proper and 
was persistently regarded by the Chinese regimes as a perilous area full of uncertainty 
and potential rivalry. Hence, the northwestern frontier zone had been a prime security 
concern of the imperial states and an important topic among statecraft writings until the 
late nineteenth century. However, as a modern Chinese historical geographer has pointed 
 
Twentieth-Century China (Leiden: Brill, 2005), 1. 
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out, there are minor differences in the definition and delimitation of the northwest in 
different historical periods, and it is important to study the northwestern region in a 
contemporary context. 8  This study focuses on Liang province, which was the 
northwestern region of the Han dynasties, for which the geographical area is not exactly 
the same as what is called northwestern provinces in China today.9 The territories of 
Liang province largely correspond to present-day provinces of Gansu and Ningxia, with 
the addition of small portions of northeastern Qinghai province and western and southern 
Inner Mongolia. Although it is somewhat anachronistic to call the territories “Liang 
province” before its formal establishment during the reign of Emperor Wu, this chapter 
will sometimes employ the term to roughly refer to the whole area for convenient 
description. Considering the ecology and environment of the region have been changing 
since antiquity under the influence of natural and human-induced changes, such as 
desertification and deforestation, the following descriptions can only be in general terms 
and aim to portray some salient geographical features of the region. 
Chinese geographers have generalized four salient features of the natural environment 
 
8 Li Xiaocong 李孝聰, Zhongguo quyu lishi dili 中國區域歷史地理 (Beijing: Beijing daxue chubanshe, 
2004), 10. Tighe has also pointed out that “Exactly what the term Northwest included was imperative. 
Different writers and users of the term intended different spatial meanings.” See idem, Constructing 
Suiyuan, 92. 
9 They include Shaanxi, Gansu, Ningxia, Qinghai, and Xingjiang. See Li, Zhongguo quyu lishi dili, 10. 
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in the northwestern region. First, it is an arid area with an average annual precipitation of 
less than 200 millimeters per year. There are micro-regional variations with the amount of 
rainfall diminishes from east to west. Second, the terrain is generally flat as most parts of 
the region are constituted by semi-desert, sand desert, stony desert (specifically referring 
to the Gobi Desert), mountain desert, and terrene flatland. These areas have been 
subjected to long term erosions under the arid climate, which in turn contributes to the 
coarse soil texture of the region. Third, this region has long been suffering from the 
problem of scarce water resources. Except for the drainage areas of the Yellow River, 
most areas only have in-ward flowing rivers which lack permanent flow. Streams source 
from the glacier on the surrounding mountains are quickly absorbed by the arid soil once 
they reach the flatland below the mountains. Fourth, layers of vegetation in this region 
are thin and scattered. Except for certain areas of pasture and forest, most areas are 
covered by desert shrubs.10    
The natural landscape of Liang province can be divided into four sectors, namely 
southeast, northwest, northeast, and southwest.  
1. The southeast sector is roughly equivalent to the southeastern part of present-day 
 
10 Li, Zhongguo quyu lishi dili, 11. 
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Gansu province. It is on the eastern bank of the Yellow River and is part of the loess 
plateau of North China. The deepest layer of the loess reaches 400 meters, which is 
also the thickest in the world. Compared with other sectors, this one enjoys a lower 
altitude (800-2200 meters in elevation), warmer weather, and larger amount of 
rainfall.11 According to the archaeological and phytogeographic studies, the loess 
plateau was more humid and more fertile in ancient times than it is today. During the 
Qin-Han period, lush forests existed over large areas in this sector. Although the 
whole sector gradually underwent a process of deforestation from the pre-Qin period 
onwards, dense forests could still be found in some areas no later than the 
mid-eleventh century CE.12 This sector was suitable for both agricultural and pastoral 
activities. Therefore, conflicts between farmers and pastoralists over land resources in 
this sector persistently happened in Chinese history.13 During the Qin-Han period, 
 
11 Ibid, 13-15. 
12 Shi Nianhai 史念海, “Huangtu gaoyuan jiqi nonglinmu fenbu diqu de bianqian” 黄土高原及其農林牧
分佈地區的變遷, in idem, Huangtu gaoyuan lishi dili yanjiu 黄土高原歷史地理硏究 (Zhengzhou: 
Huanghe shuili chubanshe, 2001), 386-391. 
13 The contenders of conflicts over land resources in this sector cannot be easily placed in the conventional 
and yet questionable dichotomy between Inner Asian pastoral nomads from the steppes and sedentary 
Chinese farmers. As those pastoralists were not necessarily nomads, nor did they all come from the Inner 
Asian steppes. In fact, in order to adapt to the natural conditions, most people of this sector practiced mixed 
economy with various degree of reliance on agriculture and animal breeding. For the pastoralists, 
pastoralism was the predominant economic activity, but agriculture was still in a secondary and 
supplementary capacity. On the other hand, farmers also practiced animal husbandry to a certain extent. 
Conflicts between the two groups were mainly caused by farmers’ encroachment, usually under state 
sponsorship, on the grazing lands and attempted to turn them into arable lands.  
For the definitions and classifications of nomadism and pastoralism, see Anatoly M. Khazanov, Nomads 
and the Outside World. Julia Crookenden trans. (Madison: The University of Wisconsin Press, 1994), 
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with the help of irrigation works under state sponsorship, this sector was capable of 
producing a considerable amount of agricultural products. On the other hand, the 
pastures provided an excellent environment for horse breeding. The Former Han state 
therefore set up a certain number of horse ranches as a major source of supplying war 
horses. Needless to say, this sector was an important base of supporting military 
logistics for Liang province.  
2. The northwest sector is the famous Hexi Corridor. As mentioned in Chapter One, it is 
on the western bank of the Yellow River and therefore corresponds to the western part 
of present-day Gansu province. Being confined by the mountain ranges on its north 
and south, Hexi Corridor is a long and narrow stretch of land with east-west distance 
of around 1000 kilometers and south-north distance varies from several kilometers to 
a hundred strong kilometers. The average altitude of this sector varying from 1000 to 
1500 meters and the altitude increases from south to north and east to west. This 
sector forms a flat passageway between mountain ranges. Within this passageway, 
desert and semi-desert areas are studded with oases.14 Although precipitation rate of 
this area is low, some rivers flowing down from the mountains sustain the oases, 
 
15-25. 
14 On the natural landscape of this area, see Lattimore, Inner Asian Frontiers of China, 163-168. 
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which provide good havens for both human and animals.15 According to the Hanshu, 
during the Former Han dynasty, the good pastureland there provided the most 
abundant sources of cattle, sheep, and horses in the empire.16 This sector was an 
important land of strategic sources for the Xiongnu and became their great loss when 
it was captured by the Former Han. 
3. The northeast sector corresponds to present-day Ningxia province. This sector is 
located between desert and loess plateau and its climate is under the joint influence of 
the monsoon zone to its east and the arid zone to its northwest. The mountainous 
terrain and the widely scattered basins make the area looks like a checkerboard. It is 
an area of dry weather, little rainfall, high evaporation, and strong sandy wind, with 
an annual average temperature of 5-9 degrees centigrade. Generally speaking, it is a 
semi-desert area and not suitable for agricultural activities. 17  However, after 
conquering this area, the Former Han put great efforts to send labor forces in, digging 
ditches at certain locations for irrigation and setting up military and farming 
settlement points; certain parts of this area were therefore capable of providing a 
 
15 Li, Zhongguo quyu lishi dili, 13-15. 
16 Ban Gu 班固, comp. Hanshu 漢書 (hereafter HS), (Beijing: Zhonghua shuju, 1996), 28B:1645. 
17 Lattimore, Inner Asian Frontiers of China, 163-168. 
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considerable amount of farm produce.18  
4. The southwest sector occupies the northeastern portion of present-day Qinghai 
province, where is also the northeastern tip of the Qinghai-Tibetan Plateau. The 
average annual temperature of this area is between 3-9 degrees centigrade. Under the 
influence of the easterly monsoon, this area enjoys a relatively warmer temperature 
and higher amount of rainfall than its environs. As the Yellow River and its tributary 
Huang River (Huangshui 湟水) pass through this area, the river valleys also provide 
ideal places for both agricultural and pastoral activities.19 Therefore, the He-Huang 
河湟 (Yellow River and Huang River) region had long been a focal point for 
resource struggles in Chinese history between autochthonous peoples and Han settlers. 
In the Han times, as will be shown in Chapter Four, it was the area where military 
conflicts between the Qiang people and the Han settlers usually broke out.         
As we now have a general picture of the natural landscape of the northwestern region, 
we can turn to the political landscape in the following sections. I will first give a general 
description of the human geography in the northwest in prehistoric era. Then, it will be 
followed by a chronological account of the processes of expansion in the northwestern 
 
18 Li, Zhongguo quyu lishi dili, 18-21. 
19 Ibid, 26-28. 
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frontier during the Qin-Han period. Based on the division of the four sectors mentioned 
above, we will start from the southeast sector, which was close to the Jing 涇 River and 
Wei River valleys where the political centers of the Western Zhou (ca. 1045-771BCE), 
Qin and Former Han located and was therefore the first northwestern frontier zone during 
those periods. Then, we will follow the footprints of the Han armies and advance 
northwestward to the Hexi Corridor. Since the following sections focus mainly on the 
political landscape of the northwestern borderlands, the cultural and ethnic characteristics 
will only be briefly mentioned if necessary and we will return to these features in the 
succeeding chapters. 
 
Political Landscape before the Former Han 
Archaeologists have generally accepted that, from the Bronze Age onward, a broad 
cultural belt in which lifestyle, economic activities, social customs, religious beliefs, and 
style of bronze tools all distant from the civilization of China proper gradually formed 
along the northern frontier of China. This distinct cultural region is called the “Northern 
Zone,” or “Northern Bronzes Complex” of China. 20  Geographically speaking, this 
 
20 For general survey of the Northern Zone from the remotest antiquity to the Warring States period, see 
Nicola Di Cosmo, “The Northern Frontier in Pre-imperial China,” in Michael Loewe and Edward L. 
Shaughnessy eds., The Cambridge History of Ancient China: From the Origins of Civilization to 221 B.C. 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), 885-966; idem, Ancient China and Its Enemies, 44-90. 
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cultural belt extends from the present-day provinces of Heilongjiang 黑龍江, Jilin 吉林, 
and Liaoning 遼寧 in the east, through Inner Mongolia, Hebei 河北, northern Henan 
河南, Shanxi 山西, Shannxi 陝西, Gansu, Ningxia, and parts of Qinghai, to Xinjiang in 
the west, comprising various natural landscapes such as forest, steppe, and desert.21 
Scholars have pointed out that the Northern Zone is a cultural complex in which 
“different communities shared a similar inventory of bronze objects across a wide area” 
and “cannot be regarded as a single culture.”22 In fact, it served as a cultural transition 
zone between the civilization of China proper and bronze cultures of Inner Asia and 
South Siberia. The socioeconomic systems of this broad cultural belt were mixed in 
nature and varied from pastoralism and agriculture in different degrees.23 Liang province 
was on the Northern Zone and under the influence of the northern cultural complex.24  
Archaeological research has clearly demonstrated that traces of human activities and 
 
The most recent and comprehensive English-language archaeological research on the Northern Zone in 
prehistoric times is Gideon Shelach, Prehistoric Societies on the Northern Frontiers of China: 
Archaeological Perspectives on Identity Formation and Economic Change during the First Millennium 
BCE (London: Equinox Publishing Ltd, 2009). A recent Chinese work on this topic is Yang Jianhua 楊建
華, Chunqiu Zhanguo shiqi Zhongguo beifang wenhuadai de xingcheng 春秋戰國時期中國北方文化帶的
形成 (Beijing: Wenwu chubanshe, 2004).  
21 Di Cosmo, “The Northern Frontier in Pre-imperial China,” 885-888. For detailed analysis of the 
territorial extent of the Northern Zone, see Yang, Chunqiu Zhanguo shiqi Zhongguo beifang wenhuadai de 
xingcheng, 8-95.    
22 Di Cosmo, “The Northern Frontier in Pre-imperial China,” 886. 
23 On the different forms of pastoralism, see Khazanov, Nomads and the Outside World, 17-25. 
24 The artifacts excavated in Northwest China such as Ningxia and Gansu display the influence from Inner 
Eurasian steppes, for details, see Emma C. Bunker, Nomadic Art of the Eastern Eurasian Steppes: The 
Eugene V. Thaw and Other New York Collections (New York: The Metropolitan Museum of Art, 2002), 
24-29 and passim; Yang, Chunqiu Zhanguo shiqi Zhongguo beifang wenhuadai de xingcheng, passim.. 
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evidence of agriculture had already existed in the northwestern region as early as around 
6000BCE. Various sites of two Neolithic cultures, namely the Majiayao 馬家窰 culture 
(ca. 5800-4000BCE) and the Qijia 齊家 culture (ca. 2100-1800BCE),25 were found 
broadly scattered over the He-Huang valley, Hexi Corridor, and their environs. They were 
settled and agrarian-based cultures, with pig raising seems to have played an important 
role to the Qijia culture.26 Another important feature of the Qijia culture is the presence 
of domesticated horses.27 Some archaeologists proposed that, based on the metal artifacts 
discovered, the Qijia culture might have connection with Siberian and Inner Asian 
cultures.28 The proportion of agriculture found in Qijia sites is lower than that in 
Majiayao sites; on the other hand, the proportion of pastoral activities in Qijia sites is 
higher than that in Majiayao’s. It shows that the importance of pastoral activities in the 
region was increasing during the Neolithic Age.29 
There are four archaeological cultures found in the northwestern region which dated 
later than the Qijia culture and roughly corresponds to the period of Shang (ca. 
 
25 For the dates and locations of the archaeological cultures mentioned in this section, see Shelach, 
Prehistoric Societies on the Northern Frontiers of China, 19. 
26 Li, Zhongguo quyu lishi dili, 59. 
27 Di Cosmo, “The Northern Frontier in Pre-imperial China,” 901. 
28 Di Cosmo, “The Northern Frontier in Pre-imperial China,” 901; Yong Jichun 雍際春, Longyou lishi 
wenhua yu dili yanjiu 隴右歷史文化與地理研究 (Beijing: Zhongguo shehui kexue chubanshe, 2009), 97. 
29 Li, Zhongguo quyu lishi dili, 59. 
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1570-1045BCE) and Western Zhou. They are known as Siba 四垻 (ca. 1900-1500BCE) 
in the western Hexi Corridor; Xindian 辛店 (ca. 1600-600BCE), which spread along the 
Tao 洮 River, the Huang River, and the upper course of the Yellow River; Siwa 寺窪 
(ca. 1300-600BCE), mainly in present-day eastern Gansu province; Kayue 卡約 (ca. 
1600-600BCE) in the He-Huang valley. The territorial distribution of these cultural sites 
is limited when compared with those of the Qijia culture.30 However, the large amount of 
animal remains, such as dogs, pigs, horses, sheep, and cattle, excavated from human 
graves reveals the importance of animal husbandry among these cultures. According to 
archaeological research, for example, the Kayue culture, which lasted from the Shang to 
Han period, “shows a gradual evolution from a mixed farming and pastoral culture with 
settled life to a predominantly nomadic economy. This transition is reflected not only in 
an increased number of animal bones and sacrifices, but also in the composition of the 
animal stock.”31 Scholars proposed that it is probably the climatic change that contributed 
to the demise of the agrarian-based Qijia culture and the rise of these four pastoral-based 
cultures, which practiced migration to certain extent and had crop farming played an 
ancillary role.32 In other words, as the climate turned cold in the late second millennium 
 
30 Li, Zhongguo quyu lishi dili, 59. 
31 Di Cosmo, “The Northern Frontier in Pre-imperial China,” 918. 
32 Yong, Longyou lishi wenhua yu dili yanjiu, 97. However, Shelach suggests that climate change as a 
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BCE, a gradual transition from agrarian-based to pastoral-based economy took place in 
the region.33 Through comparisons, some Chinese archaeologists even suggest that the 
Majiayao and Qijia cultures probably were culturally related to the ethnic Han Chinese 
while the other four cultures had a very close relationship with the Qiang and other 
non-Han peoples,34 although further evidence will be needed to prove these hypotheses. 
In the Sh
 and Tufang 土方35 probably located to the north and northwest of the Shang in the 
area corresponds to present-day northern Shaanxi and Shanxi, and even extends to the 
western fringe of Gansu and Ningxia. Qiangfang 羌方 , or simply Qiang, on the 
northwest also consistently posed threat to the Shang The wars between these peoples 
and the Shang clearly demonstrate that the Shang was facing a rival northern frontier.  
 
factor contributing to the socio-economic change in the Northern Zone is not as important as past 
scholarship have led us to believe. See Shelach, Prehistoric Societies on the Northern Frontiers of China, 
62-68. 
33 Li, Zhongguo quyu lishi dili, 60. On the relationship between climate change and the development of 
pastoralism in ancient North China, see Han Maoli 韓茂莉, “Lun Zhongguo beifang xumuye chansheng yu 
huanjing de hudong guanxi” 論中國北方畜牧業產生與環境的互動關係, in Hou Renzhi 侯仁之 and 
Deng hui 鄧輝 eds., Zhongguo beifang ganhan banganhan diqu lishi shiqi huanjing bianqian yanjiu wenji 
中國北方乾旱半乾旱地區歷史時期環境變遷研究文集 (Beijing: Shangwu yinshuguan, 2006), 294-303. 
34 Yong, Longyou lishi wenhua yu dili yanjiu, 97. 
35 In the Shang oracle bones, rival peoples against the Shang are usually referred to as fang 方, which 
means country or tribe, preceded by a character probably indicating their ethnic name. See Di Cosmo, “The 
Northern Frontier in Pre-imperial China,” 907-908. These groups of peoples were probably not pastoral 
nomads but pastorals practiced farming. For a specific study of the mixed economy of the Guifang, see 
Tang Xiaofeng 唐曉峰, “Guifang: Yin Zhou shidai beifang de nongmu hunhe zuqun” 鬼方：殷周時代北
方的農牧混合族群, in Zhongguo beifang ganhan banganhan diqu lishi shiqi huanjing bianqian yanjiu 
wenji, 263-270. 
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According to the traditional account, it was the Zhou who overthrew the Shang in t
enth century BCE. As its political center was located in the Wei River valley, which 
near its western border, the Western Zhou state faced potential threats from its western 
neighbors such as the Xianyun 玁狁 and/or the Quan Rong 犬戎.36 In the last decades 
of the Western Zhou, when relations with the Rong quickly deteriorated, military 
confrontations broke out in the area between the lower reaches of the Jing and Luo 洛 
Rivers and the Wei River valley, which was very close to the Zhou capital. The 
relationship between the two sides was complicated since the Zhou was not always a 
victim of “barbarian” invasions as later Chinese people believed. In fact, on one hand, the 
Rong repeatedly launched deep incursions into Zhou territory and it was the Quan Rong, 
located north of the Wei River valley, who finally toppled the Western Zhou state; on the 
other hand, the Zhou not only incorporated the Rong within its domain but also expanded 
northwestward to conquer the Rong and their lands outside the Zhou realm.37 
In the process of northwestward expansion, the northwestern frontier of
 
36 The relationship between the Xianyun and Quan Rong has long been a debatable topic among scholars. 
 in war and peace, see Li, Landscape and Power in Early China, especially 
In a recent research, Li Feng suggested that the name Quan Rong was a term used in the later texts to refer 
to the same people who were called Xianyun in the Western Zhou sources. In short, Quanrong and Xianyun 
were the same group of people, and they were also called the Western Rong as they were located to the 
northwest of the Zhou. The term “Rong” had a much broader meaning as it covered many hostile groups 
beyond the frontiers of the Western Zhou state. See Li Feng, Landscape and Power in Early China: The 
Crisis and Fall of the Western Zhou, 1045-771 BC (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006), 
142-145 and 343-346. 
37 On the Zhou-Rong relations
Chapter 3. 
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ally carved out of the territory of the Siwa culture, which was developed in the upper 
Wei River and Tao River valleys in eastern Gansu. Archaeologists have pointed out that 
the Zhou and Siwa cultures “overlapped each other both temporally and spatially as their 
sites were often located side by side, together forming an important aspect of the 
landscape in these regions.”38 Also, “although the Zhou culture was predominant during 
the early Western Zhou as a result of territorial expansion, the Siwa culture constituted 
another important cultural layer that coexisted with the Zhou culture throughout the entire 
Western Zhou period. Some non-Zhou elements in the bronze culture of the upper Jing 
River valley were clearly associated with the northern steppe region. By the late Western 
Zhou, even tombs with overwhelming northern features began to appear in the region.”39 
Although there is no strong link between the Siwa culture and the historical Xianyun, 
both written sources about the Xianyun and archaeological findings of the Siwa culture 
clearly depicted a crescent-shaped alien cultural sphere along the northwestern frontier of 
the Western Zhou.40 The war between the Western Zhou and the Xianyun not only 
showed the conflicting nature of the northwestern frontier but also presaged the 
 
d Power in Early China, 176. 
bs, a tomb form differed from that of the Zhou, are commonly seen in the Neolithic and 
38 Li, Landscape an
39 Ibid., 187.  
40 Catacomb tom
Bronze Age cultures of areas to the west of central Shaanxi such as Gansu, Ningxia, and Qinghai. See von 
Falkenhausen, Chinese Society in the Age of Confucius (1000-250 BC), 207. These tombs yield the 
evidence of the existence of alien cultures to the Zhou along its northwestern frontier. 
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l court retreated from the Wei River basin, the Qin gradually 
developed into a strong state and assumed a leading position in the region. The new 
consistent conflicts between the expanding Chinese state and the autochthonous peoples.  
In 771BCE, the Quan Rong sacked the Western Zhou capital and killed the Zhou 
g, a new Zhou King moved to Luoyang and left the former royal domain to 
competition between the Rong and Qin, the westernmost regional polity in the Zhou 
fengjian hierarchy. In fact, the Qin had a long history of dealing with the western 
“barbarians.”41 According to the Shiji, the Qin leader had marriage relationship with the 
Western Rong since the mid-Western Zhou period. Later, King Xuan 宣  (r. 
827/25-782BCE) of the Western Zhou appointed a Qin leader named Qinzhong 秦仲 as 
military commander to attack the Western Rong. However, Qinzhong was killed. With 
military aid from King Xuan, Qingzhong’s five sons avenged their father and defeated the 
Western Rong.42 Thereafter, military confrontation between the Qin and the Western 
Rong never ceased.43  
With the Zhou roya
                                                 
41 The ethnic origins and identity of the Qin people have long been a controversial topic among scholars of 
early Chinese studies. Some scholars traced the origin of Qin to the Western Rong, while others argued that 
the Qin people were originally from eastern China. For recent studies on the topic, see Li, Landscape and 
Power in Early China, 262-278; von Falkenhausen, Chinese Society in the Age of Confucius (1000-250 BC), 
213-243; Kern, The Stele Inscriptions of Ch’in Shih-Huang, 59-105; Gideon and Pines, “Secondary State 
Formation and the Development of Local Identity,” 202-230; Teng Mingyu 滕銘予, Qin wenhua: cong 
fengguo dao diguo de kaoguxue guancha 秦文化 : 從封國到帝國的考古學觀察 (Beijing: Xueyuan 
chubanshe, 2002).      
42 SJ, 5:177-178. 
43 For details, see SJ, 5:173-221. 
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ation intensified conflicts between the Qin and Rong. On one hand, the collapse of the 
Western Zhou state stirred up a large-scale migration of the Rong into the erstwhile royal 
domain and now Qin territory; on the other hand, the Qin launched military campaigns to 
the north and northwest against the various groups of Rong and annexed their lands, for 
which the Qin was called as “the hegemon of the Western barbarians.” Both ways 
resulted in large presence of non-Zhou people in the region. That might have been one of 
the crucial reasons why the Qin was denigrated as savage “barbarians” by the 
contemporary politicians in the east. 
Over the long course from the eighth century BCE onward, the Qin penetrated into 
the northwestern area and later cons
thwestern areas which extended west into Gansu and Ningxia.44 With the completion 
of long walls along the northern and northwestern borders, the Qin possessed “huge areas 
that had never before been part of the Zhou culture sphere, but had for centuries been 
 
44 According to some archaeologists, people of the Xindian culture were forced to retreat to the Huang 
River valley, where was the sphere of the Kayue culture, when facing the pressure of the aggressive Qin. 
The consequences were the coalescence of the Xindian and Kayue cultures and intensification of cultural 
confrontation between the Qin and the Qiang or proto-Qiang people. Archaeologists also suggested that the 
Qin influence had reached the eastern Hexi Corridor as they have found Zhou-Qin style pottery at the sites 
of the non-Qin Shajing 沙井 culture, whose chronology is probably later than the Xindian and partly 
overlapping with the Kayue culture. See Li Shuicheng 李水城, “Huaxia bianyuan yu wenhua hudong: yi 
changcheng yanxian xiduan de taoge weili” 華夏邊緣與文化互動：以長城沿綫西段的陶鬲為例, in idem 
Dongfeng xijian: Zhongguo xibei shiqian wenhua zhi jincheng 東風西漸 : 中國西北史前文化之進程 
(Beijing: Wenwu chubanshe, 2009), 176-199. 
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inhabited by nomadic or semisedentary livestock-raising populations. The original 
inhabitants were presumably either pushed out or forced under the repressive, 
revenue-producing agricultural regime of Qin.”45  
In order to exercise effective administration, the Qin establish counties (xian 縣) in 
the new lands. Commanderies were established late
counties and to assume the military, mainly defensive, duty. 46  Many counties 
established by the Qin had close relationships with the Rong and other non-Qin people, 
which marked the achievements of the westward conquest. 
 
45 von Falkenhausen, Chinese Society in the Age of Confucius (1000-250 BC), 409. 
46 The Commandery-County system was a product of long-term evolution between the eighth and third 
century BCE and was practiced by most, if not all, regional states in the Warring States period. When the 
Qin established the centralized empire in 221BCE, the system was employed to structure the whole empire. 
The system was inherited by the Han dynasties with minor adjustments and thereafter became the core 
format of regional and local government units in imperial China. Xian 縣 (county) as a level of local 
district still exist in present-day China.  
  Numerous Chinese and Japanese works are on the origins and development of the Commandery and 
County system from the pre-imperial period to the Qin-Han times, to name only a few will be suffice. The 
most classic and comprehensive study is still Yan Gengwang 嚴耕望, Zhongguo difang xingzheng zhidu 
shi: Qin Han difang xingzheng zhidu 中國地方行政制度史──秦漢地方行政制度 (Taipei: Zhongyang 
yanjiuyuan lishi yuyan yanjiusuo, 1961). A detailed study in Japanese is Kimura Masao 木村正雄, 
Chūgoku kodai teikoku no keisei: Toku ni sono seiritsu no kiso jō ken 中囯古代帝国の形成：特にその成
立の基礎条件  (Tōkyō: Hikaku Bunka Kenkyūjo, 2003), pages 221-244 are especially for the 
commanderies of Liang province. Both Yan and Kimura based mainly on received texts in their research. 
For recent studies which take account of new archaeological findings, see Fujita Katsuhiso 藤田勝久, 
Chūgoku kodai kokka to gunken shakai 中国古代国家と郡県社会 (Tōkyō: Kyūko Shoin, 2005), which 
includes many recently released wooden and bamboo slips, and Shimoda Makoto 下田誠, Chūgoku kodai 
kokka no keisei to seidō heiki 中国古代国家の形成と青銅兵器 (Tōkyō: Kyūko Shoin, 2008), which 
uses bronze weapons as historical evidence to examine the development of commanderies in some Warring 
States regimes. There is only a handful of English-language studies on this topic, for a general study, see 
Hans Bielenstein, The Bureaucracy of Han Times (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1980), Chapter 
3.  
   For the most recent examinations on the Qin commanderies and counties, see Hou Xiaorong 后曉榮, 
Qindai zhengqu dili 秦代政區地理 (Beijing: Shehui kexue wenxian chubanshe, 2009); Xin Deyong, “Qin 
Shihuang sanshiliu jun xinkao” 秦始皇三十六郡新考, in Qin Han zhengqu yu bianjie dili yanjiu, 3-92. 
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In 688BCE, according to the Shiji, Duke Wu 武 (r. 697-678BCE) of the Qin 
conquered the Gui 邽 Rong and the Ji 冀 Rong and estab
nties in Qin history over the two places.47 During the reign of Duke Mu 穆 (r. 
659-621BCE), the Qin reached its first peak of westward expansion by launching 
large-scale expeditions against the Rong and annexing a vast size of new territory.48 The 
reign of King Zhaoxiang 昭襄 (r. 306-251BCE) marked another tide of Qin’s westward 
expansion. In 271BCE, the Qin conquered the territory of Yiqu 義渠, a strong power 
among the Rong. The newly acquired land was so vast that the Qin divided it into the 
three commanderies of Beidi 北地, Longxi, and Shang 上.49  
The historical records leave some traces of the fact that many Qin counties were 
established at the expense of the “barbarians.” In Neishi 內史
ering the Qin capital and its vicinity,50 there were counties set up on the former Rong 
domain. For example, Linjin 臨晉 county was captured from the Dali 大荔 Rong and 
Liyi 驪邑 from the Li 驪 Rong.51 Although there is no clear evidence to show that 
those former Rong places still included Rong inhabitants (they probably did), it is beyond 
 
47 SJ, 5:182. 
48 SJ, 5:185-195. 
5. 
ment and functions of Neishi, see Kudō, Suikochi Shinkan yorimita Shindai no kokka to 
49 SJ, 110:288
50 On the establish
shakai, 21-56. 
51 For detailed examination of the history of the two counties, see Hou, Qindai zhengqu dili, 133-134 and 
137-138. 
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doubt that the jurisdiction of Didao 翟道 had a dominant “barbarian” population since 
dao 道 was a county-level special district, which was probably invented by the Qin and 
inherited by the Han, for administrating “barbarians.”52 In addition, the character di 翟 
is probably a variant form of the character di 狄, a gross term referred to the northern 
“barbarians.” In Beidi commandery, there was Yiqu county that was named after the Yiqu 
Rong and also Wuzhi 烏支 county named after the Wuzhi Rong. In Longxi commandery, 
besides counties named after the Rong such as Shanggui 上邽, Ji, and Mianzhu 綿諸, 
there were many dao: Didao 狄道, Didao 邸道, Gudao 故道, Yuandao 獂道, Biandao 
辨道, Rongdao 戎道, Wududao 武都道, Yudao 予道, and Bodao 薄道.53 Some of their 
characters such as Di, Yuan, and Rong obviously carry “barbarian” connotations. 
As the westernmost commandery, Longxi marked the furthest extent of the westward 
territorial expansion of the Qin. Long walls were constructed in the commandery duri
reign of King Zhaoxiang to delineate the western boundaries.54 In 220BCE, the 
following year of the establishment of Qin empire, the First Emperor (r. 246-221BCE as 
 
 
hakai, 85-118. 
uan 甘肅通史：秦漢卷 (Lanzhou: Gansu renmin chubanshe, 2009), 21-27. 
ll of 
52 HS, 7A:742. For the dao system in the Qin-Han period, see Kudō, Suikochi Shinkan yorimita Shindai no
kokka to s
53 For the history of these districts, see Hou, Qindai zhengqu dili, 149-177; Wang Shoukuan 汪受寬, 
Gansu tongshi: Qin Han j
54 For the history of building long walls in the Warring States period, see Waldron, The Great Wa
China, 13-29, Di Cosmo, Ancient China and Its Enemies, 138-158. 
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Political Landscape in the Former Han period 
In the Hanshu chapter on the Western Regions (Xiyu zhuan 西域傳), there is a neat 
account of the advance of the northwestern frontier during the Qin and Former Han 
ingled in the north 
Beidi, probably for the purposes of imperial aggrandizement and inspection of 
fortifications in the northwestern frontier. 55  Later, the First Emperor launched an 
enterprise of building long walls, pushing the northwestern walls forward to reach the 
western bank of the Yellow River,56 hence enclosing the northwestern territory of the 
empire.57 The completion of the First Emperor’s long walls signaled an end of the 
long-term tide of Qin’s westward expansion, and the Chinese empire would not cross the 
northwestern boundaries set by the Qin until the reign of Emperor Wu of the Former Han. 
 
times: 
 
Since the decline of the Zhou, the Rong and the Di had lived interm
of the Jing and Wei rivers. When the First Emperor of the Qin expelled the Rong and 
                                                 
55 After this tour, the First Emperor had a series of tours in the eastern part of the empire, which was also 
the land of the erstwhile rival states. On the First Emperor’s easterly tours, see Kern, The Stele Inscriptions 
of Ch’in Shih-Huang. For a general survey of the imperial touring in pre-Qin and Qin times, see Chang, A 
Court on Horseback, 34-46. 
56 Meanwhile, the territory of Beidi commandery also greatly extended northward as the result of expelling 
the Xiongnu from the Ordos region. 
57 For the history of the Qin walls, see Waldron, The Great Wall of China, 13-29; Di Cosmo, Ancient China 
and Its Enemies, 138-158. For archaeological examination of the Qin walls, see Xu Pingfang 徐蘋芳, 
Taotao Huang and John Moffett trans., “The Archaeology of the Great Wall of the Qin and Han Dynasties,” 
Journal of East Asian Archaeology 3:1-2 (2002): 259-281. Xin Deyong adopts a new perspective on 
locating certain points of the Qin and Han “Great Wall” in his “Yinshan Gaoque yu Yangshan Gaoque 
bianxi” 陰山高闕與陽山高闕辨析, in idem, Qin Han zhengqu yu bianjie dili yanjiu, 181-255. 
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hen the Han arose and till the time of the Filial Emperor Wu, [he] launched 
e expeditions against the barbarians in the four directions, extending his mighty 
power, and Zhang Qian began to open up the tracks of the Western Regions. Thereupon, 
 was established; later, migrants were gradually sent in to 
fill 
 
Qin-Han northwestward  
follow
As mentioned in the previous section, the Qin expanded its territory at the expense of 
the “barbarian” neighbors. Under the efforts of King Zhaoxiang and the First Emperor, 
the Qin pushed territorial boundary greatly westward and then built long walls to enclose 
the newly conquered lands.59 Both monarchs’ long walls ended at Lintao 臨洮 county in 
                                                
Di, [he] built the long walls and demarcated a boundary for the Central State, but did 
not cross Lintao to the west. 
W
punitiv
the General of Rapid Cavalry captured the territory of the Right Sector of Xiongnu, 
bringing the surrender of the Kings of Hunye and Xiuchu, and emptying [the Xiongnu] 
out of the land. The construction [of Han fortifications] thus began west from Lingju. 
At first, Jiuquan commandery
it. The land was then divided and established [the commanderies of] Wuwei, 
Zhangyi, and Dunhuang. The four commanderies were set and two passes were held.58 
自周衰，戎狄錯居涇渭之北。及秦始皇攘卻戎狄，築長城，界中國，然西不過臨
洮。 
漢興至于孝武，事征四夷，廣威德，而張騫始開西域之迹。其後驃騎將軍擊破
匈奴右地，降渾邪、休屠王，遂空其地，始築令居以西，初置酒泉郡，後稍發徙
民充實之，分置武威、張掖、敦煌，列四郡，據兩關焉。 
This quoted passage states the significant events that happened in the process of the 
 expansion and hence provides a good outline for this section to
. 
 
58 HS, 96A: 3872-3873. 
59 Xin, “Yinshan Gaoque yu Yangshan Gaoque bianxi,” 181-255; Di Cosmo, Ancient China and Its 
Enemies, 138-158.   
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Longxi commandery, which therefore marked the westernmost point of Qin’s frontier. In 
fact, not only the west but also other directions did the First Emperor expand his newly 
created empire. To the north, in 215BCE, he dispatched General Meng Tain 蒙恬 with a 
huge army to expel the Xiongnu from the Ordos region.60 The Qin army successfully 
drove out the Xiongnu and crossed the loop of the Yellow River (Hetao 河套). A good 
number of fortified counties were established and settled with soldiers and convicts. Long 
walls were also built along the new northern frontier and connected with the western ones. 
Upon the time of the completion of the First Emperor’s long walls, the territorial limit of 
the Qin empire was clearly defined.61  
Taking advantage of the turmoil between the fall of the Qin and the establishment of 
the Former Han, the once being expelled Xiongnu fought back. They re-conquered the 
lost territories in the Ordos region, pu
itical center of the Former Han dynasty, which located its capital in the same area as 
the Qin. Facing such a formidable enemy to the north, the Former Han could only adopt a 
                                
60 According to some records, the army was numbering as many as 300,000 troops, but 100,000 according 
to others. For the counting of the numbers, see Xin, “Yinshan Gaoque yu Yangshan Gaoque bianxi,” 202. 
For the strategic importance of the Ordos region, see Waldron, The Great Wall of China, 61-71.  
61 In fact, it marked not only the physical territorial demarcation of the Qin empire but also the formation 
of Chinese identity. For further analysis of this point, see Paul R. Goldin, “Steppe Nomads as a 
Philosophical Problem in Classical China,” in Paula L. W. Sabloff ed., Mapping Mongolia: Situating 
Mongolia in the World from Geologic Time to the Present (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania 
Museum of Archaeology and Anthropology, 2011), 220-246. 
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defensive posture on its northern frontier.62 Needless to say, the Former Han would have 
neither intention nor capability to follow the Qin’s path of westward expansion.     
From the sources available, it is difficult to reproduce the exact territorial boundaries 
of the northwestern commanderies in the early years of the Former Han. However, 
several features of the situations of the region and its environs can still be learned. F
Han basically retained the Qin administrative divisions of Longxi, Beidi, and Shang 
commanderies in the northwestern region. Second, after the Xiongnu re-conquest, the 
boundaries of Beidi and Shang were forced to retreat southward and the sizes of the two 
commanderies greatly shrank.63 Third, the commanderies of Longxi, Shang and Beidi 
were facing the Right/Western Sector of the Xiongnu confederacy,64  and therefore 
became a main way through which the Xiongnu made their inroads into the Han 
territories. According to the historical records, Longxi was heavily devastated by the 
 
62 For the Xiongnu invasions and the Han defensive measures in the early years of the Former Han, see Di 
oop and 
’s 
Cosmo, Ancient China and Its Enemies, 206-227; Chang, The Rise of the Chinese Empire vol. 1, 135-159; 
Jonathan Markley, “Gaozu confronts the Shanyu: The Han Dynasty’s First Clash with the Xiongnu,” in 
Craig Benjamin and Samuel N. C. Lieu eds., Walls and Frontiers in Inner Asian History, 131-140. 
63 According to the Shiji, the Xiongnu recaptured the lost territories south of the Yellow River l
pushed the boundaries back to the old boundaries/fortifications (gusai 故塞) of the Qin, see SJ, 110: 
2887-2888. Xin Deyong suggests that the old fortifications refer to the line of long walls built by King 
Zhaoxiang. He has also made a detailed examination of several strategic points along the borders between 
the Xiongnu and the Qin-Han empire, see his “Yinshan Gaoque yu Yangshan Gaoque bianxi,” 200-255.  
64 The Xiongnu divided their confederacy into three sectors: the Chanyu court (Central), the Left King
domain (East), and the Right King’s domain (West). See SJ, 110: 2891 and HS, 94A: 3751. On the Xiongnu 
political structure, see Thomas J. Barfield, The Perilous Frontier: Nomadic Empires and China, 221 BC to 
AD 1757 (Cambridge, MA. & Oxford, U.K.: Blackwell, 1996), 36-41. 
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Xiongnu.65 Some exact dates of the Xiongnu invasions were marked. For instance, the 
Right King of the Xiongnu invaded Shang commandery in 177BCE, and the most critical 
moment came in 166BCE when the Xiongnu Chanyu personally led cavalry invaded 
Beidi and killed the commandant of the commandery. The contingent of the Xiongnu 
forces burnt the Huizhong Palace 回中宮 in Beidi and the cavalry scouts even intruded 
a long way into the Ganquan Palace 甘泉宮 in the vicinity of the Han capital. To 
respond to the crisis, Emperor Wen 文 (r. 180-157BCE) appointed three officials as 
General of Shang commandery, General of Beidi, and General of Longxi to station along 
the northwestern defense line of the metropolitan area. The commanderies of Shang and 
Beidi would remain the areas subjected to the Xiongnu harrying until Emperor Wu 
launched large-scale counterattack and the ensuing northwestward expansion.  
The Qin and Former Han metropolitan area was located in and formed the core of an 
area called Guanzhong 關中 or Guannei 關內, literally “within the passes,” w
ct geographical sense refers mainly to the southern portion of modern Shannxi 
province, especially the Wei River valley, but in its greatest extent is an area largely 
corresponds to the whole Shannxi, with the addition of eastern Gansu and Ningxia, 
                                                 
65 HS, 49: 2278. 
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northern Sichuan, and the southern portion of Inner Mongolia within the Yellow River 
loop.66 The name Guanzhong tells the special position of the area as it was surrounded by 
formidable natural barriers of mountains and rivers and could only be accessed through 
several strategic passes and fords. The guan (pass/gate) in the name Guanzhong refers to 
the Hangu 函谷 Pass, literally the pass at a box-shaped gorge, and Guanzhong was the 
area west of the pass. Therefore, the area was sometimes called alternatively as Guanxi 
關西 (west of the pass). On the other hand, the area east of the pass was called 
Guandong 關東. The Guanxi area was also known as Shanxi 山西 (west of Mount Yao 
崤山; different from present-day Shanxi province), and Guandong as Shandong 山東 
(east of Mount Yao, including but not limited to modern Shandong province). The 
separation between Guanzhong/Guanxi/Shanxi and Guandong/Shandong constituted a 
very important pair of geographical concepts of the Qin-Han period.67 The relationship 
between these two halves within the empire and how they situated in the Han politics and 
society will be an important thread in the next chapter. For here, only brief mention of the 
relationship between the northwestern borderlands and Guanzhong area will suffice. 
 
66 On the geographical definition of Guanzhong area, see Xin, “Liang Han zhouzhi xinkao,” 112-119. 
67 For the geographical definition of the two areas, see Fu Lecheng 傅樂成, “Handai de Shandong yu 
Shanxi,” 漢代的山東與山西 in idem, Han Tang shilunji 漢唐史論集 (Taipei: Lianjing chuban shiye 
gongsi, 1977), 65-80; Xing Yitian 邢義田, “Shishi Handai de Guandong, Guanshi yu Shandong, Shanxi,” 
試釋漢代的關東、關西與山東、山西 in idem, Zhiguo anbang: fazhi, xing heng yu junshi 治國安邦：法
制、行政與軍事 (Beijing: Zhonghua shuju, 2011), 180-210. 
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Since the founders of both Qin and Former Han depended on Guanzhong as power 
base and then underwent a west-to-east conquest to accomplish their empires, 
asties adopted a consistent policy of promoting the prominence of Guanzhong and 
relying on it to control the whole empire. While numerous kingdoms and fiefs of marquis 
were established in Shandong to award imperial kinsmen and meritorious aristocrats 
during the Han dynasties,68 it was not the case in Guanzhong.69 The whole Guanzhong 
region, with the metropolitan area as the core, was under direct control of the Han court. 
The commanderies in Liang province, as the western flank of Guanzhong, were also 
under direct imperial control. During the reign of Emperor Wu, direct imperial control of 
the northwest was vital for commanding further northwestward expansion, coordinating 
territorial defense, and supporting the Han presence in the Western Regions.  
Thanks to the frontier nature, the northwestern commanderies of Longxi, Beidi, 
Tianshui 天水, Anding 安定,70 Shang, and Xihe 西河 all had close relation
Rong and Di. People of these six commanderies were accustomed to preparing for 
warfare and fighting against the “barbarians.” They were especially good at archery and 
 
68 For the co-existence of commandery-county system and enfeoffed kingdoms and fiefs in the Han times, 
see Yan, Zhongguo difang xingzheng zhidu shi: Qin Han difang xingzheng zhidu, 10-30 and 35-57. 
69 Goi Naohiro has made a detailed analysis of the geographical distribution of the Former Han kingdoms 
and fiefs of marquis, see his “Chūgoku kodai teikoku no ichi seikaku” 中国古代帝国の一性格, in idem, 
Kandai no gōzoku shakai to kokka, 51-70. 
70 Tianshui and Anding were established in 114BCE by extracting some lands from Longxi and Beidi. 
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hunting. During the Former Han dynasty, therefore, military talents of good family 
background from these six commanderies were recruited to form the elite corps of the 
cavalry who held the responsibility of safeguarding the emperor.71 They were called the 
Liujun liangjiazi 六郡良家子, literally “Good Sons of the Six Commanderies,” and 
usually had bright career futures. Many of the famous generals of the Former Han were 
from this group of people.72 Moreover, these areas also constituted the main source of 
cavalry of the Former Han. The details of the martial background of the six 
commanderies and the role of the LJLJZ in Han history will be given in the next chapter, 
and now we should return to the process of northwestward expansion and the ensuing 
establishment of new administrative regions. 
Until the second decade of Emperor Wu’s reign, Longxi and Beidi were the two 
westernmost commanderies of the dynasty, bu
 suddenly captured the Hexi Corridor from the Xiongnu. In fact, it was quite a 
dramatic incident in the history of Han-Xiongnu confrontation. In 133BCE, the young 
 
71 Beside martial skill, good family background without criminal record was a crucial criterion of 
recruiting elite cavalry or even ordinary cavalry in the Han times. Families of agrarian tradition and/or 
officer background were the most favorable. Physicians, merchants, and artisans were excluded from the 
list. See HS, 28B:1644. A sound financial base was also essential as the cavalry had to responsible for their 
own horses and equipment. For detailed analysis of the eligibility of the Han cavalry, see Takamura 
Takeyuki 高村武幸, Kandai no chihō kanri to chiiki shakai 漢代の地方官吏と地域社会 (Tōkyō: 
Kyūko Shoin, 2008), 57-87. 
72 HS, 28B:1644. 
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Emperor Wu determined to turn the table on the Xiongnu and thus plotted to ambush the 
Chanyu in a northern frontier town,73 but he failed as the Chanyu escaped. From 129BCE 
onward, Emperor Wu launched a series of expeditions against the Xiongnu. In 127BCE, 
General Wei Qing 衛青 (d. 106BCE) made a great achievement by driving the Xiongnu 
out of the Ordos region and re-conquering the lost lands of the Qin empire south of the 
Yellow River loop. As a result, the Former Han basically resumed the northern territories 
of the Qin dynasty. In 121BCE, Huo Qubing 霍去病 (d. 117BCE), the emperor’s most 
favored general and the General of Rapid Cavalry mentioned in the quotation at the 
beginning of this section, led a cavalry force, departed from Longxi, and marched 
northwestward to attack the Xiongnu. He achieved remarkable success. Later, General 
Huo launched another successful attack from Longxi and Beidi. While General Huo 
obtained successive victories in the western sector of the Xiongnu domain, the angered 
Chanyu summoned the King of Hunye 渾邪 and the King of Xiuchu 休屠, the two 
kings governed the region, to his court. Knowing that they would be executed by the 
Chanyu, the two kings plotted to surrender to the Han. The Han emperor then sent 
General Huo to escort the two kings to the Han territory. However, when the King of 
 
73 Hsing I-tien suggests in an article that the emperor personally participated into the operation, see his 
“Han Wudi zai Mayi zhiyi zhong de juese” 漢武帝在馬邑之役中的角色, in idem, Tianxia ijia: 
Huangdi,guanliao yu shehui, 136-159.  
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Xiuchu saw the Han forces, he changed his mind. The King of Hunye then killed his peer 
and surrendered the two tribes to the Han.74 Suddenly, the former territories of the two 
kings—the Hexi Corridor was at the Han’s disposal. In the long term, such a dramatic 
incident not only tipped the balance of power between the Han and Xiongnu but also 
profoundly changed the geographical composition of China forever. 
However, it seems that the Han court at first had no intention of imposing direct 
governance on the former territories of the two kings. More precisel
idea what to do with the surprisingly great spoils.75 Since the Xiongnu had been 
expelled from the Ordos region and the Hexi Corridor, the pressure that they could exert 
on the commanderies of Longxi, Beidi, and Xihe was greatly reduced. Therefore, the Han 
court moved the paupers from Guandong to fill in the newly restored Ordos region on the 
one hand, and reduced half of the garrison soldiers from the west of Beidi on the other.76 
Nevertheless, the Han court left the status of Hexi Corridor ambiguous. The different 
management between the two regions was probably due to their different values in the 
 
74 HS, 110:2905-2909. 
75 As Michael Loewe has pointed out that “the stages of the Han advance can hardly be explained as an 
ordered and systematic process, planned as co-ordinated measures to extend the scope of Han authority. We 
cannot expect evidence of a scheme for founding commanderies, whose centers were deliberately and 
logically placed so as to exercise the maximum degree of strategic and administrative considerations. 
Rather must the process be regarded as one of exploration and improvisation.” See Loewe, Records of Han 
Administration vol. 1, 58. 
76 SJ, 110:2909.  
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con
eyes of Han policy makers. The Ordos region was not only a strategic zone of protecting 
the metropolitan area but also a former territory of the Qin empire that the Han might feel 
obliged to restore and to strengthen control there. On the contrary, the Hexi Corridor was 
beyond the Qin boundaries and had never been part of the Chinese realm. It was a virgin 
land to the Former Han with no precedent for governing. 
Although the Han captured the Hexi Corridor in 121BCE, it was only in 112BCE that 
the Han state established formal administrative units i
quest of the Hexi Corridor, the Former Han basically left the region intact and only 
constructed fortifications along the west bank of the Yellow River. It shows that the 
sudden acquisition of a new territory did not arouse immediate interests of the Han policy 
makers and they had no further intention to the territory beyond the fortified boundaries. 
The extension of direct administration could only be justified and materialized if the new 
territory were crucial to the imperial defense strategy or other benefits to the state. During 
the interlude of nine years, the war with the Xiongnu and Zhang Qian’s second mission to 
Inner Asia were two factors that would influence the formulation of the imperial policy 
towards the Hexi region.  
The conquest of Hexi region was only one stage in the Han-Xiongnu War, and 
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fighting went on after 121B
 forced to move westward and left the Former Han time and space to consolidate its 
control over the Ordos region by constructing irrigation facilities, establishing farming 
colonies, and moving people to fill in.78 Since the center of the Xiongnu confederacy had 
moved west, the focal point for the Han-Xiongnu struggle accordingly moved, and the 
strategic importance of the Hexi region was realized by the Han policy makers. 
Meanwhile, in order to fill in the vacuum left by the Xiongnu in the Hexi region, 
Zhang Qian submitted his proposal in 119BCE and suggested inviting the Wu
ple in the Western Regions to move in to the Hexi Corridor and to form alliance with 
the Han against the Xiongnu.79 With the emperor’s permission, Zhang started his second 
mission to the Western Regions in the same year. Why did Zhang Qian have such an idea?
We learn from the Chinese records of the Han period that it was the Yuezhi who were the 
dominant inhabitants of the Hexi Corridor before the Xiongnu’s conquest. Although the 
origin and identity of the Yuezhi was a great question of ancient Inner Asian history and 
 
77 Chun-shu Chang has provided a very detailed account of Emperor Wu’s campaign against the Xiongnu 
in The Rise of the Chinese Empire vol. 1, 161-184. 
78 As the Xiongnu Chanyu moved west, the Xiongnu no longer constituted a serious menace to the Ordos 
region and the northwestern commanderies and caused an atmosphere of laxity among the local officials. 
Hence, when Emperor Wu proceeded a tour of inspection to Longxi commandery, the governor killed 
himself as he had not prepared the meal for the emperor’s entourage. Then, when the emperor proceeded 
north, he found that there was no sentry in the Ordos region. The governor of Beidi commandery and his 
subordinates were executed for their dereliction of duty. See SJ, 30:1438. 
79 SJ, 123:3168; HS, 96B:3902. 
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scholars have different theories about that,80 it is basically accepted that by the second 
century BCE, the Yuezhi people had established themselves in the Hexi Corridor. In the 
same region, there was a smaller group named Wusun. When the Yuezhi were strong, 
they killed the Wusun king and captured his land. The Wusun people then fled to the 
Xiongnu.81 Between 200s-170sBCE, the Xiongnu launched severe attacks on the Yuezhi 
and drove them from the Hexi Corridor. The majority of the Yuezhi moved further west to 
the Amu River valley, where Zhang Qian made his first mission to visit them. Some of 
the Yuezhi fled south into present-day Qinghai and others dispersed the neighboring areas. 
As Zhang Qian had failed to secure an alliance with the Yuezhi, this time he turned to the 
Wusun and tried to bring them back to the Hexi Corridor. If he could succeed, the Wusun 
would occupy the region and provide the Han an ally on its western flank. In such 
situation, the Former Han could establish a form of hegemonic control over the Wusun 
and treat it as a vassal state.82 However, the Wusun were too afraid of the Xiongnu and 
had no intention of going back to the Hexi region.83 When Zhang brought the refusal 
back to the Han court in 115BCE, it left the Han no choice but to consider the possibility 
 
80 Benjamin, “The Origin of the Yuezhi,” 101-130; Millward, Eurasian Crossroads, 12. 
t of hegemonic control from Edward N. Luttwak’s analysis on the Roman empire, 
81 HS, 61:2691-2692. 
82 I borrow the concep
see his The Grand Strategy of the Roman Empire: From the First Century A.D. to the Third (Baltimore: The 
Johns Hopkins University Press, 1976), 192-194. 
83 SJ, 123:3169. 
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of ruling the Hexi Corridor directly and imposing territorial control.  
In 112BCE, two matters helped materialize the formal establishment of administrative 
units in the Hexi Corridor. In 112BCE, the associates dispatched by 
second mission returned with delegates of various Inner Asian states and the frequent 
formal communications between the Han and the Western Regions thereupon started.84 
The importance of Hexi Corridor serving as the main route connected Inner Asia was 
recognized by the Han state. In the same year, the Qiang who had dispersed along the 
western frontier revolted. Emperor Wu dispatched army to suppress them, and sent tens 
of thousands of labors crossed the Yellow River to build fortified towns on the west bank. 
The situation now required a more dense military presence, new administrative units had 
to be created to anchor state activities. According to the Shiji, thereafter, the 
commanderies of Zhangye 張掖and Jiuquan 酒泉were established. Large-scale state 
farms and fortifications were also set up in the frontier commanderies; in total six 
hundred thousand people were moved in for garrison and farming. Vast amount of 
resources were delivered from the interior of the empire to support the newly established 
northwestern frontier.85 It is clear that the revolt of the Qiang people enhanced the 
 
170. 84 SJ, 123:3169-3
85 SJ, 30:1438-1439. 
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awareness and determination of the Han state to establish formal governance over the 
Hexi region. One of the purposes of this decision was “to segregate the Qiang from the 
Xiongnu and cut off the communications between the north and the south.” 隔絕羌胡，使
南北不得交關.86 The Hexi corridor thus served as a wedge between the Xiongnu to the 
north and the Qiang to the south and prevented any possibility of collaborative attack 
against the Han. Furthermore, Liang province as a whole and the Hexi Corridor in 
particular served as an artery connecting the imperial center and the newly explored 
Western Regions. For such purpose, Liang province became a vein providing manpower 
and other resources, whether extracted locally or transferred from other parts of the 
empire, to support the Han outposts in Inner Asia.    
Although the four commanderies of Hexi, namely Wuwei 武威, Zhangye, Jiuquan, 
and Dunhuang 敦煌 were famous in Chinese history,
still debatable. Standard histories such as Shiji, Hanshu, and Hou Hanshu have no 
accurate data provided. Before the excavation of the Han bamboo and wooden strips 
along the northwest from the early twentieth century onward, scholars could only depend 
on their interpretations on the relevant entries in standard histories to infer the date. With 
                               
86 HHS, 87:2876. 
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the introduction of the unearthed new sources, historians can re-examine and narrow the 
time span of founding dates of the four commanderies, although clear-cut answers are 
still far from obtained. Since the exact dates of establishment is a question beyond the 
thesis of this study, I will just list some representative views held by Japanese, Chinese, 
and Western scholars in the following table for reference. 
 Hibino Takeo 
日比野丈夫  87
Chang Chun-shu 
張春樹  88
Michael Loewe89 
Hexi 河西90 115BCE ── ── 
Jiuquan 酒泉 111BCE 111BCE 104BCE 
Zhangye 張掖 108-107BCE 111-109BCE 104BCE 
Dunhuang 敦煌 100-97BCE 98   or 94BCE Certainly before 
91BCE 
Wuwei 武威 67BCE 78-67BCE 
(m )ost likely 72BCE
81-67BCE 
Table 1: Founding dates of comman
 when the four commanderies w  exactly, ents 
mpire and the gradual 
dev
                                                
the four Hexi deries 
No matter ere set up their establishm
marked the real annexation of the region into the Han e
elopment of the region. In order to implement the imperial policies of development 
 
87 Hibino Takeo, “kasei shigun no seiritsu ni tsuite” 河西四郡の成立について, in idem, Chūgoku rekishi 
chiri kenkyū 中国歴史地理研究 (Kyōto: Dōhōsha Shuppanbu, 1988), 69-92. For a Japanese-language 
review of different theories, see Ikeda Yūichi 池田雄一, Chūgoku kodai no juraku to chihō gyōsei 中国古
代の聚落と地方行政 (Tōkyō : Kyūko Shoin, 2002), 326-336. 
88 Chang Chun-shu, Handai bianjiangshi lunji 漢代邊疆史論集 (Taipei: Shihuo chubanshe, 1977), 
19-122. For a recent summation of the different dates proposed by traditional Chinese sources and modern 
Chinese scholarship, see Wang Zongwei 王宗維, Handai sichouzhilu de yanhou: Hexilu 漢代絲綢之路的
咽喉：河西路 (Beijing : Kunlun chubanshe, 2001), 219-221. 
89 Loewe, Records of Han Administration Volume 1, 59-60. 
90 Hibino believed that a Hexi commandery was established in 115BCE and was later abolished. However, 
most scholars questioned the existence of the Hexi commandery. 
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and colonization, the Former Han moved people from Guandong to fill up the Hexi 
region. The practices of compulsory and recruited migrations and setting farming 
colonies in the newly conquered frontiers could be traced at least back to the Qin dynasty 
and were commonly seen in the Former Han times.91 When the Qin expelled the Xiongnu 
from the Ordos region, large numbers of people were moved in to sustain the defensive 
works, new towns, and state farms.92 Except for soldiers, most of the people who moved 
to the new borderlands were the poor, convicts, and other groups of low social status. 
New counties were established to strengthen the imperial control over the area. With the 
downfall of the Qin dynasty, however, most newly set up frontier counties were exposed 
to the Xiongnu attack and most inhabitants fled to the interior. When the Former Han 
came into power, the reestablishment of the whole northern frontier line became an 
urgent topic.93 Under the efforts of the first few emperors, the borders between the 
Xiongnu and the Han were basically delimited. The next step was to strengthen defensive 
measures. During the reign of Emperor Wen, an official named Chao Cuo 鼂錯 (d. 
155BCE) put forwarded his proposals of founding permanent settlements on the frontier 
 
91  For detailed analysis on the process of colonization and administrative establishment on the 
northwestern frontier, see Ikeda, Chūgoku kodai no juraku to chihō gyōsei, 272-336 and 381-406. 
92 SJ, 6:253. 
93 Wai Kit Wicky Tse 謝偉傑, “Lun Han Gaodi yizhao de beijing dongluan” 論漢高帝一朝的北境動亂, 
Hanxue yanjiu 漢學研究 25: 1 (2007.6): 31-58. 
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with encouraging policy to enhance the migrant families’ motivation for staying there.94 
Chao also suggested employing surrendered “barbarians” to serve on the frontiers since 
they were good at fighting and had good knowledge of the northern borderlands and the 
practices of the Xiongnu.95 Chao’s plans were endorsed by the emperor, though we do 
not know much about how the measures were put into action. 
When the tide of expansion came in Emperor Wu’s reign, even larger numbers of 
people were moved from Guandong to the new frontier zones. Local resources were
ertheless inadequate to support the new migrants, countless labor forces, corps, and 
other kinds of resources were mobilized from the east to back up the colonization 
enterprises. A historian of Emperor Wu’s court stated that the costs were so huge that the 
imperial coffers were thus empty.96 It might be exaggerated to a certain degree but not 
completely fictional. Since the newly conquered northwestern borderlands were not 
productive arable lands that would be able to sustain a large agrarian population, it 
required enormous investment to set up all the fortifications, farming settlements, local 
government seats, and other relevant facilities. For example, Emperor Wu once moved 
700,000 Guandong people, who suffered from flooding and ensuing famine in their home 
 
94 HS, 49: 2283-2289. 
95 HS, 49: 2282-2283. 
96 SJ, 30: 1421-1428. 
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regions, to the Ordos region and the southern part of modern Gansu, and they all relied 
upon government subsidies.97 Although such a large-scale migration would lessen the 
pressure from which the natural disaster inflicted on Guandong, it still caused huge 
spending from the state.  
In economic terms, the revenue/benefits of the new territories were certainly minimal, 
if any at all, when compa
 the officials who supported the expansionist policy, the costs were bearable to serve 
strategic needs. The pattern of Guandong financially supporting the newly conquered 
northern and northwestern borderlands reminds us Charles Tilly’s classification of 
financial/fiscal and military geographies and his notion of contradiction between spatial 
organization for civil and military needs.98 In our case, it also implied the possibility that 
if the imperial policy makers changed concerns, they might have different calculation and 
perceptions of the costs spent on the northwest, and their attitude toward holding the 
region might change. It was what happened in the Later Han period, and we will return to 
this in the succeeding chapters. 
 
97 SJ, 30: 1425. 
98 Tilly, Coercion, Capital and European States, 125. For a more recent research on the distinction between 
civil and military geographies in Chinese history, though focuses mainly on the Northern Song dynasty, see 
Mostern, “Dividing the Realm in Order to Govern”: The Spatial Organization of the Song State (960-1276 
CE). 
95 
 
 Yellow River by detaching two counties each from the 
com
orthwestern frontier, including Longxi, Tianshui, Anding, 
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Beside the four Hexi commanderies, a commandery named Jincheng 金城 was set 
up in 81BCE that straddled the
manderies of Longxi, Tianshui, and Zhangye. The establishment of Jincheng was 
mainly due to the needs of managing and supervising the Qiang people. Jincheng would 
be an important area and battlefield in the Han-Qiang relationship, for which details will 
be given in Chapter Four. Apart from commanderies, Dependent States (Shuguo 屬國)99 
were established  along the frontier by Emperor Wu and his successors to settle 
surrendered “barbarians.”  
When Emperor Wu divided the imperial realm into various provinces, the 
commanderies along the n
cheng, Wuwei, Zhangye, Jiuquan, and Dunhuang,100 coalesced into Liang province. 
The whole northwestern frontier zone was thus formed as a single inspectoral, and later 
administrative, unit. Except for Longxi, a very old administrative unit that could be traced 
back to the Qin times, all the commanderies in Liang province were new establishments 
 
99 Dependent State was an institution that the Han government adopted to settle surrendered alien people. 
See Liu Pakyuen 廖伯源, “Lun Handai xizhi bianjiang minzu yu saini zhi zhengce” 論漢代徙置邊疆民
族於塞內之政策, in Jilindaxue gujiyanjiusuo 吉林大學古籍研究所 ed., "1-6 Shiji Zhongguo beifang 
bianjiang, minzu, shehui guoji xueshu yantaohui" lunwenji  "1-6 世纪中國北方邊疆・民族・社會國際
學術研討會"論文集 (Beijing: Kexue chubanshe, 2008), 62-85; de Crespigny, A Biographical Dictionary 
of Later Han to the Three Kingdoms (23-220 AD) (Leiden and Boston: Brill, 2007), 1229. 
100 Beidi was under Shuofang 朔方 inspectoral region and would be returned to Liang province during the 
Later Han times. 
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by Emperor Wu and his great-grandson Emperor Xuan 宣 (r. 73-49BCE). The territories 
of Wuwei, Zhangye, Jiuquan, and Dunhuang, as well as a portion of Jincheng were the 
first time became part of the Chinese empire; their Han population all moved from the 
interior of the empire. It is also worthwhile to note that the establishment and finalization 
of the commanderies in Liang province spanning the reigns from Emperor Wu to 
Emperor Xuan, covering the period when the Former Han experienced both the peak of 
power and the onset of decay. Expansion ended with Emperor Xuan’s demise.101 
As the migrant population was the backbone of the imperial control over the 
borderlands, the management of the population became an important aspect of 
ernance. The “Treatise on Geography” (Dili zhi 地理志 , literally “Treatise on 
Terrestrial Organization”) of the Hanshu contains figures of the population census carried 
out in 2CE, which provides data of demographic distribution of the Former Han in its last 
decade.102 Based on the data, we can have a general picture of the administrative units of 
                                                 
101 For a detailed study on the transition of expansionist policy between the reigns of the two emperors, see 
Michael Loewe, Crisis and Conflict in Han China 104 BC to AD 9 (London: George Allen and Unwin Ltd), 
211-251. 
 Lao Kan, “Population and Geography in the Two Han Dynasties,” in E-Tu Zen Sun and John 
102 HS, 28A and B: 1543-1640. For research on the 2CE population census and population of the Former 
Han, see Hans Bielenstein, “The Census of China during the Period 2-742 A.D,” BMFEA 19 (1947): 
125-163, and
de Francis eds., Chinese Social History: Translations of Selected Studies, 83-102. For detailed study in 
Chinese, see Ge Jianxiong 葛劍雄, Zhongguo renkoushi 中國人口史, v.1 (Shanghai: Fudan daxue 
chubanshe, 2002), 311-395, 479-493. 
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Liang province and its population figures as the table below shows.103 
 Number of 
Counties 
Number of 
Households  
Population 
Longxi 隴西 11 53,964 236,824 
Tianshui 天水 16 60,370 261,384 
Anding 安定 21 42,725 143,294 
Jincheng 金城 13 38,470 149,648 
Wuwei 武威 10 17,581 76,419 
Zhangye 張掖 10 24,352 88,731 
Jiuquan 酒泉 9 8,137 76,726 
Dunhuang 敦煌 6 11,200 38,335 
Table 2: Data of Northwestern Commanderies in 2CE 
The above data gives a general picture that the more southern the region, the larger 
the population and the number of counties, and vice versa. The household and population 
figures are, of course, only the number of people registered by the state; people who were 
not on the official register, especially the tribal people, is nowhere to be known. Besides, 
there were several dependent states established in the jurisdiction of Liang province for 
settling the surrendered “barbarians,” but no population figure existed. Although the Han 
histories stated that the Hexi Corridor was empty of the Xiongnu sometime around 
112BCE,104 it might just be the rhetoric of describing the withdrawal of Xiongnu military 
forces from the area. It would be hard to imagine that the area became a “no-man’s-land” 
                                                 
103 HS, 28B: 1610-1615. 
104 SJ, 110: 1912. 
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and no single Xiongnu or other autochthonous peoples stayed there. The same situation 
should be true in the southern commanderies such as Jincheng, Longxi, etc., since those 
commanderies not only had a long tradition of autochthonous societies but also were 
permeable to the “barbarians” lived along or beyond the Han political boundaries. On the 
other hand, most, if not all, of the population registered in the newly established 
commanderies should be the people who moved from other parts of the empire and 
responsible for the duties of garrison, farming, and other relevant colonization tasks. The 
combination of new migrants with lower social status from different parts of the empire, 
old inhabitants of the area, and autochthonous tribal peoples made Liang province an 
ethnically complex frontier society, which in turn contributed to the estrangement 
between the northwestern borderlands and the imperial center in the Later Han period.  
The importance of population registration is also showed by another fact in th
atise and other historical records. Although the Treatise has listed all the number and 
name of counties under every entry of commandery, it does not clearly indicate the 
territorial limits of the empire. From both textual and archaeological sources, we know 
that boundary stones within and/or between commanderies were common all over the 
empire to serve as markers of the boundaries of jurisdictions and especially the taxable 
99 
 
  
                                                
areas.105 However, the territorial boundaries of the empire as a whole were mentioned 
only in a vague manner in the historical records, by describing the farthest extent of a 
region or referring to some topographical features. When comparing the detailed data of 
the population census with the vague description of the territorial limits of the empire, it 
may tell us that the empire might not be thought of as a territorial entity but rather in 
terms of the peoples that were subject to the imperial rule. Population census and 
household registration were thus important means of imperial governance as through 
them the imperial state could control the mobility of its subject and know who the 
potential soldiers and taxpayers were and where they could be found. Hence, the 
boundaries of the empire were not the territorial boundaries but the boundaries of the 
people subject to the state.106 This might also help to explain why the Later Han state 
easily inclined to give up the northwestern territories and only to pull the officials and 
registered households out of the area when the Qiang wars seemed to be uncontrollable.   
 
 
 
 
 
105 A case study of boundary stone in the Former Han period, see Satake Yasuhiko 佐竹靖彥, Chūgoku 
kodai no densei to yūsei 中国古代の田制と邑制 (Tōkyō: Iwanami Shoten, 2006), 417-443. 
106 For the difference between territorial state and jurisdiction state, see Sahlins, Boundaries, 6-7. 
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As the tide of northwestward expansion of the Former Han receded with the death 
Emperor Xuan, large-scale migration and colonization to the northwest was halted. The 
establishment of administrative units within Liang province was also finalized, and the 
province enjoyed a period of prosperity and stability till the end of the dynasty. This was 
mainly benefited from two achievements made by Emperor Xuan. First, the suppression 
of the Qiang rebellion in 61BCE temporarily solved the Qiang problem and consolidated 
the Han control over the province. Secondly, the submission of Xiongnu Chanyu to 
Emperor Xuan in 51BCE assured the ensuing peace between the two powers and thus 
greatly reduced the defensive pressure of Liang province, especially along the Hexi 
Corridor.107 In the period of relative stability, which lasted nearly five decades, the Han 
military forces even retreated from some outposts along the northwestern borders and left 
those fortifications deserted.108 
   Liang province as an administrative un
and launched a series of programs reshaping the administrative geography of the empire. 
 
107 For recent studies on the submission of the Xiongnu Chanyu, see Ellis Tinios, “Loose Rein” in Han 
Relations with Foreign Peoples (Department of East Asian Studies, University of Leeds, 2000); 
Sophia-Karin Psarras, “Han and Xiongnu: A Reexamination of Cultural and Political Relations (II),” 
Monumenta Serica 52 (2004): 37-42. For the alleviation of military conflicts between the Former Han and 
the Xiongnu along the northwestern borders, see Takamura, Kandai no chihō kanri to chiiki shakai, 
344-379. 
108 Takamura, Kandai no chihō kanri to chiiki shakai, 344-379. 
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In 4CE, Wang Mang divided the whole empire into twelve provinces and renamed some 
of them according to the records of officially sanctioned canon. Accordingly, Liang 
province lost its independent status and was coalesced into the metropolitan area and its 
vicinity to form a Yong 雍 province. In 12CE, Wang Mang adopted the names in the 
classics to reformulate and rename the provinces into nine.109 Liang province was still 
part of Yong province under the new division.110  
Wang Mang’s foreign policy also went han
inistrative geography. Shortly before his establishment of the twelve provinces, Wang 
Mang forced some Qiang tribes to surrender their land which contiguous to Liang 
province. A new commandery called Xihai 西海, literally West Sea, was thus set up. 
According to the Hanshu, Wang was eager to acquire the land and give it the name of 
Xihai since the Former Han empire had already had the commanderies of Donghai 東海 
(East Sea), Nanhai 南海 (South Sea), and Beihai 北海 (North Sea), and Wang was 
 
109 For Wang Mang’s reforms of regional administrative units, see Xin, “Liang Han zhouzhi xinkao,” 
144-161. For general studies on Wang Mang’s classics-orientated reforms, see Dubs, The History of the 
Former Han Dynasty, Volume Three, 506-536; Rudi Thomsen, Ambition and Confucianism: A Biography of 
Wang Mang (Aarhus: Aarhus University Press, 1988); Hans Bielenstein, “Wang Mang, the restoration of 
the Han dynasty, and Later Han,” in CHOC v. 1, 223-290; Michael Puett, “Centering the Realm: Wang 
Mang, the Zhouli, and Early Chinese Statecraft,” in Benjamin A. Elman and Martin Kern eds., Statecraft 
and Classical Learning: The Rituals of Zhou in East Asian History (Leiden: Brill, 2010), 129-154; Higashi 
Shiji, Ō Mō: juka no risō ni tsukareta otoko 王莽：儒家の理想に憑かれた男 (Tokyo: Hakuteisha, 2003).  
110 In fact, Wang was completely obsessed with the nomenclature of administrative unit as an integral part 
of his classics-orientated blueprint of the ideal world. As a result, not only the names of provinces but also 
those of most commanderies and counties were subjected to frequent changes, which finally threw the 
administrative system into chaos. For details, see HS, 99B: 4136-4137. 
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strongly inclined towards the completion of the “Four Seas” commanderies as a proof of 
his majesty and benevolence covering the whole known world.111  The new Xihai 
commandery was added to Liang province and then became part of Yong province. It also 
served as a place where Wang exiled tens of thousands of people who committed offenses 
under his new law code.112 However, the Qiang were in fact reluctant to make the 
submission and thus tried to retake the land by coercive means.113 Later, Wang broke the 
stable relationship with the Xiongnu and deployed numerous soldiers and laborers along 
the northern and northwestern frontiers in the hope of conquering the northern enemy. 
Zhangye commandery served as one of the important depots for the campaign.114  
Needless to say, military operations stirred up instability within Liang province.   
Wang Mang’s Xin dynasty only lasted fifteen years, and the imperial orde
ady devolved into chaos when its days were numbering. Various regional military 
powers arose to take advantage of such situation. Among those contenders, Wei Ao 隗囂 
(d. 33CE), Dou Rong 竇融 (fl. 5-30sCE), and Lu Fang 盧芳 (fl. 10s-40sCE) were 
related to Liang province.115  
 
111 HS, 99A: 4077.  
112 HS, 99A: 4077-4078. 
f the regimes of Wei Ao, Dou Rong, and Lu Fang during the Wang Mang interrgum and 
 period, see Kano Naosada 狩野直禎, Gokan seijishi no kenkyū 後漢政治史の硏究. 
113 HS, 99A: 4087. 
114 HS, 99B: 4121. 
115 For the history o
the early Later Han
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Ron
Wei Ao was from a magna
ious government offices since his youth. When the Xin dynasty was in turmoil, a 
paternal uncle of Wei Ao gathered clansmen and other local strongmen to raise a rebel 
army. Because of his reputation and knowledge, Wei Ao was elected to be the leader.116 
Wei quickly became the strongest power in Liang province. When Emperor Guangwu of 
the Later Han started to extend power to the west, initially, he tried to pacify Wei and 
seek his support by showering him with lavish honors and acknowledging him as the 
supreme commander of the west.117 However, the honeymoon period did not last long. 
Wei was ambitious to be an independent ruler and would not wholeheartedly endorse the 
imperial unification project; on the other hand, Emperor Guangwu would not allow any 
Former Han territory break away from his “restored” Han dynasty. Conflicts between 
them were unavoidable. To defeat Wei, the emperor would need Dou Rong to be an ally. 
During the civil war, Liang province was in fact partitioned between Wei Ao and Dou
g. While Wei based his power in the southern part, Dou controlled the Hexi Corridor. 
                                                                                                                                                 
(Kyōto: Dōhōsha, 1993), 34-41 and 124-140; Kojima, Kandai kokka tōchi no kōzō to tenkai, 101-104; Ukai 
Masao 鵜飼昌男, “Jianwu chuqi Hexi diqu de zhengzhi dongxiang: ‘Hou Hanshu Dou Rong zhuan’ buyi” 
建武初期河西地區的政治動向──《後漢書．竇融傳》補遺, trans. He Shuangquan 何雙全, in Xibei 
shifan daxue lishixi 西北師範大學歷史系 and Gansusheng wenwu kaogu yanjiusuo 甘肅省文物考古硏究
所 eds., Jianduxue yanjiu 簡牘學研究 vol. 2 (Lanzhou: Gansu renmin chubanshe, 2009), 227-232. 
116 HHS, 13: 513-514. 
117 HHS, 13: 522. 
104 
 
 was a native of Anding 
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Although a native of Fufeng 扶風 commandery, a part of the Former Han metropolitan 
area, Dou Rong had a very close relationship with Liang province and had inherited a 
solid power base in the Hexi Corridor since two of his family members had been grand 
administrators of commanderies in Laing province and one had been military officer 
supervising the Qiang. Besides, Dou himself was appointed by the Xin dynasty as 
Commandant of the Zhangye dependent state (Zhangye shuguo duwei 張掖屬國都尉) 
and was on intimate terms with other prominent officials, local strongmen, and the Qiang 
tribal leaders along the Hexi Corridor.118 Prestigious family background and social 
networks enabled Dou easily to assume leadership in the Hexi region during the chaotic 
period. Dou differed from Wei as he was willing to follow the Later Han emperor. This 
resulted in different fates for the two men. Dou Rong surrendered to the emperor and 
contributed greatly in the final conquest of Wei Ao. Dou himself therefore received great 
honors and held a high position in the imperial court, and his family would become one 
of the most influential consort families in the Later Han history. 
Another Liang province origin contender was Lu Fang, who
mandery.119 According to the official history, which unquestionably took a stand on 
 
118 HHS, 23: 795-797. 
119 HHS, 12: 505. 
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the Later Han, Lu Fang was an imposter who claimed himself a descendent of Emperor 
Wu and thus gathered followers around him. Lu established very close relationship with 
the Xiongnu, the Qiang, and other “barbarian” groups. Later, under the auspices of the 
Xiongnu, Lu was named Han emperor though in fact acted as a proxy for the Xiongnu by 
harrying along the Later Han northern and northwestern frontiers.120 When Emperor 
Gunagwu consolidated its governance over the empire, Lu saw there was no hope to 
challenge the Later Han. He then sought asylum in the Xiongnu and stayed there over a 
decade until his death.  
The death of Wei Ao
rporation of Liang province into the newly formed Later Han dynasty. In its early 
years, the Later Han basically followed the regional administrative division of the Former 
Han. Liang province officially restored its name and status as a top level regional 
administrative unit.121 It was during the reign of Emperor Xian 獻 (r. 190-220CE), the 
young emperor installed by Dong Zhuo and also the last Later Han sovereign, that Liang 
province as an administrative unit faced another time of abolition. In 194CE, as the 
southern part of Liang province was occupied by rebels and out of the Later Han control, 
                           
120 HHS, 12: 506. 
121 For the development of province system in the Later Han period, see Xin, “Liang Han zhouzhi xinkao,” 
162-176; Kojima, Kandai kokka tōchi no kōzō to tenkai, 244-271. 
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ince still served the important military 
fun
the imperial court announced the separation of the Hexi Corridor from Liang province 
and renamed it as Yong 廱 province, probably for the purpose of separating the Hexi 
region from the rebellious area. Later, in 213CE, Chancellor Cao Cao 曹 操 
(155-220CE), who was now the de facto ruler controlled Emperor Xian, launched a 
program of reformulating the whole empire into nine provinces. Since only the northern 
part of the nominally existing Later Han was under his control, the effect of Cao’s reform 
was limited. Nevertheless, Liang province was abolished and became part of the 
reinstated Yong province. Several years later, the last Later Han emperor was deposed by 
Cao’s son, who then proclaimed himself the founding emperor of a new dynasty and the 
province division would turn over a new leaf.  
During the Later Han times, Liang prov
ction as it did in the Former Han dynasty. First, in the early years of the Later Han, 
inherited the worsening foreign relations from Wang Mang, the whole northern and 
northwestern frontiers, as well as the Western Regions once again became the frontline of 
military confrontation between the Chinese regime and the Xiongnu. Liang province was 
a component of the imperial defensive line in general and a depot for launching 
expedition against the Xiongnu to the northwest in particular. Secondly, it served as an 
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artery connecting the imperial center and the Western Regions. As the struggles between 
the Later Han and the Xiongnu over the control of the Western Regions grew fierce, 
Liang province took up the role of supplying manpower and other resources for the Han 
presence in Inner Asia. For these reasons, as a usual practice of the Former Han, vast 
numbers of soldiers, convicts, labors, and their families were voluntarily or involuntarily 
sent to the northwest. Thirdly, conflicts between the empire and the Qiang became intense 
from the early years of the Later Han and devastating wars with the Qiang lasted from the 
middle period to the last years of the dynasty. The southern part of Liang province thus 
became battlefield. When the Qiang gained the upper hand, the Later Han state even 
evacuated its officials and people from the war-ridden area and left southern Liang 
province at the mercy of its enemies. Liang province was consequently devolved into 
chaos in the last decades of the Later Han and was one of the first regions which resisted 
the authority of the imperial center. Meanwhile, ambitious military strongman like Dong 
Zhuo took advantage of the complicated situation, accumulated his power, took control of 
the imperial court, and finally triggered the disintegration of the Later Han empire. 
Comparing with the Former Han times, Liang province was often in turmoil d
Later Han. Its administrative divisions and population also underwent sea changes. 
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We are fortunate to have data of population census that conducted in 140CE and 
information of the administrative units in the “Treatise on Commandery and Fief-state” 
(Junguo zhi 郡國志) of the Hou Hanshu,122 which provide us a general picture of the 
administrative geography and demography of Liang province in the middle period of 
Later Han.123 
 Number of 
Counties 
Number of 
Households  
Population
Longxi 隴西 11 5,628 29,637 
Hanyang 漢陽 
(formerly Tianshui, name changed in 
74CE) 
13 27,423 130,138 
Wudu 武都 7 20,102 81,728 
Jincheng 金城 10 3,858 8,947 
Anding 安定 8 6,094 29,060 
Beidi 北地 6 3,122 18,637 
Wuwei 武威 14 10,042 34,260 
Zhangye 張掖 8 6,552 26,040 
Jiuquan 酒泉 9 2,706 ---- 
Dunhuang 敦煌 6 748 29,170 
Zhangye Shuguo 
張掖屬國 
5 4,656 16,952 
Zhangye Juyan Shuguo 
張掖居延屬國 
1 1,560 4,733 
Table 3: Data of Northwestern Commanderies in 140CE 
                                                 
122 HHS, 19-23: 3385-3533. For the Later Han population, see Bielenstein, “The Census of China during 
the Period 2-742 A.D,” 125-163; Lao, “Population and Geography in the Two Han Dynasties,” 83-102; Ge, 
Zhongguo renkoushi, v.1, 399-425 and 493-500. For a general survey of the Junguo zhi in a 
historiographical perspective, see Mansvelt Beck, The Treatises of Later Han, 175-195. 
123 B. J. Mansvelt Beck has pointed out that there is a problem of anachronism in the treatise as it does not 
reflect the actual situation, for instance, in the northwestern provinces in the 140’s but the situation of the 
empire at its greatest extent. See B. J. Mansvelt Beck, The Treatises of Later Han, 193-194.  
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According to the Treatise, the Later Han province of Liang consisted of twelve 
dministrative units: ten commanderies and two dependent states. The population and 
household numbers only refer to those on the government register, as already mentioned 
in the analysis on the 2CE data; even the numbers of the two dependent states would not 
contain all of the surrendered “barbarians” in the jurisdictions, not to mention those not 
registered by the state. Moreover, the treatise does not fully reflect the actual situation in 
Liang province in 140CE. For example, under the threats of the Qiang, the commanderies 
of Anding and Beidi were moved inland in 111CE, moved back in 129CE, and moved 
inland again in 140CE. The Treatise does not mention these administrative changes and 
only provides “the situation of the empire at its greatest extent—even if it entails 
anachronisms.”124  
Nevertheless, if we compare the 140CE data with the 2CE data, we will see the 
changes over the one century and realize some features of the Later Han Liang 
province.125 
 
 
                                                
 
a
 
124 Mansvelt Beck, The Treatises of Later Han, 194. 
125 HHS, 23: 3516-3521. 
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Former Han Later Han 
 Counties Households Population Counties Households Population 
Longxi 11 53,964 236,824 11 5,628 29,637 
Tianshui/ 
Hanyang 
16 60,370 261,384 13 27,423 130,138 
Anding 21 42,725 143,294 8 6,094 29,060 
Jincheng 13 38,470 149,648 10 3,858 8,947 
Wuwei 10 17,581 76,419 14 10,042 34,260 
Zhangye 10 24,352 88,731 8 6,552 26,040 
Jiuquan 9 8,137 76,726 9 2,706 ---- 
Dunhuang 6 11,200 38,335 6 748 29,170 
Wudu ---- ---- ---- 7 20,102 81,728 
Beidi ---- ---- ---- 6 3,122 18,637 
Zhangye 
Shuguo 
---- ---- ---- 5 4,656 16,952 
Zhangye 
Juyan 
Shuguo 
---- ---- ---- 1 1,560 4,733 
Total Household Population Household Population 
362,636 1,517,573 92,491 409,302 
Table 4:
 
 Comparison of the two sets of data 
bers of the equivalent region between 
 the population of Later Han Liang province 
lost
newly added from the neighboring Yi 益
By roughly comparing the total population num
the two Han dynasties, it is very obvious that
 more than 1,100,000 registered people. 
For the twelve administrative units of the Later Han Liang province, the 
commanderies of Wudu and Beidi were 
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province and Bing 并 province, respectively, and the two dependent states were newly 
established along the northwestern-most tip of the province. Therefore, we will focus 
mainly on the commanderies which already existed in the Former Han period in order to 
see the changes over the region. Among those “old” commanderies, it is clear that there 
was a very drastic population drop, especially in the southern portion. The commanderies 
of Longxi, Tianshu/Hanyang, Anding, and Jincheng suffered tremendous population loss; 
county numbers of Tianshu/Hanyang, Anding, and Jincheng also dropped, and 
particularly drastic in Anding. Those once-populated areas became, numerically, sparsely 
populated. The main reason for these tremendous changes was due to the Qiang wars. As 
the southern portion of Liang province (i.e. the commanderies of Longxi, 
Tianshu/Hanyang, Anding, and Jincheng) was the battlefield of the Qiang wars, it went 
without saying that large numbers of people fleeing the province or taking advantage of 
the chaotic situation to hide away and erase themselves from the taxpayer roster. Pulling 
out the commandery seats of Anding and Beidi twice during the Qiang wars, details will 
be given in Chapter Four, only aggravated the situation. Besides, great casualties could be 
expected in the incessant chaos. Along with the tremendous loss of registered population 
was diminishing state control of the affected area. In contrast, a large number of Qiang 
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people and other “barbarians” who had previously lived along the borders rushed into 
Liang province, especially the southern portion. The massive influx of non-Han peoples 
finally resulted in their overwhelming population in Guanzhong and the ensuing chaotic 
situation of the area in the period after the fall of Later Han.126  
This chapter has already outlined the salient features of natural geography and 
development of administrative geography of the region equivale
Later Han period, and also touched upon the militarized nature and complex ethnic 
characteristics of the frontier society. With this background knowledge, we shall move to 
the next chapter to examine how the friction between the northwestern region and the 
imperial center grew, intensified, and influenced the fate of the empire.  
 
126 de Crespigny, Northern Frontier, 417-437. 
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Being Peripheralized: 
The Northwesterners in the Later Han Empire 
 
In 167CE, General Zhang Huan 張奐 (104-181CE) might be relieved when his request 
to transfer his registered place of residence from the northwestern frontier to the interior 
of the empire was granted. Transference of registered residence from a frontier 
commandery to an inner commandery was prohibited by the Later Han law; it was only 
Zhang’s astonishing military feats that earned him such an unprecedented imperial favor.1 
Known in the Later Han history as one of the three greatest heroes of the Qiang wars, 
Zhang Huan, whose style name (zi 字) was Ranming 然明, was a native of Yuanquan 
淵泉  county in Dunhuang commandery; with Huangfu Gui 皇甫規  (104-171CE), 
whose style name was Weiming 威明, and Duan Jiong 段熲 (d. 179), whose style name 
was Jiming 紀明, the three men were all from Liang province and were given by their 
contemporaries the moniker the “Three Brilliants of Liang Province” (Liangzhou 
 
1 HHS, 65: 2140. 
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Sanming 涼州三明).2 It was not merely because the word Ming 明 in their style names 
means “brilliance” and “brightness” but also a compliment regarding them as the three 
brilliant men of Liang province.  
   As a famous general who had just successfully quelled the Qiang rebels spreading 
across three provinces, Zhang Huan was undoubtedly an icon of Liang province. 
However, Zhang was unwilling to have his household registered in his native province 
and dared to ask for the imperial favor of transferring to Huayin 華陰 county of 
Hongnong 弘農 commandery near the Later Han capital as a special reward to his 
military achievements.3 Later, when Duan Jiong assumed the position of superintendent 
of the metropolitan region and Hongnong was in his jurisdiction, he intended to move 
Zhang’s household back to Dunhuang as a means to avenge their conflicts during the 
Qiang wars. Zhang Huan was terrified and promptly wrote a very humble letter to appeal 
to Duan’s mercy. Duan was deeply moved by the letter and therefore spared the 
supplicant and his family.4   
 
2 The three generals’ biographies were in the same chapter of Hou Hanshu, see HHS, 65: 2129-2154. For a 
full English translation of the three biographies, see Gregory Young, Three generals of Later Han 
(Canberra: Faculty of Asian Studies, Australian National University, 1984). On the three generals in Later 
Han politics, see Chen Yong 陳勇, “Liangzhou sanming lun” “涼州三明”論, Zhongguoshi yanjiu 中國史
研究 1998.2: 37-48. 
3 HHS, 65: 2140. 
4 HHS, 65: 2141-2142. 
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Zhang Huan’s story compels us to ask: Why did such an eminent man so detest being 
registered in a frontier commandery and was so desperate to move to an inner one? What 
made him eager to move out from his native Liang province? What was the advantage(s) 
or benefit(s) of being a registered resident of an inner commandery? What was the 
motivation behind his move? The prohibition of transferring registered residence from the 
frontiers to the interior of the empire implied that the central authority felt the need to 
curb any potential movement; otherwise a large amount of transference would be 
expected. Furthermore, by trying to move Zhang Huan and his family back to Dunhuang, 
Duan Jiong’s means of revenge was intriguing, and Zhang Huan’s plea for pardon 
showed how desperate he was in an attempt to save himself and his family from returning 
to the frontier. Zhang Huan’s success might be a unique case, but his desire to move 
might not be exceptional and might be shared by some of his compatriots. Zhang Huan’s 
story provides us clues to understand the contemporary perception of the northwestern 
commanderies and their residents and their status vis-à-vis the Later Han empire. Also, 
the fact that the three greatest war heroes of the Qiang wars were all from Liang province 
cannot be treated as a mere coincidence. It is a compelling evidence of the militarized 
nature of the northwestern borderlands.         
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Unlike the previous chapter, which focuses on the land, this chapter focuses on the 
people. In the following sections, I shall first introduce the settlers and their descendants 
in the northwestern borderlands during the two Han dynasties and the military nature of 
this frontier society. Then, I shall discuss the factors which influenced the change of 
political status of the northwest and its military cohort in the Later Han period and 
analyze how the change affected their relations to the imperial center. Given the limited 
historical sources for studying the northwestern settlers, I shall focus mainly on the 
military elite of the region and give a try to depict the lives of those nameless common 
settlers if possible.     
 
Peopling a Borderland 
As shown in Chapter Two, most of the territories of Liang province were the spoils of the 
northwestward expansion of the Qin-Han empire. From the Spring and Autumn period 
onwards, accompanied with the gradual territorial sprawling, not only were the remaining 
autochthonous peoples, willingly or unwillingly, subjected to the Qin-Han suzerainty, but 
also substantial numbers of people were moved from the east to the newly conquered 
lands to support the territorial control of the state. In this long course of several hundred 
years, a great variety of migrants, including soldiers, cashiered officials, political exiles, 
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amnestied convicts, 5  economic refugees, adventurers, slaves, and their families 
constituted waves of migrations to the northwestern borderlands and took up the roles of 
garrison soldiers, pioneers, and colonists. They formed the backbone of the imperial 
projects of expansion and consolidation of the region. Even after the tide of 
northwestward expansion ebbed, the Han state still kept sending migrants in. The influx 
of substantial numbers of Qin-Han settlers into the northwestern borderlands 
fundamentally changed the political, economic, cultural, and ethnic compositions of the 
region. Meanwhile, the settlers were also influenced by the environment and neighbors of 
their new home. Certainly, the origins and social backgrounds of the settlers were 
extremely complicated as they were from different places with different local cultures, 
had different social status, and arrived the northwest at different times. However, after 
several generations, they gradually took root in the region and fostered their own regional 
identities.  
   Although extant literary and non-literary sources preserve only small scraps of 
information about the Qin-Han settlers in the northwest, especially about the period 
 
5 Amnesty here does not mean that the state set the convicts free but commutes sentence of death to hard 
labor or exile. For the punishments, including death penalty, hard labor, and exile, and amnesty of the 
Former Han, see A. F. P. Hulsewé, Remnants of Han Law, volume 1: Introductory Studies and Annotated 
Translation of Chapters 22 and 23 of the History of the Former Han Dynasty (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1955), 
102-134 and 225-250. Although the abundant evidence unearthed in recent decades has made the book a bit 
dated, Hulsewé’s work is still the most comprehensive English-language introductory study of the received 
textual sources on the topic. 
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before the large-scale expansion during the reign of Emperor Wu, it is still possible to 
have a sketch of the settlers by digging into the available sources. Among the settlers, 
based on the development of their political status and family fortunes in the Qin-Han 
period, two categories can be roughly distinguished, namely the elite group and the 
non-elite group. Surely, there was no strict dichotomy between the two groups as in the 
process of social mobility non-elite men could establish themselves as elites and elite 
families could lose their status for various reasons. Such a distinction is made on the basis 
of the sources available. Needless to say, the extant histories provide comparatively 
detailed stories of the elites and slender information of the non-elite group. I shall 
introduce the elites first and the non-elite group later; the autochthonous peoples is a 
topic of the next chapter. 
In a land with tough natural environment and plagued by incessant struggle with alien 
peoples like the northwest, the most common and quickest way of achieving upward 
social mobility would be through military merit. The Qin-Han state also encouraged and 
sanctioned militarization of the region as a means to strengthen territorial control, not to 
mention launching further expansion. Serving both functions of the frontier between the 
Han and the Xiongnu and the strategic artery connecting the interior of the empire and 
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the Western Regions, needless to say, the northwestern commanderies were highly 
militarized as the Hanshu describes that the grand administrators of the area “all put 
military affairs as their top priority.”6 咸以兵馬為務. The Former Han not only repaired 
and strengthened the Qin long walls in the old commanderies but also extended the walls 
to and set up dense defense networks in the newly founded Hexi commanderies.7 Besides 
the garrison soldiers, a significant portion of the settlers were potential fighters, the 
“barbarous” autochthonous peoples notwithstanding. Violence was an everyday life of the 
settlers and the prevalence of martial spirit became a custom of the region during the two 
Han dynasties. Remember Zheng Tai’s speech, quoted in Chapter One, that Liang 
province produced the strongest and fiercest soldiers of the empire and even women and 
girls there were accustomed to wielding weapons.8 A Han primer named Jijiu pian 急就
篇 also retains the Later Han people’s impression of the northwest as the battlefront 
against the alien enemies: “The strong crossbows of Jiuquan and Dunhuang, stationed 
along the frontier and upholding the bastions to guard against the Hu and the Qiang, from 
near and afar all come to kill the king of the Rong, the realm of the Han will be 
 
6 HS, 28B: 1645. 
7 For good summary of the Former Han’s efforts on building defensive works along the northwestern 
frontier, see Wang, Gansu tongshi: Qin Han juan, 116-149. Loewe, Records of Han Administration, vol. 1 
studies the unearth documents from some spots on the defense line. 
8 HHS, 70: 2258-59. 
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prosperous and all under Heaven will enjoy peace.” 酒泉彊弩與敦煌，居邊守塞備胡羌，
遠近還集殺戎王，漢土興隆天下安 . 9  Liang province, with both old and new 
commanderies, was designed as a bastion to protect the western flank of the empire. 
It went without saying that military value would be particularly prevalent among 
people of the region. In fact, well before the reign of Emperor Wu, when the power of the 
Qin-Han empire was still limited to the east bank of the Yellow River, some of the early 
settlers in the western commanderies, such as Longxi, Tianshui, and Beidi, were already 
skilled in archery and horsemanship and therefore established themselves as the military 
elites of the region. Their golden age came with the imperial expansion under Emperor 
Wu and his successors. Their splendid military prowess enabled them to climb the social 
and political ladder and establish prosperous military careers. As the “Treatise on 
Geography” of Hanshu describes, 
Tianshui, Longxi… as well as Anding, Beidi, Shang commandery, and Xihe, are all 
closely located to the Rong and the Di, [their people] are in a state of warlike 
preparedness, admire bravery and martial prowess, and pay utmost attention to the 
skills of shooting and hunting. Therefore, the Odes of the Qin says… “The king 
 
9 Si You 史游, Jijiu pian 急就篇, in Siku Quanshu 四庫全書 vol. 223 (Shanghai: Shanghai guji 
chubanshe, 1987), 61. Most contents of the Jijiu Pian were written by Si You in the Former Han times, but 
the last 128 words in the extant version, including the above quotation, were added by anonymous Later 
Han author(s). For the introduction of the text, see Zeng Zhongsha 曾仲珊 annotated, Jijiu Pian 急就篇 
(Changsha: Yuelu shushe ,1989). For a recent study of the excavated version of the Jijiu pian, see Zhang 
Nali 張娜麗, Seiiki shutsudo monjo no kisoteki kenkyū : Chūgoku kodai ni okeru shōgakusho dōmōsho no 
shosō 西域出土文書の基礎的研究 : 中国古代における小学書・童蒙書の諸相 (Tōkyō : Kyūko 
Shoin, 2006), 85-131. 
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mobilizes the troops, polishes our armors and weapons, and goes for campaigns with 
the sons [of the region].” When the Han arises, the good sons of the six 
commanderies are selected and recruited to be [the royal guards of] the Yulin and the 
Qimen. Their martial prowess makes them officers, and many famous generals come 
out from among them.10  
天水、隴西……及安定、北地、上郡、西河，皆迫近戎狄，修習戰備，高上氣
力，以射獵為先。故《秦詩》曰……「王于興師，修我甲兵，與子偕行」……
漢興，六郡良家子選給羽林、期門；以材力為官，名將多出焉。 
 
It is clear that valor and martial prowess were prevalent in the six commanderies which 
spreading along the north and northwest of the Former Han metropolitan region: Longxi, 
Beidi, Tianshui, Anding, Shang, and Xihe. Their people were good at fighting. The 
military elites among them, known as the Liujun liangjiazi (Good Sons of the Six 
Commanderies), briefly mentioned in Chapter Two, were especially recruited by the 
imperial court to form the royal guards, which produced many famous generals of the 
Former Han dynasty. 
As shown in the previous chapter, the Qin-Han people commonly held a view on the 
difference between the areas of Shanxi/Guanxi (the west of Mount Yao or the Hangu Pass) 
and Shandong/Guandong (the east of Mount Yao or the Hangu Pass) as the former was 
the area known for martial prowess and producing military men while the latter was 
 
10 HS, 28B: 1644. 
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known for refined culture and breeding civilians.11 The six commanderies of Longxi, 
Tianshui, Beidi, Anding, Shang, and Xihe were important components of the region of 
Shanxi/Guanxi and critical sources of providing military men. Among the six 
commanderies, Longxi, Tianshui, Beidi, and Anding were all within the jurisdiction of 
Liang province and played a crucial role in the military history of the Former Han 
dynasty. Besides the aforementioned “Treatise on Geography,” the complier of the 
Hanshu also made another comments on the martial atmosphere in these four 
commanderies, 
Since the times of the Qin and Han, [the region of] Shandong produces civil 
ministers and [the region of] Shanxi produces military generals.… The Han arises, 
Wang Wei and Gan Yanshou of Yuzhi [county], Gongsun He and Fu Jiezi of Yiqu, Li 
Guang and Li Cai of Chengji, Su Jian and Su Wu of Tuling, Shangguan Jie and Zhao 
Chongguo of Shanggui, Lian Bao of Xiangwu, Xin Wuxian and [Xin] Qingji of 
Didao, were all well known for their valor and martial prowess. The fathers and sons 
of the Su’s and Xin’s were famous and were thus recorded with praise. However, 
besides them, there were still innumerable [fathers and sons like them but were not 
recorded]. Why [were there so many of them]?  [The commanderies of] Tianshui, 
Longxi, Anding, and Beidi of Shanxi region are closely located to the Qiang and the 
Hu. The people [of these commanderies] get used to be in a state of war 
preparedness, honor valor and the skills of horsemanship and archery. As the Odes 
of the Qin says, “The king mobilizes the troops, polishes our armors and weapons, 
and goes for campaigns with the sons [of the region].” It is the traditions and 
customs since antiquity. As the legacy of such culture, its folk songs are still 
enthusiastic today.12   
 
11 Fu, “Handai de Shandong yu Shanxi,” 65-80; Xing, “Shishi Handai de Guandong, Guanshi yu Shandong, 
Shanxi,”180-210. 
12 HS 69: 2998-99. 
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秦漢已來，山東出相，山西出將。……漢興，郁郅王圍、甘延壽，義渠公孫賀、
傅介子，成紀李廣、李蔡，杜陵蘇建、蘇武，上邽上官桀、趙充國，襄武廉襃，
狄道辛武賢、慶忌，皆以勇武顯聞。蘇、辛父子著節，此其可稱列者也，其餘
不可勝數。何則？山西天水、隴西、安定、北地處勢迫近羌胡，民俗修習戰備，
高上勇力鞍馬騎射。故《秦詩》曰：「王于興師，修我甲兵，與子皆行。」其風
聲氣俗自古而然，今之歌謠慷慨，風流猶存耳。    
 
As the compilation of the Hanshu was completed in the reign of the third emperor of the 
Later Han dynasty, to a certain degree, it shows that the compiler(s) and even the 
contemporary people held the view that Shanxi region, especially the four commanderies 
mentioned, was famous for producing military men in the Qin-Former Han period. 
Furthermore, in the Hou Hanshu, it is said that an official named Yu Xu 虞詡 quoted in 
his memorial an adage, “Guanxi produces military generals and Guandong produces civil 
ministers,”13 關西出將，關東出相. These all reveal that the civil and military dichotomy 
between the regions of Shanxi/Guanxi and Shandong/Guandong was commonly held by 
the Han people and hence forged a stereotype of the two regions. 
The names mentioned in the above passage were all those of famous military officials, 
general officers, and diplomats of the Former Han dynasty. Except for Su Jian and his son 
Su Wu, who were natives of Tuling county in the Former Han metropolitan region (and 
yet still part of Shanxi/Guanxi region), all of the people on the list were of northwestern 
 
13 HHS 58: 1866. 
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provenance. The following biographical vignettes introduce these and some other military 
icons and celebrities of Liang province in both Han dynasties, so that we can have a 
general impression of their military career path and the role that the Liang province 
military elites played in the period under discussion.  
For the men of the Former Han times, I listed them in the order that their names 
appear in the Hanshu passage quoted above.  
1. Wang Wei 王圍 was from Yuzhi 郁郅 county in Beidi commandery. Although no 
details of his life were given in the Hanshu, according to the “Treatise on Arts and 
Letters” (Yiwen zhi 藝文志, which is basically the catalogue of the imperial library) 
of Hanshu, there was a book called Shefa 射法 (The Method of Archery) by a Wang 
Wei who had the title of General of the Strong Crossbow (Qiangnu Jiangjun 強弩將
軍).14 Considering the fact that Wang Wei of Yuzhi was a famous military man and 
the people of the northwest were good at archery, it is highly possible that he was a 
master of archery, a commander of crossbowmen, and a writer on archery skills. 
2. Gan Yanshou 甘延壽 (d. 24BCE), also from Yuzhi, earned his fame in the Han 
history because of a remarkable military achievement. Gan was a typical Liujun 
 
14 HS, 30: 1761. 
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liangjiazi as he started his career by serving in the elite royal guards of the Yulin 羽
林 and, later, the Qimen 期門. He was good at archery and horsemanship and had 
unusual physical strength. In 36BCE, he was appointed Protector General of the 
Western Regions (Xiyu Duhu 西域都護), which was the superintendent of Han 
forces in the Western Regions.15 Following the plan designed by his associate Chen 
Tang 陳湯 (d. 12BCE), Gan mobilized the Han and non-Han troops at his disposal 
to unleash a pre-emptive strike on Zhizhi 郅支 Chanyu of the Xiongnu, who was 
staying at a makeshift fortress in Inner Asia after his failure in the power struggle 
among the leadership of the Xiongnu. After a fierce battle, Gan and Chen killed and 
beheaded the Chanyu, which was an unprecedented victory over the Xiongnu. Gan 
was therefore ennobled as a marquis.16   
3. Gongsun He 公孫賀 (d. 91BCE), a native of Yiqu county in Beidi, was a grandson 
of Gongsun Hunye 公孫昆邪 (fl. 150s-140s BCE), who was a famous general 
during the reign of Emperor Jing 景 (r. 157-141BCE).17 As examined in the previous 
chapter, Yiqu county was named after the Yiqu people of the Western Rong. The 
 
15 For the establishment of the position of the Protector General of the Western Regions and its duties, see 
HS, 19A: 738 and 70: 3006. 
16 HS, 70: 3007-15. For modern studies on the battle against Zhizhi Changyu, see J. J. L. Duyvendak, “An 
Illustrated Battle-Account in the History of the Former Han Dynasty,” T’oung Pao xxxiv (1939), 249-64; 
Loewe, Crisis and Conflict in Han China, 211-251.  
17 HS, 66: 2877. 
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Gongsun family was good at fighting and horsemanship and the name Hunye was 
perhaps a transliteration of a non-Han name (given that one of the Xiongnu kings who 
surrendered the Hexi region was the King of Hunye), the Gongsun family was 
possibly alien in origin. Gongsun He served with credit as a cavalryman when he was 
young. He was promoted rapidly during the reign of Emperor Wu and achieved 
outstanding military merits by taking part in the expeditions against the Xiongnu and 
was thus ennobled. In his old age, Gongsun He was appointed Chancellor. In a 
response to the appointment, Gongsun He described himself as “a man who grew up 
in rustic periphery, and became official because of horsemanship and archery.”18 本
邊鄙，以鞍馬騎射為官. However, Gongsun He and his son, who was also a senior 
official, were implicated and executed in the notorious case of witchcraft (Wugu 巫
蠱), which caused a large-scale purge in the last years of Emperor Wu.19 
4. Fu Jiezi 傅介子 (d. 65BCE), another native of Yiqu, started his career by serving in 
the military and made his name in two adventurous diplomatic missions. About 
77BCE, Fu as the Inspector of the Imperial Stables was sent to the Western Regions 
 
18 Ibid. 
19 HS, 66: 2877-78. On the case of witchcraft, see Loewe, Crisis and Conflict in Han China, 37-90; Poo 
Mu-chou 蒲慕州, “Wuguzhihuo de zhengzhi yiyi” 巫蠱之禍的政治意義, Zhongyang yanjiuyuan lishi 
yuyan yanjiusuo jikan 中央研究院歷史語言研究所集刊 57.3 (1987): 511-538.  
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as the delegate to interrogate the kings of Qiuzi 龜茲 and Loulan 樓蘭 for the 
liability of killing the Han envoys. The two kings surrendered and Fu took the 
advantage of killing the Xiongnu envoys who were visiting Qiuzi. Fu was rewarded 
and promoted after his return to the imperial capital. He then persuaded the regent 
Huo Guang 霍光 (d. 68BCE) to have the kings of Qiuzi and Loulan put to death in 
order to prevent any potential trouble. With Huo’s permission, Fu went on his second 
mission and beheaded the king of Loulan. He was hence ennobled as a marquis.20 
5. Li Guang 李廣 (d. 119BCE) was a native of Chengji 成紀 county in Longxi 
commandery. Well known as the “Flying General” (Fei Jiangjun 飛將軍), Li Guang 
was not only one of the most famous generals of the Former Han dynasty but also a 
renowned military figure in Chinese history. He was a famous archer grew up in a 
family with a long military tradition. According to the “Treatise on Arts and Letters,” 
a work entitled General Li’s Art of Archery (Li Jiangjun Shefa 李將軍射法) was 
attributed to him.21 He served the emperors Wen, Jing, and Wu, and spent nearly his 
whole life on fighting against the Xiongnu. His three sons were all military officers.22  
6. Li Cai 李蔡 (d. 118BCE), also from Chengji, was a cousin of Li Guang and served 
 
20 HS, 70: 3001-3002. 
21 HS, 30:1761. 
22 SJ, 109: 2867-2876; HS, 54: 2439-2450. 
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the court with him in the same period. Although not as famous as his cousin, Li Cai 
had a more prosperous career. During Emperor Wu’s reign, Li Cai was appointed 
General of Light Chariots (Qingju Jiangjun 輕車將軍) under the command of the 
Grand General Wei Qing and was granted a marquisate as a reward of his 
achievements. In 121BCE, he was appointed Chancellor.23      
7. Shangguan Jie 上官桀 (d. 80BC), a native of Shanggui 上邽 county of Tianshui 
commandery, served in the royal guards of the Yulin and the Qimen when he was 
young. He impressed Emperor Wu with physical strength and was then promoted 
Director of Palace Stables and later Minister of Transport (Taipu 太僕).24 He might 
have taken part in a large-scale military expedition to the Western Regions.25 When 
Emperor Wu was on deathbed, he entrusted his eight-year-old successor to Huo 
Guang, Jin Midi 金日磾 (d. 86BCE), Shangguan Jie, and Sang Hongyang 桑弘羊 
(152-80BCE). In order to secure his prominent position, Shangguan Jie even married 
his granddaughter to the young emperor. However, the fortune of the Shangguan 
family did not last long. Shangguan Jie and his son lost in the power struggle with 
 
23 HS, 54: 2446. 
24 HS, 97A: 3957. 
25 According to the record, there was a military officer named Shangguan Jie in the campaign. It might be 
possible a man with the same name. However, if we consider the fact that our Shangguan Jie had a strong 
martial background and the Shangguan Jie in the campaign commanded cavalrymen of Shanggui county, it 
is highly possible that the two Shangguan Jie were the same person. See HS, 61: 2702-2703.     
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Huo Guang and were both sentenced to death.26 
8. Zhao Chongguo 趙充國 (137-51BCE) was from a family of Shanggui provenance 
and later moved to Lingju 令居 county in Jincheng commandery when it was 
established in the reign of Emperor Zhao 昭 (r. 87-74BCE). He started his career as 
a cavalryman and was later recruited to the royal guard of Yulin in the name of Liujun 
liangjiazi with skillful archery and horsemanship.” 27  六郡良家子善騎射. He 
served successively emperors Wu, Zhao, and Xuan. While still a young military 
officer, Zhao Chongguo engaged in the war against the Xiongnu and suffered severe 
wounds in the battle. Being impressed by his bravery and courage, Emperor Wu 
summoned Zhao to the court to show his wounds and rewarded him with promotion. 
Thereafter, Zhao gradually rose to be a prominent official and finally reached the top 
echelon as General of the Rear (Hou Jiangjun 後將軍). In 73BCE, Zhao was 
ennobled for his contribution to the establishment of Emperor Xuan. Even though he 
was seventy years old, Zhao was still in charge of a campaign against the Qiang 
rebels, which will be treated in its appropriate place in the next chapter. He died in 
51BCE at the age of 86. To commemorate him, Emperor Xuan had Zhao’s portrait in 
 
26 HS, 68: 2932-2936. 
27 HS, 69: 2971. 
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the palace and Emperor Cheng 成 (r. 33-7BCE) asked a famous writer to compose a 
eulogy for his achievements in defeating the Qiang.28        
9. Lian Bao 廉襃 (fl. 10sBCE-3CE) was from Xiangwu 襄武 county in Longxi. 
According to the fragmented records in the Hanshu, Lian Bao was once Protector 
General of the Western Regions and was promoted to be senior official as General of 
the Right (You Jiangjun 右將軍) in 13BCE.29     
10. Xin Wuxian 辛武賢 (fl. 60s-50sBCE), a native of Didao 狄道 county in Longxi 
commandery, was Governor of Jiquan commandery when he was appointed General 
who Crushes the Qiang (Po Qiang Jiangjun 破羌將軍) by Emperor Xuan to 
collaborate with General Zhao Chongguo in the Qiang campaign.30 Later, Xin led a 
force to pacify the state of Wusun in the Western Regions which was in turmoil.31 His 
younger brother Xin Tang 辛湯 (fl. 50sBCE) was Colonel Protector of the Qiang 
(Hu Qiang Xiaowei 護羌校尉), which was a position responsible for supervising the 
Qiang people within and without the Han realm.32 It is clear that the Xin brothers 
 
28 HS, 69: 2971-95. For a recent study on Zhao Chongguo, see Edward L. Dreyer, “Zhao Chongguo: A 
Professional Soldier of China’s Former Han Dynasty,” The Journal of Military History 72.3 (2008), 
665-725. 
29 HS, 77: 3252 and 96B: 3908. 
30 HS, 69: 2977-78. 
31 HS, 96B: 3907. 
32 HS, 69: 2993. For an outline of the duty of the Colonel Protector of the Qiang in historical sources, see 
Sun Xingyan 孫星衍, ed., Hanguan liuzhong 漢官六種. Annotated by Zhou Tianyou 周天游 (Beijing: 
Zhonghua shuju, 1990), 154. For modern research on the subject, see Gao Rong 高榮, “Handai Hu Qiang 
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were specialists in the Qiang affairs. 
11. Xin Qingji 辛慶忌 (d. 11BCE), the son of Xin Wuxian, was granted his first official 
position through his privilege as the son of a senior official. While he was serving at a 
Han colony in the state of Wusun, which his father once pacified, he fought 
successfully against the enemy and was promoted to colonel. In the reign of Emperor 
Yuan 元 (r. 48-33BCE), Xin Qingji was widely admired by the court officials for his 
ability and was promoted to various important posts, including grand administrators 
of Zhangye and Jiuquan. He also earned a good reputation among the Xiongnu and 
the Western Regions. At the peak of his career, Xi Qingji was appointed General of 
the Right. His three sons were all military talents and officials, and the eldest one was 
appointed Protector General of the Qiang. With the solid foundation laid by Wuxian 
and Qingji, the Xin clan developed into a strong local magnate in Longxi 
commandery and even Liang province. However, such a prosperity provided an 
excuse for Wang Mang, the man who would usurp the Former Han, to charge the 
Xins and put Qingji’s three sons and other important members to death. The Xin 
 
Xiaowei shulun” 漢代護羌校尉述論, Zhongguo bianjiang shidi yanjiu 中國邊疆史地研究 1995.3: 
10-16; Liu Pak-yuen, Shizhe yu guanzhi yanbian: Qin Han huangdi shizhe kaolun 使者與官制演變：秦漢
皇帝使者考論 (Taipei: Wenjin chubanshe, 2006), 291-302. 
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family was thus ruined.33          
Besides the above names, there were still several famous northwesterners recorded in the 
other places of the Hanshu: 
12. Li Xi 李息 (fl. 140s-110sBCE), of Yuzhi county in Beidi commandery, started his 
career by serving Emperor Jing. He was appointed General of Infantry (Caiguan 
Jiangjun 材官將軍) by Emperor Wu and engaged in the war against the Xiongnu.34 
13. Gongsun Ao 公孫敖 (fl. 130s-90sBCE), a native of Yiqu county of Beidi, entered 
service as Palace Attendant at the court of Emperor Jing. During the reign of Emperor 
Wu, Gongsun Ao was a senior military officer in a series of campaigns against the 
Xiongnu. He was appointed General for four times. However, it was said that his wife 
implicated in a case of witchcraft, Gongsun Ao and his family were therefore all 
sentenced to death.35  
14. Li Ling 李陵 (d. 74BCE) was a grandson of the renowned “Flying General” Li 
Guang. While still in his young age, Li Ling had already been appointed as Palace 
Attendant and supervisor of the palace cavalry. Like his grandfather, Li Ling was 
famous for his skillful horsemanship and archery and was highly regarded by 
 
33 HS, 69: 2996-2998. 
34 SJ, 111: 2942; HS, 55: 2491. 
35 SJ, 111: 2942-43; HS, 55: 2491. 
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Emperor Wu for his prestigious military family background. In the late reign of 
Emperor Wu, Li Ling was responsible for training archers stationed at the 
commanderies of Jiuquan and Dunhuang. In 99BCE, Li Ling took part in a 
large-scale expedition against the Xiongnu but was assigned to lead only 5,000 
infantry as an auxiliary force. Nevertheless, Li Ling’s small force accidentally 
encountered the main force led by the Xiongnu Chanyu. After an epic battle, Li Ling 
surrendered to the Xiongnu. The Chanyu highly respected Li Ling, gave him his 
daughter to marry and granted him a title of king. Li Ling spent the rest of his life in 
the Xiongnu. Since Li Ling chose to surrender rather than to die for the imperial 
honor, which was in contrast to the expectation of Emperor Wu, his family was 
exterminated by the imperial order. The famous Li family in Longxi commandery was 
thus ruined and military men of the commandery all felt shame at such a disgrace.36 
15. Duan Huizong 段會宗 (d. 3CE?), a native of Shanggui in Tianshui, was promoted 
from Magistrate of Duling county to Protector General of the Western Regions in the 
reign of Emperor Cheng. During his tenure, Duan earned great respect from the Inner 
 
36 SJ, 109:2877-78; HS, 54: 2450-2459. For the legend of Li Ling in Chinese history, see Tomiya Itaru, 
Gobi ni ikita otokotachi: Ri Ryō to So Bu ゴビに生きた男たち：李陵と蘇武 (Tōkyō: Hakuteisha, 1994). 
Sima Qian, the compiler of the Shiji, was castrated as a punishment of his expressing sympathy for Li 
Ling’s surrender during a court meeting with the irate Emperor Wu. 
134 
 
                                                
Asian states. After several years of other postings, he was re-appointed the same 
office as the imperial court’s response to the request from those states. Duan was 
ennobled for his achievement of leading a small force to suppress the rebels in the 
state of Wusun. When he died in Wusun at the age of 75, some states of the Western 
Regions built shrines to memorialize him.37       
As will be discussed in the next section, although the political and social status of the 
northwesterners greatly declined in the Later Han, there were still some prominent 
figures played important roles in the history of the dynasty. Their brief biographies are 
given below in chronological order. 
16. Liang Tong 梁統 (d. 40CE) was from Wushi 烏氏 county in Anding commandery. 
His great-grandfather moved from Hedong 河東 commandery to Beidi commandery 
and then his grandfather moved twice and finally settled in Anding. During the civil 
war broke out in the last years of Wang Mang, Liang Tong joined Dou Rong, the 
strongman of the Hexi Corridor, and was appointed Grand Administrator of Wuwei 
commandery. Liang Tong finally surrendered to Emperor Guangwu and was ennobled. 
In the rest of his life, Liang Tong held senior official positions and established 
 
37 HS, 70: 3029-31. 
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prestigious status of his family through marriage with the imperial house. Thereupon, 
the Liang family gradually developed into one of the influential consort families of 
the Later Han.38 
17. Liang Qin 梁 慬  (d. 115CE) was a native of Geju 弋 居  county of Beidi 
commandery. His father was a military officer in the campaign against the Xiongnu in 
89CE. Liang Qin himself was renowned for his courage and bravery. He served in the 
military and was appointed Vice-Colonel of the Western Regions in 106CE. During 
his military career, Liang Qin played an active role in the Qiang wars and the 
campaigns against the Southern Xiongnu and the Wuhuan in the northeast.39  
18. Huangfu Gui, one of the “Three Brilliants of Liang Province,” grew up from a 
military family at Chaona 朝那 county in Anding commandery, with his grandfather 
was a general and father a commandant. Huangfu Gui initially entered the 
government via civil position, but he quickly showed his military talent and was 
assigned to suppress local bandits. From 161CE onward, Huangfu Gui served a series 
of commanding positions in the northwestern and northern frontiers, and was hence 
remembered as a famous general of the Later Han dynasty.40 
 
38 HHS, 34: 1165-70. 
39 HHS, 47: 1591-93. 
40 HHS, 65: 2129-37. 
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19. Zhang Huan, the protagonist of the story at the beginning of this chapter, was a native 
of Yuanquan county in Dunhuang commandery. He started with a civil-service 
position but turned to the military later. During his military career, Zhang Huan 
mainly served as frontier commander and dealt with alien peoples such as the Qiang, 
the Wuhuan, and the Xianbi.41 It was his great achievements in the Qiang wars 
caused him to be rewarded with the unprecedented permission to transfer his 
registered residence, as we have already learned.   
20. Duan Jiong, one of the “Three Brilliants,” was from Guzang 姑臧 county of Wuwei 
commandery. His great-great-uncle was claimed to be Duan Huizong of the Former 
Han. Since his youth, Duan Jiong was a skillful archer and horseman; however, he 
started his career via civil position and only shifted to the military later. He had been 
commandant against the invasion of the Xianbi people in the northeast and 
suppressed local rebels in the eastern commanderies. Later, he was appointed Colonel 
Protector of the Qiang and had long service in the Qiang Wars. In his later years, 
Duan Jiong ingratiated himself with the eunuchs who controlled the imperial court 
and therefore reached the top echelons of the bureaucracy. However, he was forced to 
 
41 HHS, 65: 2138-44. 
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kill himself when his eunuch patron was defeated by another eunuch clique.42      
21. Fu Xie 傅燮 (d. 187CE), a native of Liangzhou 靈州 county 
entered the government through civil office. Like those aforementioned names, Fu 
Xie finally established himself in military service. In the last decades of Later Han, 
Fu took part in the campaigns for suppressing the Yellow Turban rebellion (broke out 
in 184CE), which spread across the eastern part of the empire. Later, when Liang 
province was in chaos and fell in the hand of local rebels, prominent officials at the 
imperial court suggested giving up the province, Fu Xie was the staunchest opponent 
of such a plan. He was later appointed Grand Administrator of Hanyang commandery 
in Liang province, and was besieged by the rebels and finally died in battle.43  
22. Gai Xun 蓋勳 (140-190CE) was from an old official family in Guangzhi 
county in Dunhuang commandery. Starting his career with a civil assignment, Gai 
Xun proved himself as a military talent and brave fighter in battles against the rebels 
in Liang province. When Dong Zhuo controlled the imperial court, Gai Xun was one 
of the very few officials who dared to criticize the warlord to his face.44 
23. Huangfu Song 皇甫嵩 (d. 195CE) was a nephew of the great general H
 
42 HHS, 65: 2144-54. 
43 HHS, 58: 1873-78. 
44 HHS, 58: 1879-83. 
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Still a young man, Huangfu Song had already shown interest in both civil and 
military pursuits. He was good at shooting and horse riding. Huangfu Song really 
won his fame by commanding the campaign against the Yellow Turbans. Fu Xie, 
mentioned above, was his aide-de-camp. The successful suppression of the rebels 
made Huangfu Song the most renowned general and the indisputable military leader 
of his time. He was later sent to Liang province against the local rebels. At that time, 
Dong Zhuo was under his command. However, when Dong Zhuo controlled the 
imperial court, Huangfu Song was unable to stop him and was deprived of his 
command.45 
24. Dong Zhuo, t
in Longxi commandery. When he was still young, he had already been a famed 
fighter and earned friendship among the tribal leaders of the Qiang. He started his 
career as military officer of Liang province. Later, he was recruited to the Yulin royal 
guard in the name of the Liujun liangjiazi and then served as an aide-de-camp of 
Zhang Huan in a campaign against the Qiang at Hanyang commandery. Dong Zhuo 
rose quickly and became an important general in the northwestern region, in the last 
 
45 HHS, 71: 2299-2307. 
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years of the Later Han. By commanding a multi-ethnic troop from the northwestern 
borderlands, the ambitious Dong Zhuo made for himself a strong force which could 
tip the balance of power of the empire.46   
   Needless to say, the aforementioned names w
during the two Han dynasties who left traces in historical records and were a very small 
portion of the northwesterners who entered government services. Since little is known 
regarding the people of northwestern provenance,47 it is not possible to have a full picture 
of the career patterns of the whole northwestern population based on the available 
sources. Nevertheless, since the military elites were regarded by their contemporaries and 
the Han historians as representatives of their countrymen, some general features 
summarized from their career paths might give us clues to analyze the political status of 
the northwestern aspirants to government office in the period under discussion. 
Of the twenty four men whose biographies are listed above, fifteen liv
mer Han; one was active during the interval between the two Han dynasties; eight 
lived in the Later Han.  
 
46 HHS, 72: 2321-32. 
47 Fragments of records regarding the garrison soldiers, the cavalry, and the colonists from northwestern 
counties can be found in the unearthed Juyan wooden strips, but they are too slender to reconstruct a big 
picture of the life and career pattern of the northwestern people. See Loewe, Records of Han Administration, 
v.1, 99-126.   
140 
 
 from the biographies of the fifteen Former Han 
figu
Several features can be summarized
res. Firstly, they all started their official careers and received promotion on the basis 
of their military valor, skill, and merits. Some of them were the Liujun liangjiazi and 
started their careers by serving in the prestigious royal guards of the Yulin and the Qimen, 
which offered them opportunities to be close to the emperor and therefore advantages to 
develop illustrious careers. Even those who were not in the royal guard still started as 
military officers or ordinary cavalryman. At the peak of their careers, Gongsun He and Li 
Cai were appointed Chancellor, and others like Shangguan Jie, Zhao Chongguo, Lian Bao, 
and Xin Qingji reached the highest echelon of the government and played important roles 
in imperial politics. Some of them were also ennobled for their military feats. Secondly, 
nearly all the offices these men held were on military track, such as royal guards, various 
positions of military officers, and different ranks of generals. Even when they were not in 
active military service, their positions were still military related, such as Fu Jiezi’s and 
Shangguan Jie’s duties relating to the management of breeding horses and keeping 
chariots. It is clear that these men were on the military side of the government service, 
which was different from the civil one. Thirdly, most of them took part in military 
operations against the Xiongnu, the Qiang, and other Inner Asian peoples. These men 
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constituted an important corps in the defense and expansion of the Former Han empire.  
In contrast, the career pattern of the Later Han northwestern elites listed above shows
ht differences from that of their Former Han counterparts. Among the nine men, Liang 
Tong was born in the Former Han times, took part in the civil war between the two Han 
dynasties, and served in the Later Han court only after his surrender; therefore, his career 
was exceptional and should not be simply counted in the Later Han group. The remaining 
eight men were mainly active in the late period of the Later Han. Liang Qin, like his 
Former Han predecessors, started his career as a military officer and took part in the 
campaigns against the alien peoples. However, based on the sources shown above, it 
seems that there was a change in career pattern of the northwestern elites after the middle 
period of Later Han. Huangfu Gui, Zhang Huan, Duan Jiong, Fu Xie, Gai Xun, and 
Huangfu Song, while they were remembered as military talents and famous generals, all 
entered government services via civil positions and only shifted to military offices later.  
Comparatively speaking, the Former Han group started their military career from the
tom rungs of the military hierarchy, no matter whether they were in the royal guards or 
cavalry or other troops, and had first-hand experiences in combat and as a rank-and-file 
member of the military; while the Later Han elites started as civil officers and transferred 
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to the military as middle or high level officers, which deprived them of the combat and 
rank-and-file experiences. In other words, unlike the Former Han elites who grew up in 
the military, the Later Han elites were transplanted into the military. It does not 
necessarily mean that the Later Han elites were not good fighters in themselves but, for 
some reasons which will be discussed in the next section, the Later Han system did not 
provide room for them to be pure military men if they wanted to climb the ladder of 
success. Furthermore, even though the Later Han elites achieved remarkable military 
exploits, they seldom reached the highest echelons as their Former Han predecessors did 
(Duan Jiong was able to reach the highest position but only because of his relations with 
the eunuchs who had great influence in court politics). In addition, while it was common 
for the Former Han elites to enter government by being the Liujun liangjiazi, the same 
case was unlikely in the Later Han. None of the above six Later Han men were recorded 
as Liujun liangjiazi in the historical sources. It might imply the diminishing role of the 
Liujun liangjiazi in the Later Han. 
The only man who was the Li
g Zhou. His career path was different from that of the “Three Brilliants of Liang 
Province” and others as he grew up among the troops and held consistently to the military 
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, geographically speaking, the Former 
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related problems in the 
nex
e the elites, the non-elite group in this study refers to those who moved to the 
track. But in his early years he had a comparatively inferior career and was treated as an 
uncouth military man. Therefore, he was a unique case on the list.  
Differences between career patterns show that the political envi
 differed from that of the Former Han, which would directly influence the political 
and social status of the northwestern military elites and the mutual attitudes between 
them and the imperial center as we shall see later. 
Another point that merits our attention is that
 elites, especially those who were known as the Liujun liangjiazi, were from the old 
commanderies, such as Longxi, Tianshi, Beidi, and Anding; however, during the Later 
Han times, some of the elites like Zhang Huan, Duan Jiong, and Gai Xun were from the 
new commanderies of Dunhuang and Wuwei. It tells the fact that the new commanderies 
in the Hexi region founded by Emperor Wu and his successors had developed to a certain 
degree and could produce their own elites in the Later Han times. 
Before we explore the new career pattern of the elites and the 
t section, we should now focus on the non-elite settlers in the remainder of this 
section. 
   Unlik
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northwest during the course of the two Han dynasties but without achieving high political 
and social status. They constituted the local populace of Liang province and especially 
the mainstay of pioneers in the new commanderies—Dunhuang, Jiuquan, Zhangye, 
Wuwei, and Jincheng. Besides the soldiers, according to the Hanshu, those settlers who 
moved to the Hexi region were mainly “the paupers of Guandong area, or those who had 
committed transgressions in revenge, or the family members of those who had committed 
betrayal and disobedient.”48 其民或以關東下貧，或以報怨過當，或以誖逆亡道，家
屬徙焉. Simply put, the majority of them were the poor, the amnestied convicts, and the 
exiles from different parts of the empire. In the absence of willing migrants, the 
settlement of these settlers was an act of state. Considering their backgrounds, quite a 
number of them were people who had nothing to lose and had no scruples about using 
violence to achieve their aims or protect their own interests. They represented the 
potential rebellious and restive elements of society. It seemed economical for the state to 
relocate and cluster them together in the newly conquered northwestern frontier, where 
their labor could be used to serve imperial projects, either defensive or expansionist.  
Since the extant historical sources do not permit us to have the exact number a
 
48 HS, 28B: 1645. 
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er details of the multitude of settlers, I can only draw an outline of the sanctioned 
migrations toward the northwest during the two Han dynasties in the following.    
State-sanctioned migration of people to frontiers as a policy of social engineerin
ng tradition during the Qin-Han period.49 During the war of conquest in the third 
century BCE, the Qin state would relocate its own population to newly conquered areas 
and the captured subjects of rival states to the frontier regions or the old Qin domains so 
that, on the one hand, the Qin could toughen its hold on the newly acquired lands and, on 
the other hand, it could uproot the local power bases of its new subjects. Later on, when 
the Qin swept all the rival states and established a vast empire, it continued the policy of 
sanctioned migration and moved not only the erstwhile rival aristocrats and local 
magnates but also convicts and poor people as well as those with low social status to the 
northern and southern frontiers of the nascent empire.50 Two specific cases were given in 
the sources for the Qin moving people to the northwestern frontier: royal members of the 
defeated Zhao state were moved by the Qin to Tianshui county in Longxi commandery; 
ancestors of the famous “Flying General” Li Guang of the Former Han were moved to 
 
49 For an introduction of the Qin-Han forcible movement of the people and exile of criminals to the 
frontiers, see Wang Zijin 王子今 , Qin Han jiaotong shigao 秦漢交通史稿  (Beijing: Zhonggong 
zhongyang dangxiao chubanshe, 1994), 419-454. For a general survey of state-sanctioned migration in 
Chinese history, see James Lee, “Migration and Expansion in Chinese History,” in Williams H. McNeill 
and Ruth S. Adams eds., Human Migration—Patterns and Policies (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 
1978), 20-47. 
50 Ge, Zhongguo renkoushi, v.1, 517-523; Wang, Gansu tongshi: Qin Han juan, 31-34. 
146 
 
licy. During the whole course of the Former 
Han
                                                
Chengji county in Longxi commandery.51 
The Former Han adopted the same po
 dynasty, enormous numbers of local magnates and wealthy families were relocated 
to the metropolitan area under the direct surveillance of the state.52 It was called the 
policy of “strengthening the roots and weakening the branches”53 強本弱末, which was 
especially crucial for consolidating state power during the early years of the dynasty. 
Meanwhile, migration towards the northern frontier was a response to the threat posed by 
the Xiongnu. During the reign of Emperor Wen, Chao Cuo put forward his proposal of 
state sponsored migration which encouraged and rewarded people moving to the northern 
frontier for the purposes of strengthening the imperial defense, turning wild borderlands 
into arable lands, and lessening the population pressure of the interior regions. The 
essence of Chao’s plan was the militarization of the people who moved to the frontiers as 
he anticipated that the migrants, once settled, would transform into tough defenders of the 
frontiers and totally differ from the rotating garrison soldiers from the interior who were 
unfamiliar with the frontiers and were afraid of the Xiongnu, not to mention the costs of 
 
51 Wang, Gansu tongshi: Qin Han juan, 33. 
52  Ibid, 523-526; Ge Jianxiong, Zhongguo yimin shi 中國移民史  vol. 1 (Fuzhou: Fujian renmin 
chubanshe, 1997), 88-116. 
53 HS, 43: 2123. 
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sending the soldiers back and forth.54 Also, as the historian Hsu Cho-yun puts, the 
“policy of redistributing the population” was “to make more farmers independent and 
self-sufficient” as taxpayers, which served the benefit of the state most.55  
State-sanctioned migration was in addition an emergency measure 
gees when natural disasters struck the empire. The needy of the affected area would 
be moved to the frontier region in order to lessen the burden of relief in their native 
places and to utilize their labor in developing the new territories.56 In 119BCE, for 
example, Emperor Wu moved 725,000 poor people who were affected by floods in 
Guandong to the commanderies of Longxi, Beidi, Xihe, Shang, and Kuaiji 會稽.57 In 
other words, many settlers of the northwestern borderlands were immigrants from heavily 
populated areas in Guandong. 
During the reigns of Em
e-scale and yet step-by-step migrations of people to the newly acquired lands. For the 
northwest that concerns us, as noted in the last chapter, the imperial court initially had no 
 
54 HS, 49: 2286. 
55 Hsu, Han Agriculture, 28. 
56 Luo Tonghua 羅彤華, Handai de liumin wenti 漢代的流民問題 (Taipei: Taiwan xuesheng shuju, 
1989), 221-227.   
57 HS, 6: 178. Kuaji was a commandery in the southeast with low population density and was treated as a 
semi-barbarian region. Although we do not have precise information about the distribution of the 725,000 
migrants, it is reasonable to assume that large portion of refugees were moved to the northwest and some of 
those whose native places near Kuaji might be moved there.  
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long-term plan of developing the Hexi region; therefore, although the state in 118BCE 
deployed around 5,000 to 6,000 soldiers as pioneers on the farming colonies in the 
immediate area of the west bank of the Yellow River,58 its purpose was just to strengthen 
the western defense. It was not until the Wusun declined to move back that the Han 
empire took up the Hexi region in earnest. At first, only military personnel were sent to 
the new territory; for instance, 600,000 soldiers were deployed as colonists to the Hexi 
region and the neighboring commanderies of Shang, Shuofang, Xihe in 111BCE.59 
Although some of the garrison soldiers would return to their native places after 
completing their duties, quite a few would stay and become residents there. Civilians also 
gradually moved in and later reached a certain threshold which transformed the Hexi 
region from a cluster of military colonies into a full-fledged administrative region.60 For 
example, according to the “Treatise on Geography” of Hanshu, a garrison station named 
Yuze 漁澤 in Dunhuang commandery was upgraded as Xiaogu 效穀 (literally, efficient 
in crop production) county in 105BCE as a result of its flourishing agriculture and, 
 
58 SJ, 110: 2911. 
59 HS, 24B: 1173. 
60 On the structure and organization of the civil and military administrations of the Hexi region, see Loewe, 
Records of Han Administration vol. 1; Shao Taixin 邵台新, Handai Hexi sijun de tuozhan 漢代河西四郡
的拓展 (Taipei: Taiwan shangwu yinshuguan, 1988), 103-177; Wang, Gansu tongshi: Qin Han juan, 
116-149. 
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needless to say, a large farming population.61 Although the dates of establishment of the 
four Hexi commanderies are not exact, as the previous chapter noted, the fact that at least 
three commanderies were established between 121BCE, the year of the acquisition of the 
region, and 91BCE, the last possible year that Dunhuang commandery was set up, reveals 
that local population must have reached certain amount and necessitated setting up new 
commanderies. As the Hexi region was originally not a place commonly inhabited by the 
Han people, the sudden and drastic increase of the Han population must be the result of 
state-sanctioned migration. The Hanshu clearly states that in the autumn of 111BCE, the 
Han state divided the commanderies of Wuwei and Jiuquan into two new commanderies 
of Zhangye and Dunhuang and had people settle in.62 When the Former Han established 
Jincheng commandery on the former Qiang territory in 81BCE, it went without saying 
that it was the Han settlers who constituted the mainstay of the registered population. 
From a recently excavated source, we know that in 28BCE Dunhuang commandery sent 
officers to commanderies of Donghai 東海 and Taishan 泰山, which were located in the 
east, to lead the homeless roaming people there to the northwestern frontier.63 
 
61 HS, 28B: 1614-1615. 
62 HS, 6: 189. 
63 Hu Pingsheng 胡平生 and Zhang Defang 張德芳, Dunhuang Xuanquan Hanjian shicui 敦煌懸泉漢
簡釋粹 (Shanghai: Shanghai guji chubanshe, 2001), 44. 
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The Former Han not only moved refugees and deployed soldiers to the northwest, it 
also exiled criminals to the northwest. A notorious example was that Emperor Wu exiled 
a large number of offenders who were implicated in the infamous witchcraft hunting to 
Dunhuang in 91BCE.64 Various examples of discharged officials and their families being 
exiled to the northwest can also be found in the historical records.65  
According to the estimation of a Chinese historical geographer, around 1.5 million 
people had migrated to the northwest by the end of the Former Han dynasty.66 Based on 
the population census of Liang province which recorded in the “Treatise on Geography” 
of Hanshu, migrants made up nearly all of the registered population of the commanderies 
of Dunhuang, Jiuquan, Zhangye, Wuwei, and Jincheng, half of Beidi, and a sizable 
portion of Longxi, Tianshu, and Anding.67 Of course, besides the Han settlers from 
various parts of the empire who constituted the mainstay of the registered population, 
there were also countless autochthonous peoples and other alien peoples whom were 
captured and settled by the empire, which will be discussed in the next chapter. 
Because of the limitations of the extant sources, it is hardly possible to go into details 
about the lives of the northwestern settlers. However, thanks to the discovery of a Later 
 
64 HS, 66: 2282. 
65 Examples in HS, 66: 2898, 75: 3193-3194, 77: 3261, and 83: 3396.  
66 Ge, Zhongguo renkoushi, v.1, 529. 
67 Ibid; Ge, Zhongguo yimin shi, vol. 1, 153-154.  
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Han stele in 1943, we now have a telling case of the history of migration of an elite 
family in Liang province, which might shed some light on our understanding of the 
migration and development of northwestern elites and even common settlers.  
The stele dates to 180CE and was dedicated to Zhao Kuan 趙寬 (d. 152CE), who 
was a local notable68 of Haomen 浩亹 county in Jincheng commandery of Later Han 
and a fifth-generation-grandson of the famous Former Han general Zhao Chongguo. 
According to the inscription on the stele, which traces the family history of the Zhaos, 
Zhao Zhongkuang 趙 仲 況 , the great-grandfather of Zhao Chongguo, was the 
Superintendent of the Privy Treasury (Shaofu 少府) sometime in the reigns of Emperor 
Wen and Jing; his son Sheng 聖 was an Advisory Counselor (Jianyi Dafu 諫議大夫). 
Sheng had two sons: the elder of whom was a magistrate of a county and the younger was 
a palace attendant and also the father of Chongguo. The Zhaos, however, suffered a 
setback as Chongguo’s father committed a serious offense in the palace and the family 
was exiled to Shanggui county in Longxi commandery.69 That was the beginning of the 
Zhaos as inhabitants of the northwest. Chongguo was enlisted in the local cavalry in his 
 
68 He was appointed by the local government as “Thrice Venerable” (Sanlao 三老) whose duties were to 
serve as intermediary and facilitator between local authorities and common people and as consultant for 
local officials.  
69 The inscription of the “Stele for Zhao Kuan” can be found in Gao Wen 高文, Hanbei jishi 漢碑集釋 
(Kaifeng: Henan daxue chubanshe, 1985), 432-435; Nagata Hidemasa 永田英正 ed., Kandai sekkoku 
shūsei 漢代石刻集成 (Kyoto: Dohosha, 1994), v.1: 225-229 and v.2: 226-227. 
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early age and later recruited to the royal guard because he was a Liujun liangjiazi. Since 
Chongguo attained a highly prestigious position in his entire career, his family grew 
strong and most of his offspring enjoyed successful official career.70 Some of them might 
move out from Liang province for postings in other sectors of the empire, nevertheless, 
the main branch of the family remained in the northwest. According to his biography of 
Hanshu, probably as a result of military campaign against the Qiang, Chongguo moved to 
Lingju county in Jincheng commandery, which was set up on the former Qiang 
domains. 71  It was an example of migration as a measure accompanied territorial 
expansion and consolidation. However, the stele gives no indication of this migration. On 
the other hand, the stele states that the protagonist Zhao Kuan moved from Shanggui to 
Poqiang 破羌 county in Jincheng when he assumed the office of Deputy Major of the 
Colonel Protector of the Qiang (Hu Qiang Xiaowei Jia Sima 護羌校尉假司馬) in the 
Later Han times. One possible explanation for the two migrations would be that 
Chongguo moved to Lingju with the troops but left some of his family members in 
Shanggui; Kuan grew up in the family remaining in Shanggui and only moved to Poqiang 
for his new posting. Later, Zhao Kuan engaged in a battle against the Qiang, in which the 
 
70 The inscription listed the official titles of Chongguo’s descendents, but for the purpose of simplicity, I 
skipped them in the above analysis. See Gao, Hanbei jishi, 433; Nagata, Kandai sekkoku shūsei, v.1: 
225-229 and v.2: 226-227.   
71 HS, 69: 2971. 
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imperial army was defeated and Kuan’s four sons were all killed. In the ensuing 
evacuation, Kuan fled from Liang province with the refugees to the erstwhile Former Han 
metropolitan area. Several years later, he moved back to Poqiang, then again to Haomen 
county, where the stele was excavated.72  
The history of the Zhao family paints a vivid picture of the experience of some 
settlers in the northwestern borderlands. For various reasons, the settlers, mostly 
unwillingly, moved from their native places to the northwest; some of them would settle 
down but others might need to move again when the imperial power proceeded to further 
northwest. On the other hand, natural disasters and war would become push factors 
forcing settlers to move out of the northwest. The Qiang wars in the Later Han times 
especially triggered waves of outward migration in the northwest, as we shall see in the 
next chapter. 
Like the Zhao family, some northwestern elites in the Later Han also benefited from 
their ancestors who moved to the northwest during the Former Han times and 
accumulated their wealth and influence in the region. The aforementioned Liang Tong 
was a good example of those who greatly benefited from their family background and 
 
72 Gao, Hanbei jishi, 433; Nagata, Kandai sekkoku shūsei, v.1: 225-229 and v.2: 226-227. 
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thus attained official positions in Liang province and even the Later Han imperial court. 
According to the historical records, for some reasons, Liang Tong’s great grandfather 
moved from Hedong commandery in the east to Beidi commandery in the northwest. 
Later, as the Liang family had accumulated a great fortune, they were moved by the 
Former Han government to the metropolitan area as a means to curb strong local 
magnates. Not until the last years of the Former Han did the Liangs return to the 
northwest and settle in Anding commandery.73 With the great fortune and possibly 
accompanying influence, the Liangs became local leaders. As a result, Liang Tong easily 
assumed power in the region during the civil war and was highly esteemed by Emperor 
Guangwu of the Later Han after his surrender.74 
The early Later Han rulers, on one hand, relied upon local magnates like Liang Tong 
to help restore order in the northwest in the aftermath of the civil war; on the other hand, 
they continued the policy of sanctioned migration as a measure to rehabilitate the region. 
The southern sector of Liang province was especially devastated during the war and 
many people were dislocated, as the Hou Hanshu says, “Although Longxi was pacified, 
 
73 HHS, 34: 1165.  
74 Another Later Han stele named the “Stele for Cao Quan” 曹全碑 (Cao Quan Bei; produced in 185CE) 
traces the protagonist Cao Quan’s family history, saying that the Caos were moved to the northwestern 
commanderies such as Anding, Wudu, Longxi, and Dunhuang as a result of the expansion under Emperor 
Wu of the Former Han, and the Caos became local magnates in those commanderies. See Gao, Hanbei jishi, 
472-476; Nagata, Kandai sekkoku shūsei, v.1: 252-259 and v.2: 246-247. For English translation and 
analysis of the inscription of this stele, see Ebrey, “Later Han Stone Inscriptions,” 339-353. 
155 
 
                                                
people were starving and many of them were roaming.”75 隴西雖平，而人飢，流者相
望. Besides providing relief to the roaming population, the Later Han state also moved 
those who fled the war back to their home towns. For example, Emperor Guangwu once 
ordered the Grand Administrator of Wuwei commandery to send 3,000 refugees in his 
jurisdiction back to Jincheng commandery.76 Moreover, the emperor issued an edict to 
emancipate those who were forced to be slaves in Liang province as a means to increase 
the taxable population of the region.77 Meanwhile, in order to strengthen the defensive 
efforts of the northwestern frontier zone, the Later Han resumed farming colonies in the 
northwest, settling soldiers, commoners, amnestied convicts, surrendered Qiang people, 
and their families there. Especially from the middle period of the dynasty on, when the 
northwest was beset by the intermittent Qiang revolts, commoners were recruited to serve 
in garrisons in the region. Furthermore, the state frequently commuted death sentence 
into exile and sent convicts to the frontiers with their families. According to the records in 
Hou Hanshu, examples can be seen in the following years (all in CE): 73, 74, 82, 84, 87, 
96, 124, 126, 130, 144, 147, 150, 153, and 154. The practice lasted until the final years 
 
75 HHS, 15: 588. 
76 HHS, 24: 836. In 50CE, Emperor Guangwu issued another edict ordering all those who fled to the 
interior returned to the frontiers, see HHS, 1B: 78.  
77 HHS, 1B: 64. For slaves in the Han period, see C. Martin Wilbur, Slavery in China during the Former 
Han Dynasty 206 B.C.-A.D. 25 (Chicago: Field Museum of Natural History, 1943); Ch'ü, Han Social 
Structure, 135-159. 
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when the Later Han lost control of the northwest.78 Needless to say, the use or threat of 
violence played a key role in a region keeping criminals, whether in the way that the 
convicts against each other or the authorities imposed order or discipline on them.79 This 
would no doubt contribute to the prevalence of martial spirit in the region.  
Compared to the Former Han, sending convicts to the northwest became a routine 
practice throughout the Later Han. Liang province was in general a land of exile, 
Dunhuang commandery was in particular infamous for being a destination for amnestied 
convicts. It might partly explain why Zhang Huan was so desperate to move out from 
Dunhuang. Certainly, there were deeper reasons, which will be the subject of the next 
section. 
 
Peripheralization of the Northwestern Borderlands 
Despite of his fame in the northwest, Zhang Huan seems uncomfortable being a 
northwesterner. Was it Dunhuang commandery’s bad reputation of hosting amnestied 
convicts that aroused his dislike? It was possible, but not completely. If Zhang Huan 
merely detested the commandery, he could have requested to move to another part of 
 
78 HHS, 2: 121, 122; 3: 143, 147, 156, 157, 158; 4: 182; 5: 240; 6: 253, 257, 276; 7:291, 296, 298, 300.   
79 Julius R. Ruff, Violence in Early Modern Europe 1500-1800 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
2001), 73-116. 
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Liang province but not necessarily the interior of the empire. Also, during the Qin and 
Former Han dynasties, the northwest had long been a region for settling convicts, 
cashiered officials, refugees, paupers, and so forth, but for many settlers the region 
provided opportunities to start new life, the military elites were especially proud of being 
the Liujun liangjiazi, which enabled them to set up social ladder. Elite families like the 
Zhaos mentioned in the preceding section even took the initiative of moving to new 
commanderies as a means to serve the imperial project. The contrast between Zhang 
Huan and the Former Han elites in fact reflects that something about the importance of 
the northwest vis-à-vis the empire and the status and self-perception of its elites changed 
between the two Han dynasties. Furthermore, the Later Han prohibition of transferring 
one’s registered residence from frontiers to the interior implied that there were always 
frontier inhabitants who wanted to move inward and the state had to use legislative means 
to prevent it. The prohibition itself was not only a preventive measure but also a sign of 
restriction and discrimination against the frontiersmen.     
In the whole course of Qin-Han history, as noted in the previous chapter, the 
northwest was a periphery of the empire in the geographic sense. Nevertheless, the region 
was not necessarily always peripheral to imperial politics. In the Former Han, especially 
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during the reigns of emperors Wu and Xuan, the northwest was a particular target of 
imperial concern and its military elites reached the apogee of their prestige. It was not a 
periphery but a core in terms of politics and military. However, the northwest underwent 
a gradual change of political status from the Former Han to the Later Han, in which the 
confidence, glory, prestige, and privilege of the northwestern military elites were 
undermined and the resources injected into the region by the imperial state were deprived. 
The confidence of the northwestern military elites in the Former Han times was rooted in 
the honor by the imperial state for their military service, which was a mark of their 
success and value. The sense of honor was essential for the military elites, as “[h]onor 
embraces the value one places on oneself, but even more importantly it also represents 
the esteem in which society holds one.”80 Remembering that when the famous Li family 
of Longxi commandery was dishonored after Li Ling’s surrender to the Xiongnu, all the 
military men of the commandery were ashamed of their relationship with the Li family.81 
It may give us a clue as to how the northwestern military elites regarded their honor.  
While the Later Han northwestern military elites still upheld the tradition of pursuing 
honor, however, the chance of receiving honor was remote to them now. For quite a 
 
80 Ruff, Violence in Early Modern Europe 1500-1800, 75. 
81 SJ, 109: 2878. 
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number of them, the loss of honor not only meant that their chance of upward social 
mobility was diminishing but also implied that their political and social status was 
tarnished. As this section will show, the lackluster role of the northwest and the low 
self-esteem of its military elites during the Later Han were caused by the change of 
contemporary political and social perception towards the region and its people. As the 
Later Han dynasty progressed, the northwest became not only a geographical periphery 
but also a political one. In what follows, I shall trace the track of change and factors 
contributed to the full-fledged “peripheralization” of Liang province in the Later Han 
times, in which three interrelated aspects will be under examination, namely the declining 
significance of Liang province as an imperial defense priority; the impact of the eastward 
shift of political center; and the ascendancy of scholar-officials.  
 
The declining significance of Liang province as an imperial defense priority 
The relative lowering of political and social status of the Later Han northwestern military 
elites was a consequence of the region’s relative decline in importance in the new 
strategic situation facing the empire. Although both Han dynasties were born on 
battlefield, their perceptions of strategic circumstances were very different. A brief 
comparison between the zeitgeist of the two Han dynasties will lay a background for 
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understanding the change of strategic concerns in the Later Han, which consequently 
affected the significance of the northwest in the imperial security. 
   The Former Han, which was built on the debris of the short-lived Qin—the first 
empire on the Chinese landmass, was in essence a nascent empire continuing its 
predecessor’s experiment in empire-building. This backdrop gave opportunities for 
various kinds of political philosophy and theory to be put into practice and for people 
from all walks of life to play a role on the political stage. The general ethos of the epoch 
was adventurous, aggressive, creative, and vigorous. The Later Han, on the other hand, 
rooted its legitimacy in the self-proclaimed “restoration” of the Han dynasty and was an 
empire that fashioned itself on the model of the “mature” Former Han. The political, 
social, and cultural circumstances of the later Former Han and Wang Mang’s Xin 
dynasties therefore cast a huge shadow over the Later Han and resulted in dogmatism in 
political culture and restricted opportunities for certain social groups’ advancement in the 
political arena. The general posture of the Later Han was conservative, defensive, 
retrenching, and restrained.82  
 
82 Qian Mu has made a lucid comparison between the strengths of the two Han dynasties, see his Guoshi 
dagang 國史大綱 (Taipei: Lianjing chuban shiye gongsi, 1994), 215-224. Sophia-Karin Psarras, “The 
Political Climate of the Later Han,” Journal of Asian History 27.1 (1993): 16-29 and Brown, The Politics of 
Mourning in Early China, 61-63 also compare the politics and society of the two Han dynasties.  
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Different attitudes of political elites of the two Han dynasties towards the decadence 
of their empires were also compelling. When the Former Han were declining in the last 
decades of the first century BCE, the political elites were still active and ambitious to try 
to overcome the decline by showing dogged determination and persistence in the attempts 
of various reforms, and even hailing and supporting Wang Mang as a means of 
reorienting the world. On the contrary, when the Later Han showed the signs of 
decadence, its political elites were rather pessimistic about the future of the empire and 
some of them even gave up any hope of saving the existing world.83 Though some of the 
outspoken Later Han literati, particularly the juniors, did sacrifice themselves in fierce 
factional struggle in the vain hope that their actions could refresh the imperial court,84 
most political elites, especially those in power, chose to stay aside and seize chances to 
accumulate their own resources while welcoming the final breakdown of the empire.85 
Such a contrast may partly explain why the Later Han was able to establish itself after the 
Former Han but no solid empire could be rebuilt after the collapse of the Later Han.  
   The reflection of different zeitgeist on the imperial grand strategy was the different 
 
83 For some Later Han intellectuals’ sense of decline, see Mark Laurent Asselin, A Significant Season: Cai 
Yong (ca. 133-192) and His Contemporaries (New Haven: American Oriental Society, 2010), 1-38; Asselin 
suggests that 159CE “might well be regarded as the beginning of the end of Han rule,” see p.1 of his book. 
84 This refers to the two Great Proscriptions in 166 and 169CE, see de Crespigny, “Political Protest in 
Imperial China,” 1-36 and Psarras, “The Political Climate of the Later Han,” 16-29. 
85 Hsu, “The Roles of the Literati and of Regionalism in the Fall of the Han dynasty,” 176-195; de 
Crespigny, “Provincial Gentry and the End of Later Han,” 533-558. 
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perceptions of strategic circumstances and hence different strategic settings. As a young 
empire in its developing stage during the reign of Emperor, the Former Han adopted an 
expansionist strategy. The acquisition and consolidation of the new northwestern 
territories was a product during the most intense phase of empire-building. For two main 
reasons, the Former Han paid serious attention to and put great effort in constructing and 
consolidating its rule over the northwestern region. 
Firstly, since the capital of the Former Han was located in Guanzhong, the 
northwestern region which next to it therefore played a crucial role in defending the 
western flank of the metropolitan region. However, when the Later Han set its capital in 
Luoyang, the political center henceforth shifted from the western to the eastern sector of 
the empire. It went without saying that the importance of the northwest as a western flank 
of the empire diminished.  
Secondly, the importance of Liang province in the imperial defense priority was 
directly linked to the empire’s engagement in Inner Asia. In order to deepen the defense 
of the western flank of the empire, to project the imperial power into the Western Regions, 
and to keep the connection with the Western Regions smooth and secure, particularly in 
the contest with the Xiongnu for the hegemony over the Inner Asian states, Liang 
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province was crucial to the imperial strategic blueprint. Well before the conquest of the 
Hexi Corridor, as noted in the preceding chapter, the Former Han had already tried to 
make an alliance with the Yuezhi and established diplomatic relations with other Inner 
Asian states. After acquiring the Hexi Corridor from the Xiongnu, the Former Han 
obtained an easier access to the Western Regions and hence an opportunity to further 
undermines the Xiongnu’s power base in the region. The two great powers thus engaged 
in a fierce tug of war in the region. The Former Han rulers such as emperors Wu and 
Xuan, and even the usurper Wang Mang, were willing to engage in battles with the 
Xiongnu or other Inner Asian states for the sake of retaining Han influence and power in 
the region. Liang province therefore acted as a crucial artery and depot of material supply 
to the expeditions; its military elites and even commoners, undoubtedly, played active 
roles in military operations; soldiers and settlers in Liang province were further deployed 
in the colonial spots in the Western Regions as pioneers and colonists. When the imperial 
government emphasized the value of the Western Regions, Liang province would 
naturally deserve serious attention.  
   During the Later Han, as a direct result of the change of strategic value of the Western 
Regions in the eyes of the Later Han policy makers, the strategic importance of Liang 
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province changed. Compared with their Former Han predecessors’ enthusiasm for 
engaging in the Western Regions, the Later Han rulers adopted a carefully-restrained 
attitude from the very beginning and would not allow themselves to become deeply 
involved in the region; any proponent of active interference in the region would usually 
meet with a lukewarm response. The Later Han’s retrenchment in the Western Regions 
consequently undermined the role of Liang province as a bridgehead or springboard for 
advancing into Inner Asia and reduced the resources that the state would be willing to 
invest in the northwest. 
The “Tradition of the Western Regions” (Xiyu chuan 西域傳) of Hou Hanshu 
provides us chronological account of diplomatic relations between the Later Han and the 
Western Regions.86 Based on this text, with complementary sources, a vivid picture of the 
Later Han’s retrenchment policy towards the region can thus be painted.  
   Although the Former Han had never completely wiped out the Xiongnu’s influence in 
the Western Regions, a fragile balance between the two powers was maintained over the 
region till the end of the dynasty.87 Those Inner Asian states located in between generally 
 
86  HHS, 88: 2909-2934. A recently published book-length study and annotated English-language 
translation of this text is Hill, Through the Jade Gate to Rome. On the relations between the Western 
Regions and the Later Han, see Rafe de Crespigny, “Some Notes on the Western Regions in Later Han,” 
Journal of Asian History 40:1 (2006): 1-30.  
87 It is beyond the scope of this study to account all of the activities of the Former Han as well as the Xin 
dynasties in the Western Regions. For modern studies on this topic, see the introduction written by Michael 
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adopted an opportunistic approach to serve their own interests. During Wang Mang’s Xin 
dynasty, bilateral relations between the Chinese regime and the Western Regions were 
damaged by Wang’s foreign policy and official relations were finally cut off.88 The 
Xiongnu took advantage and imposed their control over the region. In 45CE, two decades 
after the establishment of the Later Han, some states in the Western Regions, 
overburdened by the Xiongnu economic exploitation, sent delegates to ask Emperor 
Guangwu to reinstate the Protector General of the Western Regions as a means to offset 
the Xiongnu influence in the region. However, the emperor set internal recovery as his 
top priority and refrained from engaging in adventures abroad.89 The emperor sent the 
delegates back and took no further action, which meant that he was unwilling to return to 
the Western Regions. Consequently, the area was left at the mercy of the Xiongnu and 
was open to competition among some ambitious local states. As the area could no longer 
serve as a buffer between the Xiongnu and the Han, the Hexi region was exposed to 
frequent raids by the Xiongnu and their Inner Asian satellite states. During the reign of 
Emperor Ming明 (r. 58-75CE), it was reported that the towns of the Hexi region had to 
 
Loewe in Hulsewé, China in Inner Asia; Yü, “Han Foreign Relations,” 405-422. 
88 HS, 99B: 4133. 
89 HHS, 1B: 73 and 88: 2909. For Emperor Guangwu’s attitude towards the Western Regions, see 
Bielenstein, “The Restoration of the Han Dynasty: volume III,” 131-134; Bielenstein also has an overview 
of Guangwu’s foreign policies, especially towards the north, in his Emperor Kuang-wu, 25-57, and the 
Northern Barbarians (Canberra: Australian National University, 1956). 
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shut their gates even in daytime to avert havoc.90 
It was not until 73CE when it launched an expedition against the Northern Xiongnu91 
that the Later Han reopened official relations with the Western Regions as an auxiliary 
means for weakening the northern foe.92 The Protector General was reinstated. It was but 
a temporary success. Two years later, when Emperor Ming died, the anti-Han forces of 
the Western Regions turned the table and killed the Protector General and his men; other 
Han troops in the region were besieged. Although a rescuing force from Jiuquan 
commandery defeated the enemy in the Western Regions, the newly-enthroned Emperor 
Zhang 章 (r. 76-88CE) still decided to abandon the region to save resources. Only a 
major named Ban Chao 班超 (32-102CE) voluntarily stayed in the region with his 
handful followers; Ban would spend the following thirty years upholding the Han 
influence over some of the states.93 The pinnacle of the Later Han’s enterprise in the 
Western Regions was under Emperor He 和 (r. 89-105CE), when the Han soundly 
 
90 HHS, 88: 2909. 
91 During the reign of Emperor Guangwu, concomitantly, the Xiongnu broke out fierce struggle over 
leadership. As a result, the Xiongnu was split into two halves, the Southern Chanyu allied with the Later 
Han and moved in to the northern frontier, whereas the Northern Chanyu remained in the steppe and was in 
conflict with his southern counterpart and the Later Han. For the relevant historical records, see HHS, 89: 
2940-2948. For modern scholarship on the division of the Xiongnu, see Yü, “Han Foreign Relations,” 
398-405; de Crespigny, Northern Frontier, 219-275; Psarras, “Han and Xiongnu: A Reexamination of 
Cultural and Political Relations (II),” 49-64.     
92 HHS, 88: 2909.  
93 HHS, 47: 1571-1582. 
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defeated the Northern Xiongnu and Ban Chao was appointed Protector General.94 
Nevertheless, the Later Han never established stable control over the Western 
Regions. Anti-Han forces rose up again shortly after the retirement of Ban Chao and the 
death of Emperor He. The Later Han once again left the region. In 119CE, the Grand 
Administrator of Dunhuang commandery put forward a proposal of recapturing the 
Western Regions but was rejected by the imperial court. As the Northern Xiongnu and its 
Inner Asian satellite states frequently invaded the Hexi region, some officials even 
discussed the possibility of shutting the Yumen 玉門 and Yang 陽 passes at the 
westernmost frontier to prevent invasion,95  which implied the abandonment of the 
Western Regions. In 123CE, another Grand Administrator of Dunhuang suggested a plan 
of dealing with the situation in the Western Regions and was supported by the Imperial 
Secretariat Chen Zhong 陳忠 (d. 125). Chen then submitted a memorial in which he 
traces the history of Han’s involvement in the Western Regions and reminds the ruler that 
the establishment of the Hexi commanderies by Emperor Wu was to disrupt the 
connection between the Xiongnu and the Qiang and to further Han’s influence on the 
Western Regions in order to cut off the “right arm” of the Xiongnu. The effort that 
 
94 HHS, 88: 2909-2910. 
95 HHS, 88: 2911. 
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ancestors spent on the Western Regions should be respected and not be given up easily.96 
Chen warns that if the Xiongnu controlled the Western Regions, it would be easy for 
them to form alliance with the Qiang and then the Hexi Corridor would be subjected to 
the united attack from both sides. The cost of defending the Hexi commanderies would be 
very high if without the Western Regions as a cover.97 In short, the Hexi Corridor and the 
Western Regions should be treated as an integral whole in the defense agenda. The chain 
effect of losing the Western Regions described by Chen Zhong finally persuaded the 
emperor to take action. Ban Yong 班勇 (fl. 120sCE), Ban Chao’s son, was sent to the 
Western Regions but with only five hundred convicts. Although he worked very hard, 
Ban Yong was unable to fully restore Later Han’s influence over the region.98 Neither his 
tenure nor his achievement lasted long. From 130sCE on, the authority of Later Han over 
the region diminished with time, the imperial state was neither willing nor able to make 
any commitment to the region; it could only let its presence in the region fade out. 
   The Later Han was not enthusiastic about getting involved in the Western Regions. In 
order to save resources for rehabilitating his new regime, Emperor Guangwu refused to 
restore the Han presence in the region; the comeback made under Emperor Ming was 
 
96 HHS, 88: 2911-2912. The complete translation of Chen Zhong’s memorial can be seen in Hill, Through 
the Jade Gate to Rome, 8-11. 
97 HHS, 88: 2912. 
98 Ibid; HHS, 47: 1587-1590. 
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merely a by-product of the expedition against the Xiongnu;99 Emperor Zhang quickly 
resorted to retrenchment policy when facing difficulty in the region. Ban Chao’s heroic 
venture, though it earned him everlasting fame in Chinese history, was in fact largely a 
self-motivated adventure and not a plan of the state. Needless to say, he did not have 
strong support from the state and his successor easily lost control of the region. Although 
Ban Yong was commissioned by the imperial court to the Western Regions, he had scant 
resources at his disposal; what he really depended upon was the fame of his father. The 
Later Han’s disinterest in the Western Regions is also reflected by the fact that every time 
when crises emerged in the region, central officials generally inclined to avert troubles 
and suggested closing the frontier passes and abandoning the region.100 Some Grand 
Administrotors of northwestern commanderies such as Jiuquan and Dunhuang would 
champion the cause of retaking and protecting the Western Regions, which was crucial to 
the security of their territories, the central government seldom sympathized with their 
views. Courtiers like Chen Zhong, who supported the restorative campaign in the region, 
were rare. Obviously, the general attitude of the imperial court was to avoid spending on 
such a remote region. For the Later Han rulers, the costs of maintaining the Han presence 
 
99 de Crespigny, “Some Notes on the Western Regions in Later Han,” 23. 
100 de Crespigny, “Some Notes on the Western Regions in Later Han,” 24-25. 
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in the Western Regions largely outweighed any benefit or revenue that could be derived 
from controlling the region. 
   The Later Han’s reluctance to get involved in the Western Regions revealed that the 
region no longer held the same strategic value to the Later Han as it did to the Former 
Han. As Rafe de Crespigny points out that “the Western Regions presented the imperial 
regime of Later Han with potential for some strategic advantage against the Xiongnu, and 
it was naturally desirable that trade across central Asia should be maintained. The 
territory, however, was not considered critically important, and the great days of ambition 
had passed.”101 I agree with de Crespigny and would take one step further to ask why the 
Western Regions became less important to the Later Han and why the empire lost its 
ambition in the region. A simple explanation would be that due to their internal problems 
and the expeditions launched by the coalition forces of the Later Han and the Southern 
Xiongnu in 73CE and 88CE, the Northern Xiongnu had been greatly weakened and was 
no longer a threat to the Later Han; the Western Regions as well as the northwestern 
frontier zone thus lost their strategic positions in the Han-Xiongnu contest. Meanwhile, 
the Later Han had to shift its attention and resource to deal with the Southern Xiongnu 
 
101 de Crespigny, “Some Notes on the Western Regions in Later Han,” 6. 
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along the northern frontier and the newly emerging Xianbei in the northeast. In other 
words, the Later Han had to deal with threats from elsewhere. However, it only partially 
answered my questions but did not explain why the Later Han staunchly continued 
retrenchment policy when facing challenges in the Western Regions and, as will be 
discussed in the next chapter, even chose to withdraw from Liang province when facing 
serious threats from the Qiang. Obviously, the Later Han did not treat the threats from the 
west as seriously as those from the east or did not adopt the same policy to deal with 
threats from different regions. In fact, it all depended on what was defined as a threat, 
how serious and urgent was it being identified, and what was accepted as an appropriate 
way to deal with it. The logic lay behind was the Later Han policy makers’ perception of 
threat, recognition of strategic circumstances, and setting of strategic priority, which were 
all determined by the political and cultural contexts they encountered. These will be the 
subjects of the following analysis.         
 
The eastward shift of political center 
Different attitudes toward the west not only show the different regional concerns between 
the two Han dynasties but also reveal their respective visions of empire. As mentioned 
before, the triumph of the Qin dynasty made Guanzhong the political center of the new 
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empire. Such a prestigious position of Guanzhong was intact and even strengthened in the 
Former Han dynasty as the geographical and strategic advantages of the region made the 
Former Han founding emperor finally decide to build the imperial capital in the region;102 
the founders of the Former Han also shifted their regional concerns and interests from 
east to west.103 Accordingly, the Former Han inherited the Qin pattern of the West 
overwhelming the East, which consequently deepened the divergence between 
Guanzhong and Guandong.104 
   As the foundation on which the Former Han exercise its rule over the empire, 
Guanzhong became a magnet for aspirants to official careers, who tried any means to 
access the area and to seek imperial favors or official advancement. Even well established 
officials wanted to be included in the area as a mark of prestigious position. Here is a 
vivid example: in 114BCE, the General of Towered Warship (Louchuan Jiangjun 樓船將
軍) Yang Pu 楊僕 (fl. 120s-100sBCE), who had achieved successful military exploits, 
was ashamed of being a resident outside Guanzhong (Guanwai min 關外民) and thus 
 
102 SJ, 55: 2043-2044, 99: 2715-2717. 
103 Tse, “Lun Han Gaodi yizhao de beijing dongluan,” 31-58. 
104 The recently released “Ordinances of the Fords and Passes” (津關令) of the “Statutes of the Second 
Year” (二年律令) unearthed from the Han tomb at Zhangjiashan 張家山 states the discriminatory policies 
between Guanzhong and Guandong and the limitations imposed on travelling between the two regions, see 
Zhangjiashan ersiqi hao Hanmu zhujian zhengli xiaozu 張 家 山 二 四 七 號 漢 墓 竹 簡 整 理 小 組 , 
Zhangjiashan Hanmu zhujian (ersiqi hao mu) : shiwen xiudingben 張家山漢墓竹簡(二四七號墓) : 釋文
修訂本 (Beijing : Wenwu chubanshe, 2006), 83-88. 
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persuaded Emperor Wu to move the boundary of the Hangu Pass, which was the dividing 
line between the west and the east, slightly eastward, so that the area of Guanzhong 
would expand and include Yang’s home town.105 Emperor Wu did move the Pass 
eastward. Certainly, the movement should not be a result of satisfying a general’s desire 
but was Emperor Wu’s strategic consideration of redrawing the defense line of 
Guanzhong.106 Nevertheless, the anecdote tells us that the Han idea of being a resident of 
Guanzhong promised prestige and higher social status. It is easy to understand as even 
today, aspirants to prosperous official careers would like to move to the political center.  
Serving as the western flank of Guanzhong, the northwest was also regarded as part 
of the greater Guanzhong, as noted in the previous chapter, and had a long history of 
under direct supervision and governance of the imperial state. While the Former Han 
dynasty divided the eastern part of the empire into large numbers of fief-states with 
various sizes, the whole Guanzhong region, including the metropolitan area and the 
northwest as its backyard, was never granted as fiefs to princes and marquis.107 This 
policy was strictly followed in the whole course of the Former Han. The Later Han also 
 
105 HS, 6: 183. 
106 Xin, “Liang Han zhouzhi xinkao,”114-116. 
107 Goi, “Chūgoku kodai teikoku no ichi seikaku,” 51-70. 
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adhered closely to the policy, although its capital was in the east.108 During its last years 
when facing widespread revolts, the Later Han appointed several senior officials as 
Regional Commissioner (Zhou mu 州牧, literally Provincial Shepherd), the highest 
executive and military official of a province and was given plenary authority in his 
jurisdiction; however, Guanzhong, including Liang province, was not on the list and still, 
at least nominally, under the direct central control.  
Needless to say, when the political and military core of the empire was in Guanzhong, 
the northwest not only enjoyed the geographical convenience to access the imperial 
center but also played an important role in protecting the western flank of the 
metropolitan area and serving for further northwestward expansion. The northwestern 
military elites, particularly those who were the Liujun liangjiazi, were settled 
advantageously in the greater Guanzhong region, which enabled them to easily engage in 
the imperial politics and share the glory of being “people within the pass.” 
While Guanzhong played the role of political and military center during the 
Qin-Former Han period, Guandong/Shandong served as the key economic and cultural 
region. With its fertile soil, dense population and other natural advantages, Guandong had 
 
108 Kojima, Kandai kokka tōchi no kōzō to tenkai, 323-332. 
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enjoyed economic prosperity centuries before the founding of the Qin-Han empire, and 
its economic development, particularly in terms of commerce, had already outpaced the 
Guanzhong region.109 Its economic importance was never underrated by the Qin-Han 
imperial state. One of the reasons of the Qin and Former Han imperial states forcibly 
moved substantial number of wealthy families from the east to Guanzhong was to break 
up the natural concentrations of economic power in the east. As the Former Han dynasty 
progressed, the economic growth of Guandong greatly benefited from the peace and 
prosperity brought by the unified empire, it became the central region of finance, 
commerce, and manufacturing of the empire. The Former Han set up offices of 
manufacturing in eight commanderies: Henei 河內, Henan 河南, Yingchuan 潁川, 
Nanyang 南陽, Taishan, Jinan 濟南, Guanghan 廣漢, and Shu.110 The first six were all 
in Guandong, and the remaining two in Yi province of the southwest.111 There were also 
three textile manufacturing offices in Qi 齊 commandery and others in Chenliu 陳留 
commandery, all located in Guandong.112 Agricultural production of Guandong was also 
flourishing as the region was known as the breadbasket of the empire and provided 
 
109 For the economic abundance of the Shandong area in early China, see the relevant discussion in Hsu, 
Han Agriculture, especially chapters 2, 4, and 6. 
110 Hsu, Han Agriculture, 133. 
111 Yi province in the Han times largely corresponds to modern Sichuan province, where is famous for its 
affluence of natural resources since antiquity and was entitled the “heaven’s storehouse.” For Han people’s 
depiction of the economic prosperity of Yi province, see HS, 28B: 1645. 
112 Hsu, Han Agriculture, 133. 
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substantial amount of agricultural products to Guanzhong (the agrarian surpluses of the 
area were not enough to support the imperial court, government apparatus, and troops; 
besides, the submission of grains was a form of taxation).113 According to a memorial by 
an official in mid-50sBCE, a large amount of grain was shipped annually from Guandong 
to the metropolitan area and 60,000 labors were deployed for the task. 114  The 
metropolitan area’s reliance upon the grain supply from Guandong was so great that 
when an imperial advisor tried to persuade Emperor Yuan to move the capital to the east, 
one of his points was the guaranteed abundant storage of grains.115  
As a key economic region in an agrarian society which practiced intensive farming, 
Guandong needed large input of farming labor; at the same time, the flourishing 
development of commerce sector provided opportunities for making fortunes, all of these 
factors encouraged the concentration of population in the region. In fact, a great portion 
of the overall population was living in Guandong and the population density of the area 
was extremely high. Based on the data of population census recorded in the two Han 
dynastic histories, which have been cited in the last chapter, Hans Bielenstien drew two 
 
113 For the recent research on the agricultural development in Qin-Han Guanzhong area, see Wang Yong 
王勇, Dong Zhou Qin Han Guanzhong nongye bianqian yanjiu 東周秦漢關中農業變遷研究 (Changsha: 
Yuelu shushe, 2004). 
114 HS, 24A: 1141. 
115 HS, 75: 3176. 
177 
 
                                                
maps to show the population distribution of the two Han dynasties as follows:116 
 
 
Map 8: Population of the Former Han in 2 CE 
(Each dot represents 25,000 persons) 
 
Map 9: Population of the Later Han in 140 CE 
(Each dot represents 25,000 persons; the grey area 
is where the population figure are missing) 
 
   Comparing the two maps, it is crystal clear that during the two Han dynasties a large 
proportion of the registered population clustered together in Guandong or the mid-eastern 
part of the empire. Even though the overall recorded population of the Later Han was less 
than that of the Former Han, the overwhelming concentration of population in the east 
still clearly shows on the map. In contrast, the population of Guanzhong area was much 
lower and distributed sparser. Only when the Former Han located its capital in the region 
 
116 The two maps are adapted from Bielenstein, “The Census of China during the Period 2-742 A.D.” 
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did a relatively large population be found in the metropolitan area; when the capital was 
in the east during the Later Han, however, the population around the Former Han 
metropolitan area experienced a drastic drop. It evidently shows that the dense population 
in the Former Han metropolitan area was a product of political force which differed from 
the natural concentration in Guandong. 
  Guandong not only provided the economic underpinning for the Qin-Han empire but 
also played the role of cultural and intellectual center long before the imperial age. 
During the sixth to third century BCE, the era of “hundred schools of thoughts” called by 
modern historians and is remembered as the golden age in Chinese intellectual history, 
most, if not all, of the philosophers, scholars, and their schools originated and flourished 
in Guandong. The Qin state, although residing in the erstwhile Western Zhou domain, 
was despised by the eastern states for being cultural backward and barbarous.117 Even in 
the Qin-Former Han period the establishment of political core of a unitary empire in 
Guanzhong could not alter the leading role of Guandong in intellectual and academic 
development. As the Former Han dynasty progressed, the peace and stability of the 
empire further enhanced the intellectual prosperity of Guandong; at the same time, to 
 
117 For the Warring States period derogatory remarks on the Qin and the modern assessment based on 
archaeological findings, see von Falkenhausen, Chinese Society in the Age of Confucius, 233-243. 
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meet the needs of civil governance, increasing number of eastern origins scholar-officials 
held government offices and finally constituted the mainstay of imperial bureaucracy by 
the last decades of the dynasty. The setting up of the Later Han capital in Luoyang 
located in Guandong, was in part a result of the consideration of being close to the main 
sources of scholar-officials and many local strong families; meanwhile, it also 
strengthened the dominant cultural position of the east.118 It was in such a situation that 
Guandong achieved an unchallengeable position in fashioning the political culture of 
Later Han, which will be mentioned under the next heading. For now, I would like to 
focus on the Later Han founders’ decision of establishing capital in the east and its 
influence on their vision of empire.    
   Although the founders of the two Han dynasties both arose in the east, they had very 
different considerations on locating their capitals, which were related to their experience 
of regime-building and the strategic circumstances facing them.  
The founding emperor of the Former Han and his core followers were initially 
roaming armed forces without strong local base; not until they entered Guanzhong area 
and won the local support did they have solid footing, which ensured their final victory in 
 
118 For the leading cultural role of Guandong in the Later Han period, see Martin J. Powers, Art and 
Political Expression in Early China (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1991), chapter III. 
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the civil war after the fall of the Qin.119 Based on the support of Guanzhong, the Former 
Han actually repeated the Qin’s conquest of the east and maintained the West over the 
East ruling pattern. Part of the political legitimacy of the Former Han was even based on 
the notion of succeeding to the Qin.120 Also, Guanzhong could provide the strategic and 
geographic advantages which enabled the Former Han state to safeguard itself and project 
its power to the east.121 Needless to say, since the capital was located in Guanzhong, the 
northwest would be recognized as a region with key strategic value. 
   In contrast, the Later Han followed an entirely different trajectory of regime-building. 
Unlike their predecessors who were of plebian origins and generally less educated, the 
founding members of the Later Han were generally from better-off backgrounds. 
Emperor Guangwu, a distant imperial kinsman of the Former Han, was from a wealthy 
landlord family. He was well educated and a student of the Imperial Academy during 
Wang Mang’s reign. As a response to the chaotic situation, Emperor Guangwu and his 
elder brother assembled their clan members and retainers and allied with other local 
 
119 For the composition of the Former Han founders, see Li kaiyuan 李開元, Handiguo de jianli yu Liu 
Bang jiduan : jungong shouyi jieceng yanjiu 漢帝國的建立與劉邦集團：軍功受益階層硏究 (Beijing: 
Sanlian shudian, 2000), 119-179; Wang Aihe, “Creators of an Emperor: The Political Group Behind the 
Founding of the Han Empire”, Asia Major 14.1 (2001): 19-50. 
120 Tian Yuqing 田餘慶, “Shu Zhang Chu: Guanyu wang Qin bi Chu wenti de tantao” 說張楚──關於「亡
秦必楚」問題的探討, in idem, Qin Han Wei Jin shi tanwei 秦漢魏晉史探微 (Beijing: Zhonghua shuju, 
1993), 1-27; Li, Handiguo de jianli yu Liu Bang jiduan, 124-146; Tse, “Lun Han Gaodi yichao de beijing 
dongluan,” 31-58. 
121 SJ, 55: 2043-2044, 99: 2715-2717. 
181 
 
                                                
strong families to form their first troops. In the process of establishing regime, Emperor 
Gunagwu was greatly benefited from kinship networks and aided by various strong local 
families like his. After Emperor Guangwu died, his son Emperor Ming ordered the 
portraiture of twenty-eight generals who assisted his father in building the dynasty to be 
shown at the Cloud Terrace (Yuntai 雲臺) of the palace. They were well known as the 
“Twenty Eight Generals of the Cloud Terrace” (Yuntai ershiba jiang 雲臺二十八將)122 
in Chinese history and folklore, which resembles King Arthur’s knights of round table. 
They were Deng Yu 鄧禹,123 Ma Cheng 馬成,124 Wu Han 吳漢,125 Wang Liang 王
梁,126 Jia Fu 賈復,127 Chen Jun 陳俊,128 Geng Yan 耿弇,129 Du Mao 杜茂,130 Kou 
Xun 寇恂,131 Fu Jun 傅俊,132 Cen Peng 岑彭,133 Jian Tan 堅鐔,134 Feng Yi 馮異,135 
Wang Ba 王霸,136 Zhu You 朱佑,137 Ren Guang 任光,138 Zhai Zun 祭遵,139 Li Zhong 
 
122 HHS, 22: 789-791. 
123 HHS, 16: 599-605. 
124 HHS, 22: 778-779. 
125 HHS, 18: 675-684. 
126 HHS, 12: 774-775. 
127 HHS, 17:664-667. 
128 HHS, 18: 689-691. 
129 HHS, 19: 703-713. 
130 HHS, 22: 776-778. 
131 HHS, 16: 620-626. 
132 HHS, 22: 782. 
133 HHS, 17: 653-662. 
134 HHS, 22: 783. 
135 HHS, 17: 639-652. 
136 HHS, 20: 734-737. 
137 HHS, 22: 769-771.  
138 HHS, 21: 751-752. 
139 HHS, 20: 738-742. 
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李忠,140 Jing Dan 景丹,141 Wan Xiu 萬脩,142 Gai Yan 蓋延,143 Pei Tong 邳彤,144 Yao 
Qi 銚期,145 Liu Zhi 劉植,146 Geng Chun 耿純,147 Zang Gong 臧宮,148 Ma Wu 馬
武,149 and Liu Long 劉隆.150 These 28 generals plus four other men, Wang Chang王
常,151 Li Tong 李通,152 Dou Rong,153 and Zhuo Mao 卓茂154 were regarded as the 32 
meritorious officials of the founding of Later Han dynasty.155  
Of the thirty two men, most, if not all, of them were well educated.156 To name only a 
few, Zhuo Mao was a famous scholar of his time; Deng Yu, Zhu You, and Jing Dan all 
studied at the Imperial Academy; Deng and Zhu were even classmates of Emperor 
Guangwu. In economic terms, many of them were members of well-off or powerful 
families like Emperor Guangwu, and had strong kinship networks and large landholdings 
 
140 HHS, 21: 754-756. 
141 HHS, 22: 772-773. 
142 HHS, 21:757. 
143 HHS, 18: 686-689. 
144 HHS, 21: 757-759. 
145 HHS, 20: 731-733. 
146 HHS, 21: 760. 
147 HHS, 21: 761-765. 
148 HHS, 18: 692-696. 
149 HHS, 22: 784-786. 
150 HHS, 22: 780-781. 
151 HHS, 15: 578-581. 
152 HHS, 15: 573-576. 
153 HHS, 23: 795-808. 
154 HHS, 25: 869-871. 
155 Besides these thirty two meritorious officials, there were still others who made great achievements on 
building the Later Han, such as Ma Yuan 馬援 and Lai Xi 來歙. Ma was one of the famous generals of 
the Later Han and was from Guanzhong. According to the official explanation, in order to avoid any 
suspicion of consort family intervening in court politics, Ma Yuan, who was the father-in-law of Emperor 
Guangwu and grandfather of Emperor Ming, was excluded from the list of Cloud Terrace meritorious 
generals. For a similar reason, Lai was absent from the list because he was a cousin of Emperor Guangwu. 
156 Zhao, Nianershi zhaji xiaozheng, 90-91. 
183 
 
                                                
with a certain number of retainers and tenants, which enabled them easily to gather their 
military forces in the civil war. Many of them had official background when they joined 
Emperor Guangwu; they were either from official families or (senior or junior) local 
officials themselves.157 Most importantly, except for one case, all the above meritorious 
officials were deeply rooted in Guandong area and would prefer to stay close to their 
power bases. The only exception was Dou Rong, as mentioned before, who was from an 
official family in the Former Han metropolitan area which enjoyed great influence in the 
Hexi Corridor due to taking successive postings in the region. With such a background, 
Dou became the supreme leader of the Hexi Corridor during the civil war. What made 
him became a meritorious official of the founding of the Later Han dynasty was his 
surrender to Emperor Guangwu. The Later Han capital had already been set at Luoyang 
before Dou’s surrender. Even when there were voices asking the imperial court to move 
back to the Former Han capital Chang’an, Dou did not dare to express his opinion. With 
his recent history of being a warlord, Dou was very cautious about committing himself to 
anything after entering the Later Han court. In fact, he was honored by the emperor but 
was not given any real power. In such an easterner-dominated court, strong local power 
 
157 For the composition of the founding members of the Later Han, see Bielenstein, “The Restoration of the 
Han Dynasty,” 82-165 and “The Restoration of the Han Dynasty, volume II,” 11-256; Yü, “Dong Han 
zhengquan zhi jianli yu shizu daxing zhi guanxi,” 109-203; Utsunomiya, “Ryōshū to nanyō,” 375-404; 
Kojima, Kandai kokka tōchi no kōzō to tenkai, 73-123.  
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bases, vested regional interests, and sense of attachment would lead the Later Han 
founders incline to stay in the east.  
   Besides, there were strategic considerations that made the Later Han locate its seat of 
authority in Guanzhong impossible. During the civil war and the initial years of the Later 
Han, the whole Guangzhong region was divided into domains of contending powers, and 
it took the Later Han some years to conquer and pacify the region.158 Furthermore, during 
the fighting between, the Former Han capital city Chang’an was devastated. Therefore, 
locating the capital in Luoyang represented the Later Han founders’ interests and 
response to the new strategic realities. The Later Han was based in the east and launched 
its campaign of conquest to the west, which was in a reverse direction compared with the 
Former Han’s and made the eastern-centric attitude inevitable. 
    In addition, Luoyang indeed had its own merits to win the position as the capital. 
The importance of Luoyang had been recognized by the Former Han rulers.159 For 
 
158 Guanzhong was at first where Wang Mang ruled until his downfall in 23CE. Then the area was in the 
hands of Liu Xuan 劉玄 (d. 25CE), who was the leader of an anti-Wang Mang army and was proclaimed 
emperor because of his distant relationship with the Former Han imperial house. Liu Xuan’s domination in 
Guanzhong was quickly replaced by another rebel group called the “Red Eyebrows,” by whom another 
distant member of the Former Han imperial house was enthroned. It was in 27CE that Emperor Guangwu 
defeated the Red Eyebrows and in 30CE that the Later Han finally controlled the Former Han metropolitan 
area. However, the area was still not secure as Liang province was divided between Wei Ao and Dou Rong, 
and Gongsun Shu 公孫述 (d. 36CE) proclaimed emperor in Yi province, which next to Liang province. 
Wei and Gongsun even allied to against Emperor Guangwu and therefore posed great threats to Guanzhong 
area. Emperor Guangwu once intended to set aside Wei and Gongsun temporarily so that he could focus on 
the consolidation of his control in the east (HHS, 13: 526). 
159 The area where Luoyang situated had long been regarded by Chinese people dated back to Zhou times 
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example, Emperor Wu once rejected his concubine’s request of enfeoffing her son at 
Luoyang because of its crucial military and economic value.160 When Wang Mang was in 
power, he initiated a plan for building Luoyang as the second capital. Besides military 
and economic considerations, Wang had his ideological reason to do that. As a usurper 
who entertained his Confucian conviction to win popular support, Wang found Luoyang 
was important in his project of establishing political legitimacy. According to the classics, 
Luoyang was a city first founded by the Duke of Zhou, a cultural hero of antiquity and 
also a model of emulation for Wang Mang. By building Luoyang a capital, Wang could 
fabricate and strengthen his image as a “Duke of Zhou” of his time—a living sage.161 
Wang’s plan therefore deepened the relationship between Luoyang and Classicism, which 
enjoyed a dominant position in the east. Although the Later Han was built on the failure 
of Wang Mang, it actually inherited and continued the political culture fostered in the last 
decades of Former Han and flourished under Wang Mang. 162  Wang’s building of 
Luoyang had prefigured Luoyang’s role as capital in the Later Han times.163  
   Many westerners, however, especially the residents of the erstwhile Former Han 
 
as the core of the central state, which was the center of the known world. For an overview of such a cultural 
centrality, see Des Forges, Cultural Centrality and Political Change in Chinese History, 1-4. 
160 SJ, 126: 3209. 
161 Thomsen, Ambition and Confucianism, 151-153. 
162 For Emperor Guangwu’s and his successors’ dependence on the classics, see Powers, Art and Political 
Expression in Early China, Chapter IV. 
163 For a detailed study of the Later Han Luoyang, see Bielenstein, “Lo-yang in Later Han Times,” 1-147. 
186 
 
                                                
metropolitan area were unwilling to accept the new situation. Since the day the Later Han 
captured Guanzhong, they had strongly advocated the restoration of the seat of authority 
in their area. One famous example was Du Du 杜篤 (d. 78CE), a scion of a renowned 
family in the erstwhile Former Han metropolitan area and a celebrated writer of his day, 
composed the “Rhapsody on the Capitals” (Lundu fu 論都賦), urging that the capital be 
moved back to Chang’an.164 Although no action was taken by the Later Han state, the 
westerners’ nostalgia for the old capital persisted at least until the reign of the third Later 
Han emperor.  
In such an eastern-based regime with its easterner-dominated imperial court, the 
strategic, economic, and cultural importance of Luoyang provided an arguably ideal seat 
for the state. A deep-rooted nexus gradually unfolded between Luoyang and the whole 
Guandong which made the movement of capital impossible. Luoyang became a magnet 
which attracted all the aspirants to official career. The northwesterners who had once 
enjoyed easy access to the central authority during the Former Han times thus lost their 
geographical advantage. Moreover, the northwesterners found themselves facing a 
foreign political environment in which they were forced to adapt for the sake of 
 
164 HHS, 70A: 2595-2609. 
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advancement, which is the last point I want to examine in this chapter. 
 
The ascendancy of scholar-officials 
The declining strategic significance of Liang province as the western flank of the political 
center and as the forward base for northwestward expansion did deprive the northwestern 
elites’ geographical advantage of accessing to the imperial court. However, these were 
secondary factors as the northwestern elites could still rely on their talent to overcome 
geographical barriers and enter government service. In fact, what really lay behind the 
estrangement between them and the political center and hampered their career was a new 
political culture which emerged in the later years of the Former Han and matured in the 
Later Han. This new political culture fostered a new political environment of the empire, 
in which the northwestern elites faced a dilemma: whether to adapt themselves to the new 
rules for advancement or to uphold their traditional way, though which might lead to an 
inferior position. The new political culture, as a result of the ascendancy of 
scholar-official, was a product of the prevalence of eastern based civil culture, which 
deeply influenced the vision of empire and the official recruitment criteria in the Later 
Han times. To examine this, we shall start with the civil-military relations of the time.       
   As the Sinologist Derk Bodde noted that Wen 文 (the civil side of life) and Wu 武 
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(the martial side) constituted a notable dichotomy in pre-modern Chinese society;165 
putting this dichotomy in political context, the relative strength between civil and military 
provides a perspective on understanding the empire-building process and political 
development of early China.  
   Although the Western Zhou nobility was regarded as the embodiment of both civil 
and military qualities, a distinction between civil and military positions within the 
government had already begun to be drawn at the time.166 In the centuries after the fall of 
the Western Zhou, with the decadence of the old nobility, the various regional states hired 
outsiders of ruling lineages for their talent to serve the administrations. Professional 
specialization between civil and military sectors also became a desideratum for 
governmental effectiveness and efficiency. Particularly in such a period of contending 
states, military affairs were highly regarded by rulers as an essential means of protecting 
their own state from invasion or invading others for expansion. Professional soldiers and 
military experts, therefore, played important roles in the political arena.167 Compared 
 
165 Derk Bodde, “What and Why in Chinese Civilization,” In Willard J. Peterson, Andrew H. Plaks, and 
Ying-shih Yü eds., The Power of Culture: Studies in Chinese Cultural History (Hong Kong: The Chinese 
University Press, 1994), 352-353. 
166 Hsu Cho-yun 許倬雲, Xi Zhou shi 西周史 (Beijing: Sanlian shudian, 1994), 206-230. For recent 
study on the Western Zhou governmental organization, see Li Feng, Bureaucracy and the State in Early 
China: Governing the Western Zhou (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008). 
167 On the emergence of professional military expertise in the Warring States period, see Lewis, Sanctioned 
Violence in Early China, Chapter 3; for the tendency of militarization in terms of conscription system in the 
period, see Du, Bianhu qimin, Chapter 2. 
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with the civil side, the military profession was highly specialized. Most military 
knowledge and skills could not be solely learned from books but, most importantly, had 
to be passed on at first hand, requiring persistent demonstration and practice and specific 
drills (here I refer to those who really engaged in battle, and not armchair strategists who 
were mainly literati). Military men’s experience on the battlefield and in the barracks was 
in addition sharply different from what their civil colleagues obtained from academy and 
government office buildings. Different training and experience thus fashioned different 
mindsets, languages, and worldviews,168 not surprisingly, the relations between civil and 
military officials would not be harmonious and tensions have existed from very early 
times. A sophisticated ruler would know how to maintain the balance between the two 
sides and how to make them serve the interests of him or the state. The relative emphasis 
on the two sides would also change in accordance with the need of the state. 
   In the process of building empire, the Qin state launched large-scale militarization 
program which transformed itself into an effective war machine. Agricultural production 
and military feat were both promoted as the top priority of the state. A new system of 
ranks of merit or “meritorious military ranks” (Jungong Jue 軍功爵) was promulgated. 
 
168 For the cultural differences between the civil and military officials in early China, see David A. Graff, 
Medieval Chinese Warfare, 300-900 (London: Routledge, 2002), 24-26. 
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Under this system, every man who served in the army and rendered meritorious service 
would be granted a meritorious military rank which accompanied by material rewards, 
economic benefits, and qualification for official positions. Not only did the rank holder 
enjoy various privileges but one’s heir could also inherit certain ranks. The system of 
meritorious military ranks was an effort of the state-sanctioned militarization policy, 
through which martial spirit was promoted and military discipline was indoctrinated to 
the people so that they were easily mobilized for military operations. As the rank holder 
was respected and honored by the state, political and social status of military men was 
held in high esteem which in turn enticed people to pursue such careers. The ranks of 
merit system thus reshaped the Qin social structure.169 As the system was inherited and 
practiced by the Former Han, a Japanese scholar Nishijima Sadao 西嶋定生 even 
 
169 For details of the rank system and its effect on the Qin-Han society, see Du, Bianhu qimin, Chapter 8; 
Zhu Shaohou 朱紹侯, Jungong juezhi kaolun 軍功爵制考論 (Beijing: Shangwu yinshuguan, 2008); 
Nishijima Sadao, Chūgoku kodai teikoku no keisei to kōzō: nijittō shakusei no kenkyū 中國古代帝國の形
成と構造：二十等爵制の硏究 (Tōkyō: Tōkyō Daigaku Shuppankai, 1961); Tatemi Satoshi 楯身智志, 
“Zen Kan ni okeru ‘Teishi’ no kōzō to hensen─nijittō shakusei no kinō wo megutte─” 前漢における「帝
賜」の構造と変遷─二十等爵制の機能をめぐって─, in Kudō Motoo 工藤元男 and Ri Sonshi 李成
市 eds., Higashi Ajia kodai shutsudo moji shiryō no kenkyū 東アジア古代出土文字資料の研究 (Tōkyō: 
Yūzankaku, 2009), 82-110; Michael Loewe, “The Orders of Aristocratic Rank of Han China,” T’oung Pao 
Second Series, vol. 48, Livr. 1/3 (1960): 97-174; Loewe, “Social Distinctions, Groups and Privileges,” in 
Michael Nylan and Michael Loewe eds., China’s Early Empires: A Re-appraisal (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2010), 296-299; Mark Edward Lewis, “Gift Circulation and Charity in the Han and 
Roman Empires,” in Walter Scheidel ed., Rome and China: Comparative Perspectives on Ancient World 
Empires (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009), 122-124. For other aspects of the militarization 
promoted by the Qin state, see Robin D. S. Yates, “Law and the Military in Early China,” in Nicola Di 
Cosmo ed., Military Culture in Imperial China (Cambridge, MA.: Harvard University Press, 2009), 38-42. 
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asserted that such a system was the underpinning for the Qin- Han society.170 
   In addition to the ranks of merit system (with minor variations), the early Former Han 
also inherited the martial spirit and respect for military feat. Emperor Gao (r. 
206-187BCE), the first emperor of Former Han was very proud of himself for “holding a 
three-foot sword to win the realm under Heaven”171 提三尺劍取天下 and winning his 
empire on horseback 居馬上而得之.172 Most of the senior positions, whether civil or 
military, of the early Former Han were occupied by military men who assisted the future 
Han emperor in founding the dynasty. The position of Chancellor, the head of the 
government, was monopolized by those military founding members.173 Even during the 
reign of Emperor Jing, the fourth generation emperor, Shentu Jia 申屠嘉 (d. 155BCE), 
merely a captain of a crossbowmen team following Emperor Gao, was appointed 
chancellor, for he was possibly the last man alive who had served the founder of the 
dynasty.174 Such a period was also the time that the Liujun liangjiazi emerged.  
As the dynasty progressed, the tendency of militarization reached its high tide during 
Emperor Wu’s time: Military affairs became a top priority of the state; the Liujun 
 
170 Nishijima, Chūgoku kodai teikoku no keisei to kōzō; Tatemi, “Zen Kan ni okeru ‘Teishi’ no kōzō to 
hensen, ” 82-110. 
171 SJ, 8: 391. The three-foot sword was in Han measurement; one Han foot is equivalent to 23.1cm.  
172 SJ, 97: 2699. 
173 See SJ, 18 and 22. 
174 HS, 42: 2100. 
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liangjiazi became a backbone of the imperial expansionist project; the officials who were 
close to and entrusted by the emperor was military generals like Wei Qing and Huo 
Qubing.175 Emperor Wu himself was very interested in military affairs and paid serious 
attention to who attained military achievements. There was a telling story that when 
Emperor Wu learned that the young Zhao Chongguo was heavily injured in a battle, he 
summoned Zhao to the court to show him the wounds. The emperor was overwhelmed by 
that and therefore promoted Zhao as a reward for his courage and service.176 During 
those days, the military men’s ascent reflected the emphasis on military heritage that was 
a tenet of the imperial definition of empire. The northwestern military elites, needless to 
say, were the champions of the time. 
   However, after the reign of Emperor Xuan, the great-grandson of Emperor Wu, the 
importance of military culture was gradually taken over by the civil one. The ranks of 
merit, as a symbol, lost its military meaning and degenerated into a superficial system. 
Military men in general and the northwestern military elites in particular entered a period 
of gradual decline. Their loss of significance in politics went hand in hand with the 
 
175 Fu Lecheng pointed out the conflicts between the military talents from the northwestern commanderies 
and the generals with marital relations with Emperor Wu, such as Wei Qing and Huo Qubing, see his “Xi 
Han de jige zhengzhi jituan” 西漢的幾個政治集團, in idem, Han Tang shilunji, 20-26. 
176 HS, 69: 2971. 
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empire’s increased use of scholar-officials. 
   As the advisor Lu Jia 陸賈 (fl. 220s-130sBCE) questioned Emperor Gao that 
“(Although Your Majesty) won the empire on horseback, can it be governed on 
horseback?”177 居馬上得之，寧可以馬上治之乎？ and suggested employing both civil 
and military personnel was the method for the regime to last longer (文武並用，長久之術
也), the emperor realized that he could not rule his empire solely by military might once 
the chaotic period was over and the people were hoping for a return to normalcy. In order 
to put his realm on the track of stability, the emperor needed the aid of men of letters.178 
Since the founding members of the dynasty were generally less educated, the emperor 
needed to recruit educated men from outside his caucus and these men, like Lu Jia and 
the famous classics scholar and ritual expert Shusun Tong 叔孫通 (fl. 200s-180sBCE), 
were mostly from Guandong, the breeding ground of men of letters. Those educated men 
did make great contributions to the long-term development of the Han empire. For 
example, it was Shusun Tong and his disciples who established and formulated the court 
etiquette, ceremonial rites, and other relevant procedures which lay the foundation of 
imperial rites of the Han empire. Shusun was even called by the Han intellectual as a 
 
177 SJ, 97: 2699. 
178 For the development of men of letters in the Han dynasties, a comprehensive treatment is Yu Yingchun 
于迎春, Qin Han shishi 秦漢士史 (Beijing: Beijing daxue chubanshe, 2000).  
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saint of his day and the progenitor of Han classical studies.179 Shusun Tong’s success 
revealed the value of men of letters to the imperial rulers and also presaged the flowering 
of scholar-officials in the following centuries. 
   Before expounding on how the official-scholars gradually formed the mainstay of the 
imperial bureaucracy and its effect on the relations between the civil and military sectors, 
it should be remarked that the dichotomy between civil and military presented in this 
study is deliberately simplistic for the convenience of analyzing and showing the 
changing relative strength between the two sectors and the tendency to preponderance of 
the scholar-officials. In fact, each sector was not homogeneous within. The military side 
had military men from different origins and with competing interests, and the 
northwestern military elite was only a group among them (they did not always share the 
same concerns); so did the civil side.180 From its very beginning, the civil sector of the 
Han bureaucracy contained not only men of letters and classics students like Lu Jia and 
Shusun Tong but also a large team of clerical officers who were familiar with 
administrative routines, procedures, and legal practices. In Chinese tradition, the former 
 
179 SJ, 99: 2721-2726. The original text called Shusun Tong “Hanjia ruzong” 漢家儒宗, literally the 
progenitor of Han Ru. As discussed in Chapter One, the term Ru was not necessarily Confucian in the Han 
context, therefore, I try to use other neutral terms like classics scholars, men of letters, scholar-official, 
literati, intellectuals and so forth to describe those who called themselves Ru in the Han times.  
180 See Fu, “Xi Han de jige zhengzhi jituan,” 9-35. 
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group was usually called Rusheng 儒生 (Confucian) and the latter Wenli 文吏 (Clerical 
officer).181 The clerical officer was a legacy of the Qin, which was famous for its 
meticulous clerical system,182 and played an extremely important role in the early years 
of Former Han. The first chancellor of the Former Han dynasty, Xiao He 蕭何 (d. 
193BCE), was himself a consummate clerical officer of a local government office during 
the Qin times and finally played a leading role in shaping the legal and administrative 
framework of the Han dynasty.183 Benefiting from the historian Yan Buke’s meticulous 
studies on the Rusheng and Wenli, we now have a clear picture of the development and 
relations of the two groups during the Han times.184 I shall not repeat the details here as it 
is beyond the scope of this study; therefore, a brief summary will suffice.   
   In the early years of Former Han, although the rulers decried the harsh governance 
and strict clerical practice of the Qin dynasty and promoted superficially more lenient or 
laissez-faire policy, the clerical officers still constituted the backbone of the civil service 
 
181 The most comprehensive survey on the two groups and their relationship during the Han times is Yan 
Buke 閻步克 , Shidaifu zhengzhi yansheng shigao 士大夫政治演生史稿  (Beijing: Beijing daxue 
chubanshe, 1996). 
182 Thanks to the archaeological findings in recent decades, we now have quite a number of Qin legal 
statutes and relevant documents which shed light on how the clerical system operated in the Qin times. The 
literature on this topic is enormous and still growing, a comprehensive study in English on the earlier 
excavated texts is A. F. P. Hulsewé, Remnants of Ch’in law: An Annotated Translation of the Ch’in Legal 
and Administrative Rules of the 3rd Century B.C., Discovered in Yün-meng Prefecture, Hu-pei Province, in 
1975 (Leiden : E.J. Brill, 1985). 
183 SJ, 53: 2013-2020; HS, 39: 2005-2012. 
184 Yan, Shidaifu zhengzhi yansheng shigao, especially Chapter 6-10. 
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system. As the dynasty progressed, however, increasing number of men of letters 
emerged in government offices. During the reign of Emperor Wu, literary writing and 
classical studies were recognized as criteria for entering civil service. The importance of 
classical studies was growing rapidly and finally outpaced other criteria from the time of 
Emperor Xuan on. Thereafter, more and more classical students entered the bureaucracy 
and even reached senior official positions. 185  Since the classics which the 
scholar-officials and aspirants to office studied were closely related to Confucian 
teachings, the success of official-scholars was hailed as a victory of Confucianism.186 The 
usurpation of Wang Mang was also a product of the prevailing Confucianism as 
promoting Confucian conviction was an important means by which Wang used to gain 
popular support within and without the government.  
Facing the growing prosperity of scholar-officials, the relative importance of the 
clerical officers declined. Since classical studies became desiderata for the success of 
officialdom, most aspirants who sought to advance their careers within the bureaucracy 
did so by studying the classics. Possession of culture was therefore seen and valued by 
 
185 Qian Mu has a lucid analysis on this development in his Guoshi dagang, 160-167. 
186 On the victory of Han Confucianism, see Homer H. Dubs translated and annotated, The History of the 
Former Han Dynasty, volume II (Baltimore: Waverly Press, 1955), 196-198, 285-286, and 341-353. 
Recently, Liang Cai has a detailed treatment of the success of Confucians in the Former Han bureaucracy; 
see her doctoral dissertation “In the Matrix of Power.” 
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the elite as a criterion of political and social superiority. On the other hand, the 
administrative and legal knowledge that distinguished the clerical officers from others 
was gradually disdained by scholar-officials as routine and trivial matters which should 
be left to the minor functionaries. From the viewpoint of scholar-officials, they deserved 
high positions since they studied the teachings passed on from the sages whereas clerical 
officers should be content with junior positions as what they were doing was secular and 
repetitive paperwork. Certainly, it did not necessarily mean that scholar-officials thought 
the knowledge of clerical officers was useless as it was still crucial for daily operation of 
the administration but just was not the prime knowledge that a scholar-official should 
pursue. Some scholar-officials studied legal and administrative knowledge to enable 
themselves handle government affairs more effectively and efficiently. Meanwhile, there 
were clerical officers who received classical training in order to qualify themselves for 
senior positions. As a result, a tendency of combination of the two groups emerged in the 
last years of Former Han. Such a combination was encouraged in the Later Han since 
Emperor Guangwu and his meritorious generals were classical students, as noted above, 
and also interested in legal and administrative skills, which were essential for the 
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rebuilding of empire.187 Needless to say, classical knowledge was primary and clerical 
knowledge was secondary.   
The preponderance of scholar-officials not only squeezed the space of clerical officers 
but also hindered the advancement of military officials. In theory, civil and military 
officials had their own career trajectories. In reality, however, the predominance of 
scholar-officials transformed the political culture of the empire into a civilized one which 
honored civil officials with classical training and enhanced their comparative advantage 
in bureaucratic recruitment. Although the historian Hsing I-tien 邢義田 points out in his 
research that equipping oneself with both civil and military knowledge and skills was the 
embodiment of ideal official in the Han times,188 it was just an ideal type indeed. With 
the growing prosperity of scholar-officials, in fact, military knowledge and skill were not 
being treated on equal footing with their civil counterparts. In another article, Hsing cites 
examples which show tellingly that a principle of recruitment based on appearance 
gradually developed in the last years of Former Han and was practiced by the Later Han. 
In order to reach a certain level of official position, according to the principle, candidate 
 
187 Yan, Shidaifu zhengzhi yansheng shigao, Chapter 10. On the changing status of legal knowledge in the 
Han bureaucracy, also see Hsing I-tien, “Qin Han de luling xue” 秦漢的律令學, in idem, Zhiguo anbang, 
1-61. See also Higashi, Gokan jidai no seiji to shakai, 43-49. 
188 Hsing I-tien, “Yunwen yunwu: Handai guanli de yizhong dianxing” 允文允武：漢代官吏的一種典型, 
in idem, Tianxia ijia, 224-284. 
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could not bear wounds made by weapons.189  But who would have such wounds? 
Generally speaking, it was mostly the military men. Hence, such a recruitment principle 
implied a hindrance to military men’s advancement, and contradicted the ideal type. 
Comparing with the story of Emperor Wu’s appreciation of Zhao Chongguo’s wounds 
and Zhao’s ensuing promotion, mentioned before, the times had drastically changed.    
While recruitment based on appearance discriminated against military men, civil 
officials even invaded the privilege of their military counterparts. One salient example 
was the transformation of the title and duty of the position of military general. By the 
time of Emperor Wu, the various titles of General (Jiangjun 將軍) were granted to those 
who took charge of military operations as commanders of an army. The person who was 
entitled General was usually a military man.190 The situation gradually changed after 
Emperor Wu. During Emperor Xuan’s reign, civil officials started to take up the title of 
General. For example, the famous classics scholar Xiao Wangzhi 蕭望之 (d. 47BCE) 
was appointed General of the Van (Qian Jiangjun 前將軍) in 49BCE,191 but no matter 
whether before or after his assumption of the position Xiao had nothing to do with 
 
189 Hsing I-tien, “Lun Handai de yimao churen” 論漢代的以貌取人, in idem, Tianxia ijia, 377-395. 
190 On the institution of General in the Former Han, see Liu Pakyuen, “Shilun Xi Han zhu jiangjun zhi 
zhidu jiqi zhengzhi diwei” 試論西漢諸將軍之制度及其政治地位, in idem, Lishi yu zhidu: Handai 
zhengzhi zhidu shishi 歷史與制度：漢代政治制度試釋 (Hong Kong: Xianggang jiaoyu tushu gongsi, 
1997), 138-203. 
191 HS, 78: 3283. 
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military affairs. Certainly, Xiao and other civil officials’ appointments of the position of 
General were due to a variety of political reasons, but the predominance of civil officials 
in bureaucracy was arguably an important factor.  
During the Later Han, it was more common that many Generals were civil officials 
and were not necessarily related to military affairs.192 More than that, the men who really 
took charge of military operations and commanding troops were not necessarily entitled 
General but appointed as General of the Gentlemen-of-the-Household (Zhonglang Jiang 
中郎將, a modern equivalent would be Lieutenant General), which was subordinate to 
General. Hence, civil officials would occupy the position of General and not take part in 
military affairs, whereas military men who were intimately engaged with military 
operations might only reach the second rank of the military hierarchy. 
A recruitment system named Chaju 察 舉 , 193  literally “observation and 
recommendation,” and usually called “Recommendation System” in modern Western 
scholarship, adopted by the two Han dynasties contributed greatly to the expansion of 
scholar-officials in the imperial bureaucracy. During the early years of Former Han, the 
 
192 On the institution of General in the Later Han, see Liu Pakyuen, “Dong Han jiangjun zhidu zhi yanbian” 
東漢將軍制度之演變, in Lishi yu zhidu, 204-308. 
193 For detailed studies on the system, see Huang Liuzhu 黃留珠, Qin Han shijin zhidu 秦漢仕進制度 
(Xi'an: Xibei daxue chubanshe, 1985); Fukui Shigemasa 福井重雅, Kandai kanri tōyō seido no kenkyū 漢
代官吏登用制度の硏究 (Tōkyō: Sōbunsha, 1988); Yan Buke, Chaju zhidu bianqian shigao 察舉制度變
遷史稿 (Shenyang : Liaoning daxue chubanshe, 1997), especially Chapters 1-4. 
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founding members and their descendants had hereditary advantages of accessing official 
positions, although other ways of entering government service existed.194 As the dynasty 
progressed, however, the need for acquiring talents from society became urgent and a 
new method of recruitment was produced. In 178BCE and 165BCE, Emperor Wen issued 
decrees ordering nobles and officials to recommend “worthy and upright persons and 
persons who are outspoken and not afraid to criticize” 賢良方正能直言極諫者; in 
134BCE, Emperor Wu promulgated a new law which ordered every commandery and 
fief-states to recommend “filial and incorrupt” (Xiaolain 孝廉) persons. These marked 
the incipient phase of the Recommendation System.195 The system at first contained a 
wide variety of recruitment subjects, besides the two mentioned above, there were 
“understanding the classics” (Mingjing 明經), “understanding the law” (Mingfa 明法), 
“capable of managing the river” (nengzhihe 能治河), “courageous and knowledgeable 
about the art of war” (Yongmeng zhibingfa 勇猛知兵法), “incorruptible official” (Lianli 
廉吏), “abundant talent” (Maocai 茂才), “extraordinary excellence” (Youyi 尤異).196  
However, the system gradually concentrated on the subject of “filial and incorrupt.” 
Provinces and commanderies were required to recommend candidates of “filial and 
 
194 For the recruitment methods of the early Former Han, see Huang, Qin Han shijin zhidu; Yan, Chaju 
zhidu bianqian shigao, 22-27.  
195 Yan, Chaju zhidu bianqian shigao, 3. 
196 Ibid, 4. 
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incorrupt” to the central government annually. In theory, “filial and incorrupt” were 
virtues that everybody could develop; in reality, such a title was interpreted as derived 
from Confucian ethics and gradually slipped into the hands of the men of letters who 
asserted themselves as followers of Confucian teachings. Moreover, the rights of 
recommendation were in the hands of senior officials who were always scholar-officials. 
As a result, men of letters gradually controlled the system and gained greater presence in 
the government officialdom. The scholar-officials, once they attained vested interests, 
further strengthened such a system as the chief way of recruitment. Local powerful 
families which were rooted mainly in Guandong and had resources to provide classical 
education to their members took advantage to become the main source of 
scholar-officials in the Later Han.197 Furthermore, they established a rather exclusive 
system based on their own ties and networks and helped their candidates entered the 
government while excluding others from advancing in the bureaucracy.198 As a result, a 
handful of families got the lion’s share of bureaucratic positions. Japanese scholars such 
 
197 As Hsing I-tien points out sharply that the chance of a man from humble origins to become a candidate 
of the “filial and corrupt” is very limited if not impossible. See Hsing, “Dong Han xiaolian de shenfen 
beijing,” 285-254.  
198 On the ties and networks established among the scholar-officials which influenced the recommendation 
system, see Yan Buke, “Xiaolian tongsui yu Hanmo xuanguan” 孝廉「同歲」與漢末選官, in idem, Yueshi 
yu shiguan: chuantong zhengzhi wenhua yu zhengzhi zhidu lunji 樂師與史官：傳統政治文化與政治制度
論集 (Beijing: Sanlian shudian, 2001), 209-225.  
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as Watanabe Yoshihiro and Higashi Shinji have presented detailed studies on the 
composition of the Later Han bureaucracy, which show arguably the dominance of 
Guandong based scholar-officials,199 and I shall not repeat their findings here.     
As a modern Han historian has stated sharply, “Confucianism was but a veneer that 
made the local power alignment respectable and acceptable in the eyes of the court.”200 
Indeed, after the state opened the door of officialdom to the powerful families, the 
“Confucianization” championed by the scholar-officials was largely self-directed and 
became a tool for vested interests to enhance their status, wealth and power under the 
auspices of imperial authority.201 Hence, scholar-officials reached their predominance at 
the expense of the advancement of other groups, including the military men.  
    Under such an eastern scholar-official dominated and growingly “Confucianized” 
recommendation system, aspirants to official position in the frontier regions found 
themselves in a disadvantaged situation. The elites of Liang province in particular 
suffered from a “relative deprivation.”202 They were famous for military ability and thus 
 
199 Watanabe, Gokan kokka no shihai to jukyō, 99-191, especially 115-124; Higashi, Gokan jidai no seiji to 
shakai, 337-339. 
200 Chen, “Han Dynasty China,” 144. 
201 “Confucianization” was a multi-faceted phenomenon during the Han dynasties, especially in the Later 
Han times, the system of recruitment but only one facet of it. In a newly published article, Paul Goldin 
provides an example of “Confucianization” of law of the time, see his “Han Law and the Regulation of 
Interpersonal Relations: ‘The Confucianization of the Law’ Revisited,” Asia Major XXV. Part I (2012): 
1-32. 
202 Robert Gurr, Why Men Rebel (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1974), 13. 
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enjoyed privileges on official career paths during the first half of the Former Han dynasty; 
however, as the recommendation system gradually put absolute emphasis on civil value 
than the martial one, the northwestern military elites lost their traditional advantages in 
the competition of advancement. As analyzed before, a large proportion of the registered 
population of Liang province was composed of paupers and convicts from the east; they 
were the scum of the society and their general level of education would not be high. In 
response to the environment and practical needs of such a frontier society, the settlers and 
their descendants would prefer military training to classical studies, especially when the 
state relied heavily on their military contributions. The situation did not improve much 
even after the empire had transformed its posture from aggressive to defensive. In the last 
years of the Later Han, Liang province was still treated by scholar-officials as a land of 
backwardness. In 184CE, when rebels rose up in Liang province, an official named Song 
Xiao宋梟 (fl. 180sCE) told Gai Xun (no. 22 on the list of northwestern elites) his views 
on the cause of and solution to the revolt and said, “Liang province lacked for education, 
therefore, revolts always happened. Now, I intend to produce more copies of the Classics 
of Filial Piety and let every household study it. It may lead the people to know 
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righteousness.”203 涼州寡於學術，故屢致反暴。今欲多寫《孝經》，令家家習之，庶
或使人知義. The Classics of Filial Piety was a primer for children in the Later Han,204 
Song’s intention of teaching the people of Liang province the text showed clearly how 
poor he thought the education level of the province was. Song’s words might be 
hyperbolic but might still reveal how some scholar-officials despised Liang province. 
After hearing Song’s opinion, Gai Xun, as a Liang province military elite himself, warned 
Song that his words would only arouse the hatred of the entire province (結怨一州).205 
The people of Liang province were discontented with being treated as cultural backward, 
or more precisely, detested the cultural arrogance of the scholar-officials. 
   Some Han rulers understood the disadvantaged positions of the frontier regions in 
producing civil talents and tried to maintain a balanced recruitment. In 12BCE, when 
Emperor Cheng asked all interior commanderies and fief-states to recommend “upright 
and outspoken persons” to the court, he treated the frontiers separately by asking twenty 
two commanderies on the northern frontier to recommend “persons who are courageous 
and knowledgeable about the art of war.”206 The emperor understood the interior and 
 
203 HHS, 58: 1880.  
204 Emperor Ming especially emphasized the moral teachings of the Classics of Filial Piety, see Powers, 
Arts and Political Expression in Early China, 161. 
205 Ibid. 
206 HS, 10: 326. 
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frontier commanderies produced different kinds of talents and made an attempt to provide 
the militarized frontier commanderies an opportunity to recommend their own 
candidates.  
However, the predominance of scholar-officials and the increasing importance of 
“filial and incorrupt” in the recommendation system were too strong to be altered. In 
101CE, Emperor He of Later Han addressed clearly that the frontier provinces such as 
You 幽 (in the northeast), Bing, and Liang had a low population and the official path of 
their elites were narrow; the emperor thus assigned the frontier commanderies quotas of 
recommendation in proportionate to their population. Accordingly, frontier commanderies 
which had 100,000 or more people could recommend one “filial and incorrupt” annually; 
those with populations below 100,000 could recommend one biennially; those with 
populations below 50,000 could recommend one triennially.207 Although the emperor 
aimed to guarantee the rights of recommendation of the frontier commanderies, the 
population of frontier regions was absolutely overwhelmed by that of Guandong and was 
quantitatively too weak to compete with the interior commanderies.  
   Since military ability was no longer a guarantee to a bright career future as it once 
 
207 HHS, 4: 189. 
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was, some Later Han northwestern elites realized that they had to adapt to the new rules 
of the game in order to move upward in the bureaucracy of the “Confucian State.”208 In 
other words, they have to transform themselves into scholar-official or, at least, to seek 
recognition from the scholar-officials. Such a tendency explains why the “Three 
Brilliants of Liang province”: Huangfu Gui, Zhang Huan, and Duan Jiong all started their 
official career with civil positions. Although they all transferred to the military 
trajectories later in life, the experience of civil office might enable them to have a similar 
career experience with their civil colleagues and communicate with the latter. When the 
first Great Proscription (166CE) happened and many renowned scholar-officials and 
literati were arrested,209 Huangfu Gui was ashamed of himself for not being included 
though he was an outstanding man of the western province (自以西州豪傑，恥不得豫). 
Therefore, he submitted a memorial and claimed his relations with the proscribed parties. 
His efforts of being implicated were in vain but he still worked to help the accused.210 
The reason for Huangfu Gui’s attitude might be complicated, but his eagerness to be 
recognized by the scholar-officials was probably a crucial consideration. Duan Jiong, 
albeit a tough warrior, studied classics when he was mature and was recommended as a 
 
208 For the Later Han as a “Confucian State,” see Watanabe, Gokan kokka no shihai to jukyō and Gokan ni 
okeru "Jukyō kokka" no seiritsu. 
209 For the Great Proscription, see de Crespigny, “Political Protest in Imperial China,” 1-36. 
210 HHS, 65: 2136. 
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“filial and incorrupt” to enter government service.211 Among the three men, Zhang Huan 
was the most “Confucianized” one. He studied classics with famous scholar-officials, 
editing classical texts that his edition was later kept by the imperial library, teaching a 
thousand students, and being an author of many literary works including an exegesis of a 
Confucian canon. He even brought his students with him and lectured calmly to them in 
the midst of a battle.212 This might particularly remind his contemporaries that Emperor 
Guangwu and his meritorious generals were well-known for their promotion of classical 
studies and rituals during their time in the battlefield.213  Probably because of his 
“Confucian” background, Zhang Huan was desperate to move out from Liang province, 
which lay beyond the realm of the “Confucian State.”       
   Nevertheless, although Liang province produced the “Three Brilliants,” the 
northwestern elites were still too insignificant to tip the balance to favor themselves. 
According to Hsing I-tien’s statistical research on the 324 Later Han “filial and incorrupt” 
whose names were recorded in historical sources, only 2 among the 265 people whose 
origins were known were from Liang province; the remainder all distributed in the 
middle, eastern, southeastern part of the empire and Yi province in the southwest. Among 
 
211 HHS, 65: 2145. 
212 HHS, 65: 2138-2144.  
213 For example, Zhai Zun of the “Twenty-eight Generals of the Cloud Terrace,” see HHS, 20: 742.  
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them, the majority was in the commanderies of Guandong such as Runan 汝南, Nanyang, 
Yingchuan, Henan, and Chenliu 陳留, all were traditional power-bases of powerful 
families.214 Although the sample size is small and the textual records were left by 
scholar-officials, the numbers still give a clue to how tiny the role Liang province played 
in the recommendation system.   
   Besides, even though the “Three Brilliants” tried very hard, their successes were 
limited. Duan Jiong seemed to be the most successful one as he was twice appointed 
Grand Commandant (Taiwei 太尉), which was equal to Chancellor. However, it was due 
to the patronage of eunuchs, and Duan was despised by most scholar-officials for his 
collaboration with eunuchs. Duan was forced to commit suicide and his family was exiled 
to frontier when his patron lost in a factional struggle among the eunuchs.215 During the 
second Great Proscription (168CE), Zhang Huan was used by the eunuchs to suppress 
their rivals—the leaders of scholar-officials and students of the Imperial Academy, who 
had established a very strong patron-client relations. In the aftermath, Zhang Huan 
bitterly regretted being deceived by the eunuchs.216 This episode compellingly tells that 
Zhang Huan lacked connections with the leading scholar-officials and was not accepted 
 
214 Hsing, “Dong Han xiaolian de shenfen beijing,” 285-254. 
215 HHS, 65: 2153-2154. 
216 HHS, 65: 2140. 
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as one of them. 
The absolute majority of the proscribed scholar-officials and students of the Imperial 
academy, who were all the cultural elites of the time, were, not surprisingly, from the 
eastern part of the empire. The Historian Jin Fagen 金發根 has analyzed the places of 
origins of the proscribed or related people records in Later Han history and arranged the 
order of the regions in accordance with their numbers: 
(1) Guandong area, including the commanderies of Henan, Hongnong, (where Zhang 
Huan requested to move to), Taiyuan 太原, Shangdang 上黨, and the region to the east 
of Nanyang commandery and the north of Huai 淮 River. 
(2) The regions along the middle and lower courses of the Yangzi River, including Nan 
南 commandery and the area to the east of Wuling 武陵 commandery.   
(3) The regions along the upper course of Yangzi River and the southwestern 
commanderies. 
(4) The metropolitan area of the Former Han and the northwestern commanderies.217 
It is clear that the most prominent cultural elites mainly concentrated in the 
 
217 Jin Fagen 金發根, “Dong Han danggu renwu de fenxi” 東漢黨錮人物的分析. Zhongyang yanjiuyuan 
lishi yuyan yanjiusuo jikan 中央研究院歷史語言研究所集刊 34(1963): 505-558. Besides Jin’s article, 
one can refer to Watanabe, Gokan kokka no shihai to jukyō, 367-418 and Higashi, Gokan jidai no seiji to 
shakai, 292-326. Wantanbe’s research in particular criticizes Jin’s and provides a more detailed analysis of 
the origins and backgrounds of the proscribed members.  
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commanderies at the mid-lower reach of the Yellow River, and the commanderies such as 
Henan and Hongnong were just next to the imperial capital. The concentration of cultural 
elites reveals an uneven distribution of power in favor of the core area. For the periphery, 
of the 12 people recorded in the fourth category, 9 were from the former metropolitan 
area; the remaining 3 were Zhang Huan, Huanfu Gui, and Gai Xun. Nevertheless, these 
three men were only indirectly involved in the incident. On the other hand, as de 
Crespigny has pointed out that among the men who were praised as martyrs and heroes in 
the Great Proscription, only two had ever taken part in military campaign on the frontiers 
and the military generals such as the “Three Brilliants” received no mention, which 
reflected the “essential lack of sympathy and contact between” the scholar-officials and 
the frontier military men.218  
Once again, the statistical data show us the minor significance of the northwestern 
elites in relation to the cultural elites of the whole empire and their participation in the 
high politics. No matter how hard the northwestern elites like the “Three Brilliants” tried, 
the eastern scholar-officials dominated “Confucian State” was difficult to be challenged 
except by brutal violence, which would be realized by Dong Zhuo, a military strong man 
 
218 de Crespigny, “Political Protest in Imperial China,” 25. 
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and a Liujun liangjiazi, who did not adapt himself to the new rule of the game of power. 
 
   To conclude this chapter, the geographical characters and the composition of the 
settlers determined the military nature of the region called Liang province. When the 
empire was in an aggressive mode, the northwestern military elites reached their pinnacle; 
however, when the empire retreated to a defensive mode, their significance diminished. 
Limited by the geographical and cultural conditions of the frontier society the 
northwestern elites could only be latecomers and losers when the eastern-based 
scholar-officials re-shaped the political culture of the empire and dominated the imperial 
politics. But the new political culture did not bring a broader cultural unity to the empire. 
The new cultural elites of the empire drew a firm line between what they saw as the core 
of the empire and its barbaric periphery. They dominated the Later Han state and held a 
disproportionate share of central government offices by benefiting from their classical 
education, provincial quotas of the recommendation system, and geographical proximity 
to the imperial center. On the other hand, given their career frustrations and provincial 
origins, some of the northwestern military elites adapted to the new political culture while 
others felt the estrangement from the imperial center and finally resorted to violence—the 
means which they were most familiar with—to pursue their interests. Besides, not only 
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did the elites felt aggrieved but also the commoners became increasingly disaffected from 
the Later Han state. All in all, the elites needed a discontented people to support their 
actions against the empire. How the northwest was treated by the imperial center as a 
barbaric periphery and how the northwesterners were further alienated from the Later 
Han state will be discussed in the next chapter. 
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Enemy within the Gates: 
The Qiang Wars and the Abandonment of the Northwest 
 
In the past, when the Qiang caitiffs launched their rebellions, they began in the 
provinces of Liang and Bing, spread to Sili (the metropolitan area), wreaked havoc on 
Zhao and Wei to the east, and plundered Shu and Han to the west; five provinces were 
devastated and six commanderies were removed. In the surrounding areas, for over a 
thousand li,1 nothing was left in the countryside; pillage and havoc were ceaseless day 
and night; people were being destroyed and burnt to ashes for days and months. 
However, the gentlemen of interior commanderies who were not affected by the 
disasters all proposed leaving the situation unfettered and waiting for the appropriate 
time to deal with it. How could such an intention meet the expectations of the people?2  
往者羌虜背叛，始自涼、并，延及司隸，東禍趙、魏，西鈔蜀、漢，五州殘破，
六郡削迹，周迴千里，野無孑遺，寇鈔禍害，晝夜不止，百姓滅沒，日月焦盡。
而內郡之士不被殃者，咸云當且放縱，以待天時。用意若此，豈人心哉！ 
 
When the disheartened Wang Fu 王符 (ca. 90s-160sCE) wrote the above passage, which 
belongs to an essay entitled “Jiubian” 救邊 (Rescuing the Frontiers), sometime during a 
respite in the Qiang wars in the mid-second century CE, the terrible images of the 
war-torn northwest and the discontent with the imperial center might still have haunted 
 
1 Li is an ancient Chinese measure of length. One li in Han dynasty approximates to 0.415 km. But in 
certain contexts of the Han records, such as this quotation, the term li is used for rhetorical purpose rather 
than as a precise indication of distance. 
2 Wang Fu 王符, Qianfulun jian jiaozheng 潛夫論箋校正 (hereafter Qianfulun), annotated by Wang Jipei 
汪繼培 and Peng Duo 彭鐸 (Beijing: Zhinghua shuju, 2010), 22: 257. 
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him. Even nearly two thousand years thereafter, the reader can still feel his sorrow, 
frustration, and anger from his words as he recalls the Qiang wars. 
   Wang Fu, a native of Linjing 臨涇 county in Anding commandery of Liang province, 
was a noted yet eccentric scholar of his age. Although no details of his life are given in 
the historical records, we know he was active during the first half of the second century 
CE, which covered two intense periods of the prolonged Qiang wars (107-118CE and 
140-145CE) and also the period during which the Later Han state began turning to 
decadence in various respects.3 He probably never entered government service but was 
just an outspoken critic of contemporary politics and social issues. His commentaries 
were preserved in the work entitled Qianfulun 潛夫論, literally The Comments of a 
Recluse.4 Having experienced first-hand the Qiang wars and the concomitant chaos, 
 
3 For Wang Fu’s biography, see HHS, 49: 1630-1643. For an examination of Wang Fu’s dates of birth and 
death, see Jin Fagen, “Wang Fu shengzu niansui de kaozheng ji Qianfu lun xieding shijian de tuilun” 王符
生卒年歲的考證及潛夫論寫定時間的推論. Zhongyang yanjiuyuan lishi yuyan yanjiusuo jikan 中央研究
院歷史語言研究所集刊 40.2(1969): 781-799. 
4 For modern English-language research on the text, see Margaret J. Pearson, Wang Fu and the Comments 
of a Recluse (Tempe, Arizona: Center for Asian Studies, Arizona State University, 1989) and Anne Behnke 
Kinney, The Art of the Han Essay: Wang Fu’s Ch’ien-Fu Lun (Tempe, Arizona: Center for Asian Studies, 
Arizona State University, 1990). Pearson’s study focuses mainly on the political thought of Wang Fu 
whereas Kinney’s focuses on the literary value of the text. Both works provide partial translations of the 
essays in Qianfulun, but do not touch the essays on the Qiang wars and frontier policy. On Wang Fu’s 
political thought, one can also refer to Etienne Balazs, “Political Philosophy and Social Crisis at the End of 
the Han Dynasty,” in H. M. Wright trans., Chinese Civilization and Bureaucracy: Variations on a Theme 
(New Heaven and London: Yale University Press, 1964), 187-225. For Chinese scholarship, besides Jin’s 
article mentioned in the previous note, see Liu Wenqi 劉文起, Wang Fu "Qianfu lun" suo fanying zhi dong 
Han qingshi 王符《潛夫論》所反映之東漢情勢 (Taipei: Wenshizhe chubanshe, 1995). 
   Although calling himself a recluse, Wang Fu did not lead an isolated way of life. In fact, he had 
connections with some renowned intellectual figures of his time, including certain eastern-based 
scholar-officials; he was highly admired by the northwestern military elite Huangfu Gui. 
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Wang Fu left in his work the eyewitness accounts of the suffering of the northwestern 
people and his criticism of the imperial strategy dealing with the disasters. Three essays 
in the Qianfulun were on frontier problems, namely “Jiubian,” “Bianyi” 邊議 (Opinion 
on the Frontiers), and “Shibian” 實邊 (Fortifying the Frontiers), all focus on the Qiang 
wars. The value of his essays in understanding the history of the Qiang wars and other 
related issues cannot be overemphasized. When Fan Ye compiled the Hou Hanshu nearly 
three hundred years after Wang Fu, he adopted Wang’s report as one of the main sources 
in the account of the Qiang wars.5 In the twentieth century, the Sinologist Etienne Balazs 
praised Wang Fu as being “the most important eyewitness of his times, about which we 
would know very little if it were not for his account.”6 Nevertheless, some scholars have 
pointed out that Wang Fu was extremely hostile to the government and his essays on the 
Qiang wars were highly partisan as well as emotional.7 It is true that, as a northwesterner, 
Wang Fu’s criticism of the imperial court’s handling of the disaster unavoidably had a 
strong bias, but for the purpose of this study his attitude provides appropriately the 
viewpoints of some of his northwestern countrymen’s perceptions of the imperial center.   
Before we move to the history of the Qiang wars, we shall first turn our attention to 
 
5 de Crespigny, Northern Frontier, 91. 
6 Balazs, “Political Philosophy and Social Crisis at the End of the Han Dynasty,” 199. 
7 de Crespigny, Northern Frontier, 91. 
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the Qiang people per se, whom I have mentioned many times in this study hitherto. Who 
were the Qiang? It is a question that I shall deal with in the first section of this chapter. 
Then, in the second section, I shall outline the military conflicts between the Qiang and 
the Han regimes in order to provide a backdrop for our understanding of how devastating 
the Qiang wars were. The final section will focus on two interwoven subjects: firstly, the 
catastrophic impact of the wars on the Later Han in general and Liang province in 
particular; secondly, the court debates over abandoning Liang province during the intense 
periods of the Qiang wars and the ensuing forcible withdrawals. We shall see how the 
Qiang wars exposed the underlying conflicts between the northwesterners and the 
imperial center, aggravated the feeling of alienation of the former from the latter, and 
deepened feelings of distrust and estrangement between the two sides. 
 
Who were the Qiang?  
The military confrontation between the Later Han and the Qiang was a “Hundred Years’ 
War” that continued intermittently throughout the mid-first century CE to the late-second 
century CE and spanned nearly the whole life of the dynasty. It was a war of attrition in 
that the Later Han became entangled in the military conflicts, exhausted enormous 
amount of resources on fighting against the adversary and drained the imperial coffers to 
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the point of bankruptcy, but without achieving clear and decisive military and political 
victories. Undoubtedly, the Qiang wore down the Later Han and hence contributed to the 
failure of the empire. In this section, I shall try to examine who the insurmountable Qiang 
were. 
   According to the conventional viewpoint in Chinese history, the Qiang as an ethnic 
group has an ancient origin and enjoys a very long history. Nowadays in the People’s 
Republic of China, the Qiang are one of the 55 officially designated minority groups 
(Shaoshu minzu 少數民族) or so-called “brotherly groups” (Xiongdi minzu 兄弟民族), 
who join the dominating ethnic Han to constitute the Chinese nation (Zhonghua minzu 
中華民族).8 The modern Qiang people are officially and commonly regarded as the 
descendants of the ancient Qiang since both of them reside in basically the same area 
corresponding generally to the modern provinces of Qinghai, Gansu, Ningxia, and 
Sichuan, and lead a nomadic way of life. In many modern studies the Qiang are regarded 
as an ethnic group whose history can be traced back to the Prehistoric period. Over this 
long course of history, the Qiang have passed down their ethnic identity and culture 
 
8 On modern classification of minority groups under the PRC, see Thomas S. Mullaney, Coming to Terms 
with the Nation: Ethnic Classification in Modern China (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2011). 
219 
 
                                                
generation after generation to the present.9 
Chinese archaeologists also try to manifest the above assumption of traditional 
historiography in archaeology. Findings excavated in modern Gansu province and its 
environs are characterized to being the remains of the Qiang and the sites of Neolithic 
civilizations found in the areas such as Xindian, Siwa, and Kayue, mentioned in Chapter 
Two, are regarded as the settlements of the ancient Qiang.10 However, since no written 
evidence or other concrete traces left by the Qiang have been discovered, no clear linkage 
can be established between those ancient civilizations and the ancient Qiang, as well as to 
the modern Qiang. The assertion that the Qiang were the ancient inhabitants in the 
northwest is in fact more susceptible to the presumption that the Qiang have always been 
living in the same area. In other words, the people who inhabited the area in earlier times 
were the ancestors of the Qiang in the Han dynasties, as well as in later centuries.11 
 
9 It is a dominant view in enormous Chinese works, for example, Ma Changshou 馬長壽, Di yu Qiang 氐
與羌 (Shanghai: Shanghai renmin chubanshe, 1984); Ren Naiqiang 任乃強, Qiangzu yuanliu tansuo 羌
族源流探索 (Chongqing: Chongqing chubanshe, 1984), in which the author asserted that the Tibetans are 
a branch of the Qiang people, see pages 38-42; Geng Shaojiang 耿少將, Qiangzu tongshi 羌族通史 
(Shanghai: Shanghai renmin chubanshe, 2010). Some western scholarship also follows the same tradition 
when narrating the story of the Qiang, for example, see Terry F. Kleeman, Great Perfection: Religion and 
Ethnicity in a Chinese millennial Kingdom (Honolulu: University of Hawai’i Press, 1998), 54-58. 
10 For example, Yu Weichao 俞偉超, “Gudai Xi Rong he Qiang, Hu kaoguxue wenhua guishu wenti de 
tantao” 古代“西戎”和“羌”、“胡”考古學文化歸屬問題的探討 in idem, Xian Qin liang Han kaoguxue 
lunji 先秦兩漢考古學論集 (Beijing: Wenwu chubanshe, 1985), 180-192; Zhao Huacheng 趙化成, 
“Gansu dongbu Qin he Qiang Rong wenhua de kaoguxue tansuo” 甘肅東部秦和羌戎文化的考古學探索 
in Yu Weichao ed., Kaogu leixingxue de lilun yu shijian 考古類型學的理論與實踐 (Beijing: Wenwu 
chubanshe, 1989), 145-175. 
11 In fact, it is a common practice of PRC scholarship on constructing the connections between various 
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Archaeological findings are interpreted as corroborating evidence for such an assertion. 
Nevertheless, since no concrete evidence is available, the lineage of the Qiang from 
Prehistoric to the Han periods should be suspected of being an invented or an imaginative 
construction. 
   Such an invented lineage of the Qiang people is not necessarily a modern invention 
but has a long tradition in Chinese historical records. The fact that there are no 
independent accounts of the Qiang in the Shiji and the Hanshu reflects that the Qiang had 
not yet been qualified as an important group in relation to the empire. However, when the 
Qiang became a menace to the Later Han empire, historians felt it was needed to 
understand and record such a dreadful enemy. As a result, the first independent and 
detailed account of the Qiang appears in the Hou Hanshu. In the “Account of the Western 
Qiang” (Xi Qiang zhuan 西羌傳) of Hou Hanshu, the complier Fan Ye traces the origins 
of the Qiang to the San Miao 三苗, a tribe in the legendary period. According to Fan, the 
San Miao originally lived in the south and was a branch of a clan surnamed Jiang 姜. 
When the sage-emperor Shun 舜 expelled the Four Villains (Sixiong 四凶) to the 
frontiers, the San Miao was exiled to the northwest, an area that was part of Jincheng 
 
ancient and modern East Asian ethnic groups. 
221 
 
                                                
commandery of the Han dynasties.12 The story goes on to discuss the relationship 
between the Qiang and the ancient Chinese regimes—Xia, Shang, and Zhou in 
chronological order, and the Qiang were regarded as one group among the various 
Western Rong,13 an umbrella name of the western barbarians during the Zhou times. It 
was not until the time of the legendary chieftain Wuyi Yuanjian 無弋爰劍 that the 
Qiang people separated from the Rong family. According to the sources, Wuyi Yuanjian 
was a fugitive slave of the ruler of Qin state. He hid in a cave and survived the fire set by 
his pursuers. Then, he married a woman with a dismembered nose whom he met in the 
wild. As the Qiang people believed Wuyi Yuanjian was protected by divine power from 
the harm of fire, they honored and followed him as leader. The story also says how Wuyi 
Yuanjian and his wife shaped the customs of the Qiang as he taught them to practice 
animal husbandry and his wife who wore her hair hanging down to cover her nose-less 
face, was emulated by the Qiang in their hair style.14 The descendants of Wuyi Yuanjian 
gradually divided and constituted the various groups of the Qiang people in the Han 
times.  
   In the above account, Fan Ye provided his readers with a full story of explaining who 
 
12 HHS, 87: 2869.  
13 HHS, 87: 2870-2874. 
14 HHS, 87: 2875. 
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the Qiang were, where they came from, and why they emerged in the northwest as they 
were known in the Han times. When tracing the origins of the Qiang, Fan constructed a 
fictive relationship between the Qiang and the Han people by associating the Qiang with 
legendary figures such as Emperor Shun and the San Miao in order to lead his readers to 
believe that the Qiang were people with whom the Chinese ancestors had already 
associated. 15  As the historian Nicola Di Cosmo analyzed, Sima Qian’s effort to 
rationalize the Xiongnu in the Shiji gave an alien people a “Chinese” origin, to make 
them into “a legitimate component of Chinese history from the very beginning,” and to 
make them “part of the family” of the Chinese,16 and Fan Ye did the same. It was a 
project of demystifying the Qiang and familiarizing the Han people with them. 
   Fan Ye also casted the Qiang in an appropriate role to explain their adversarial 
relationship with the Later Han. According to Fan, the Qiang were descendants of the evil 
San Miao who had conflicts with the sage Emperor Shun; the Qiang then became a 
member of the Western Rong family, the traditional enemy of the Zhou and Qin regimes. 
 
15 In the “Account of the Xiongnu” of Shiji, Sima Qian constructed a fictive kinship relationship between 
the Xiongnu and the ruling house of the Xia dynasty. For detailed study on the topic, see Di Cosmo, 
Ancient China and Its Enemies, 294-311; Wang Mingke 王明珂, Huaxia bianyuan: lishi jiyi yu zuqun 
rentong 華夏邊緣：歷史記憶與族群認同 (Taipei: Yunchen wenhua shiye gufen youxiangongsi, 1997), 
292-295; Wang Mingke, Yingxiong zuxian yu dixiong minzu: genji lishi de wenben yu qingjing 英雄祖先
與弟兄民族：根基歷史的文本與情境 (Taipei: Yunchen wenhua shiye gufen youxiangongsi, 2006), 
Chapters 3 and 8. 
16 Di Cosmo, Ancient China and Its Enemies, 300. 
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These stories revealed that the vicious nature of the Qiang was ingrained and one should 
not be surprised by the bellicose relations that prevailed between the Qiang and the Han.  
Besides, as an enemy of the Han people, the Qiang were depicted as debased and 
barbarous as possible. They were the offspring of the ostracized San Miao and then a 
member of the barbarous Western Rong; their legendary chieftain Wuyi Yuanjian was 
originally a slave of the Qin state, which was regarded as the culturally backward 
regional state of the Zhou dynasty. Hence, the ancestors of the Qiang were constructed as 
being the worst of the worst. Furthermore, Wuyi Yuanjian hid in a cave like an animal to 
escape from his pursers; he later married a nose-less woman he met in the wild. Although 
Fan Ye did not explain why Wuyi Yuanjian’s wife had her nose cut off, it probably 
implied she was a convict since amputation of the nose was one of the official 
punishments in early China. It is clear that the couple was described as the scum of the 
earth. Moreover, that the couple met and married in the wild meant they did not go 
through proper marriage rites and “meeting in the wild” (implies that having sexual 
intercourse in the wild) was in particular an uncouth practice criticized severely by the 
Han Confucian scholars. Needless to say, the descendants of a fugitive slave and a 
convict who married in the wild like animals were a degenerate people. One instance of 
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the Qiang’s barbarism was that they felt no shame in following Wuyi Yuanjian’s wife, 
probably a convict, in letting their hair hang loose (pifa 披髮). From the standpoint of 
Han culture, untied hair was a sign of abandoning refined culture and turning oneself into 
a barbarian, which I will discuss more later. All these depictions clearly show how the 
Qiang people were being despised and de-humanized in the standard history.17 
   Although Fan Ye compiled the “Account of the Western Qiang” nearly 300 years after 
the Later Han, it does not necessarily mean that the reconstruction of the Qiang story was 
his own invention. He must have based his writing on the sources transmitted from the 
Later Han times.18 For instance, Ying Shao 應劭 (d. 200), a famous scholar-official in 
the last decades of Later Han, mentioned the Qiang in his work entitled Fengsu tongyi 風
俗通義 (Comprehensive Discussion of Customs) as “originally from the Western Rong 
origins, and were people of low and degraded status” 本西戎，卑賤者也.19 It seems that, 
at least in the last years of the Later Han, it was a prevailing view that the Qiang were 
 
17 In a sharp contrast to the Qiang, the Xiongnu were given a noble origin of being from the ruling house of 
the Xia dynasty in the Han historical records. It is probably because the Xiongnu were once a Eurasian 
hegemon and, most importantly, had established formal diplomatic and marriage relations with the Han 
dynasties, therefore, they earned much respect from the Han historians. For detailed discussion, see Di 
Cosmo, Ancient China and Its Enemies, 294-311; Wang, Huaxia bianyuan, 292-298; Wang, Yingxiong 
zuxian yu dixiong minzu, Chapters 3, 7, and 8. 
18 de Crespigny, Northern Frontier, 55. 
19 This is an entry not found in the present edition of Fengsu tongyi but preserved in the 10th century 
encyclopedic work Taiping yulan 太平御覽. See Ying Shao 應劭, Fengsu tongyi jiaozhu 風俗通義校注, 
annotated by Wang Liqi 王利器 (Beijing: Zhonghua shuju, 1981), 488. For detailed study on Ying Shao 
and his works, see Michael Nylan, “Ying Shao’s ‘Feng Su Tung Yi’: An Exploration of Problems in Han 
Dynasty Political, Philosophical and Social Unity” (Ph.D. Dissertation, Princeton University, 1982).  
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members of the Western Rong family, which indicated that the Qiang were a group of 
barbarians in the west. 
   In recent years, the Taiwanese scholar Wang Mingke 王明珂 has published widely 
in the field of Qiang studies and provided, from my point of view, a persuasive theory of 
the identity of the Qiang in history. Basing his research on both textual sources and 
archaeological data, Wang proposed that although the name “Qiang” was mentioned in 
various Chinese documents, from oracle-bone inscriptions of the fourteenth century BCE 
that were excavated in the early twentieth century to the texts of the Han times, the Qiang 
were in fact not a “people” with continuity in time and space but rather just a general 
label used by the ancient Chinese to call the non-Chinese people in the west.20 According 
to Wang, the name “Qiang” was an exonym (a label used by outsiders to refer to a given 
group) used by the ancient Chinese with other ethnic labels such as Di, Yi, and Rong 
rather than an autonym (which people use to identify themselves). 21  Therefore, it 
 
20 Wang first proposed this view in his doctoral dissertation, see Wang Mingke, “The Ch’iang of Ancient 
China through the Han Dynasty: Ecological Frontiers and Ethnic Boundaries” (Ph.D dissertation, Harvard 
University, 1992). He later expounded this thesis in his Chinese works like Huaxia bianyuan; Yingxiong 
zuxian yu dixiong minzu; Manzi, Hanren yu Qiangzu 蠻子、漢人與羌族 (Taipei: Sanmin shujun gufen 
youxiangongsi, 2001); Qiang zai Han Zang zhjian : yige Huaxia bianyuan de lishi renleixue yanjiu 羌在漢
藏之間 : 一個華夏邊緣的歷史人類學研究 (Taipei: Lianjing chuban shiye gufen youxiangongsi, 2003); 
Youmuzhe de jueze: miandui Handiguo de bei Ya youmu buzu 游牧者的抉擇：面對漢帝國的北亞游牧部
族 (Guilin: Guangxi shifan daxue chubanshe, 2008). 
21 Wang, “The Ch’iang of Ancient China through the Han Dynasty,” 99. Not until the 4th and 5th centuries 
CE did the term “Qiang” become an autonym of the Qiang people. For the self identity of modern Qiang 
people, see Wang, Manzi, Hanren yu Qiangzu, 21-58 and 91-122; Wang, Qiang zai Han Zang zhjian, 1-35 
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represented a sense of otherness and a concept of “those in the west who are not us” 
among the ancient Chinese.22 In other words, “the Qiang were not only some people 
living along China’s western frontiers generation after generation, but also a concept in 
the minds of the ancient Chinese generation after generation,” and “the people were the 
Qiang because the Han Chinese believed that they were.”23 Wang further suggested that 
the demographic and geographic implications of the term Qiang changed over time. From 
the Shang to the Han dynasties, the term “Qiang” was generally applied to the people(s) 
widely distributed across the west and northwest of China, and its ethnic boundary kept 
shifting towards the west along with the Chinese westward expansion.24 During the Han 
dynasties, the Han people reached the boundary of ecological extent and the 
autochthonous people lived there were thus named “Qiang” by the Han empire.  
In fact, given the limited availability of historical sources, especially with no direct 
evidence left by the ancient Qiang, it might not be possible to establish a clear connection 
between the Qiang of the Han times and the ancient peoples who inhabited the same area 
of activity. Therefore, hereafter, I will cut the Qiang people of the Han times off from the 
periods before and after the Han times and adopt Wang Mingke’s view of treating the 
 
and 251-296.  
22 Wang, “The Ch’iang of Ancient China through the Han Dynasty,” 1-3. 
23 Ibid, 98.  
24 Ibid, 129-132. 
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term “Qiang” as an ancient ethonym and a catch-all category of identification for the 
people living in the west of the Han regimes. The term “Qiang” as an exonym does not 
necessarily mean that the people who were called “Qiang” cannot be treated as an ethnic 
group. Here, I follow the definition given by Sian Jones that an ethnic group was “any 
group of people who set themselves apart and/or are set apart by others with whom they 
interact or coexist on the basis of their perceptions of cultural differentiation and/or 
common descent.”25 By this definition, the people who were called “Qiang” (as an 
exonym) during the Han times constituted an ethnic group not only because they were 
regarded as and set apart by the Han people but also because, as will be shown below, 
they developed a different culture from the Han people. Also, conflicts with the Han 
empires made the Qiang acutely aware of their common boundaries, forcing them to 
define their differences from the Han and leading them to build defenses or launch 
offensives against the common adversary.  
   As the Qiang were distinct from the Han people, we may ask what kind of marker(s) 
of distinction the Han people adopted. Since antiquity, the Chinese people have been in 
contact with peoples dissimilar from themselves; some of them could be distinguished 
 
25 Sian Jones, The Archaeology of Ethnicity: Constructing Identities in the Past and Present (London: 
Routledge, 1997), xiii. 
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from physical appearance like the notion of “deep eyes and high noses,” which became a 
salient feature and stereotype of defining foreigners in later periods.26 However, there 
was no record that the Qiang had different physical features from the Han.  
Hairstyle was surely a significant marker of ethnicity. In contrast to the hairstyle of 
the Han people, the Qiang let their hair untied, which was regarded by the Han people as 
a signifier of cultural barbarism.27 In the early Later Han, a famous scholar Ban Biao 班
彪  (3-54CE) once warned Emperor Guangwu that there were large numbers of 
surrendered Qiang intermingling with the Han people in Liang province, and it would 
cause tremendous problems if the empire did not take any preventive measures. He called 
the Qiang a people who “let the hair unbound and folding the robes to the left” 被髮左衽 
(pifa zuoren), pointing out that the customs between the Han and the Qiang were different 
(xisu jiyi習俗既異), and their languages were mutually unintelligible (yanyu butong 言
語不通).28 It was true that the Qiang left their hair unbound, as we have seen above, but 
we have no evidence of the Qiang’s clothing. In fact, whether the Qiang really folded 
their robes to the left was not the crux of the matter. What Ban Biao said pifa zuoren was 
 
26 See Marc Samuel Abramson, “Deep Eyes and High Noses: Physiognomy and the depiction of barbarians 
in Tang China,” in Nicola Di Cosmo and Don J. Wyatt eds., Political Frontiers, Ethnic Boundaries, and 
Human Geographies in Chinese History (London: Routledge, 2003), 119-159. 
27 Also, as Abramson has pointed out in his article, in certain context, “hairstyles and head coverings also 
had significance in that they were viewed both in Inner Asia and China as makers of political allegiance.” 
See Abramson, “Deep Eyes and High Noses,” 125. 
28 HHS, 87: 2878. 
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of symbolic meaning to draw a line between civilized people and barbarians. Since 
Confucius first used the phrase pifa zuoren to describe the non-Zhou people,29 the phrase 
had become a metaphor of bestiality used by ancient Chinese scholars to describe alien 
people who led a barbarous and uncivilized way of life.30 By using this catchphrase, Ban 
Biao wanted to emphasize the fundamental cultural differences between the Qiang and 
the Han, and he used the different customs and languages as supporting evidence. 
Although we do not know the language of the Qiang people during the Han times, we 
have historical records of their social customs. 
According to the sources available, the most significant markers that distinguished the 
Qiang from the Han were their way of life and social organization.31 The “Account of 
Western Qiang” says,  
 [The Qiang] have no fixed abode, but follow the availability of water and grass. Their 
lands produce little of the five grains, and they make their living by raising and herding 
animals… when the father dies, [the son] marries the step-mother; when the elder 
 
29 See Chapter 14 of the Analects (Lunyu 論語). In Confucius’s day, the Zhou people knotted their hair, 
wore caps, and folded their robes to the right; letting hair unbound and folding robes to the left was a 
non-Zhou custom, which meant the violation of the Zhou rites. From the Zhou times onward, the proper 
combination of “robes and caps” 衣冠 (yiguan) was symbolized as one of the essences of Chinese culture.  
30 In the “Account of the Xiongnu” of Hanshu, which was mainly compiled by Ban Biao’s son Ban Gu, the 
phrase pifa zuoren was also used to describe the barbarians. See HS, 94B: 3834. Another example in a 
memorial jointly written by two Han officials can be found in HS, 73: 3126. Goldin, “Steppe Nomads as a 
Philosophical Problem in Classical China,” 220-246, has a brief discussion on the usage of the term pifa 
zuoren by the Han scholars.  
31 For a summary of the living style and social organization of the Qiang in the Han times, see Guan 
Donggui 管東貴, “Handai de Qiangzu (I)” 漢代的羌族(上), Shihuo yuekan 食貨月刊 1.1 (1971): 15-20 
and “Handai de Qiangzu (II)” 漢代的羌族(下), Shihuo yuekan 1.2 (1971): 87-97. Guan also doubts the 
relationship between the Qiang of the Han times and their assumed ancestors in the same area of activity. 
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brother dies, [the younger brother] marries the widow. Hence, there are no widowers 
and widows in their country, and their breeds are prosperous. There are no monarchs or 
officials; no one tribe is superior to others or trying to unify the others. When [a group 
is] strong, they will separate from their original tribe and have their own leader; when 
[they are] weak, they will attach to a stronger one. They raid and plunder each other 
and worship strengths as heroic… They are good at fighting in mountain valleys but 
weak on plains. [Their military strength] cannot be enduring, but [they are] determined 
to charge headlong plunge. [They] regard dying in battle as auspicious, and dying from 
illness as inauspicious. [They] can withstand extremely cold weather just like 
animals.32 
所居無常，依隨水草。地少五穀，以產牧為業……父沒則妻後母，兄亡則納厘綆，
故國無鰥寡，種類繁熾。不立君臣，無相長一，強則分種為酋豪，弱則為人附落，
更相抄暴，以力為雄……其兵長在山谷，短於平地，不能持久，而果於觸突，以
戰死為吉利，病終為不祥。堪耐寒苦，同之禽獸。 
   Ying Shao provided a similar entry in the Fengsu tongyi, which Fan Ye probably 
copied into his work, 
 [The Qiang] have neither monarchs and officials nor superiors and subordinates. The 
strongest one is the leader. [They] cannot be unified, and divided into various breeds 
and groups. The strong bully the weak, and they raid each other. For a male to die in 
battle is regarded as auspicious and to die from illness considered inauspicious.33 
無君臣上下，健者為豪，不能相一，種別部分，強者陵弱，轉相抄盜，男子戰死
以為吉，病終者謂之凶。  
Both passages must have depicted the most notable features of the Qiang that struck 
the Han writers and distinguished them from the Han people. According to Fan’s account, 
the first striking contrast between the Qiang and the Han was that the former led a 
nomadic way of life, raising and herding animals for livelihood while the latter was 
 
32 HHS, 87: 2869. 
33 Ying, Fengsu tongyi jiaozhu, 488. 
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composed mainly of a sedentary agrarian population. Benefiting from modern 
geographical and archaeological studies, we now know that the Qiang and the ancient 
people who inhabited the same area led a nomadic way of life as a strategy of survival 
and in adaptation to the natural environment.34 A series of changes in climate occurred in 
the area of activity of the Qiang people and their presumed ancestors from the late 
Neolithic to the Bronze Ages, roughly around 3000-500BCE, which led the area to 
become separate from the middle and lower Yellow River Valleys (the core of China 
proper) in terms of human ecology. This transformed the inhabitants from sedentary 
farmers into nomadic pastoralists.35 Herding cattle, horses, sheep, and goats constituted 
the Qiang’s production portfolio. The Qiang were, in particular, known as shepherds. The 
Later Han scholar Xu Shen 許慎 (d. 120sCE) explained the meaning of the character 
“Qiang” 羌in his etymological classic Shuowen jiezi 說文解字 (Explanation of Simple 
and Compound Graphs) that the character Qiang was formed by “sheep” and “man,” and 
that the Qiang were shepherds in the west.36 Ying Shao also said that the Qiang “work 
 
34 For the natural setting and human ecology of the area of activity of the Qiang people and their presumed 
ancestors, see Wang “The Ch’iang of Ancient China through the Han Dynasty,” 5-13; Wang, Youmuzhe de 
jueze, 158-162. 
35 Wang “The Ch’iang of Ancient China through the Han Dynasty,” 14-57. 
36 Ibid, 110. The character Qiang first appeared in oracle-bone inscriptions of the Late Shang period (ca. 
14th-12th centuries BCE) and the pictograph is composed of two parts: sheep and man. Wang Mingke 
suggests that Qiang was a label used by the Shang people to refer to non-Shang or hostile population living 
west of them. Also, the Qiang captured in the wars were used by the Shang people as human sacrifices in 
ancestral worship ceremonies which implied that the Shang people did not treat the Qiang as human beings 
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mainly as shepherds, therefore the character Qiang is formed by sheep and man, and they 
are thus called.” 主牧羊，故羌字從羊人，因以為號.37 It is clear that the image of the 
Qiang as shepherds was engraved in the memory of the Han people.  
The fact that the Qiang had no fixed abode nor cities or towns and had to keep 
moving with their cattle in search of pasture all marked their utmost fundamental 
differences from their Han neighbors. For the Han people, a sedentary way of life was an 
indisputable signifier between civilized and non-civilized peoples. It formed the basis for 
the Han people to define the cultural and ethnic “others.”  
   Another distinctive contrast between the Qiang and the Han was their social customs 
and organizations. The Qiang practiced levirate marriage, where a brother of a deceased 
man was obliged to marry his brother’s widow; a son of a deceased man was obliged to 
marry his step-mother.38 These practices, as a strategy of survival in a tough natural 
environment, were surely for the benefit of the Qiang to continue their family lines. 
However, in the eyes of the Han people, especially in the Later Han period when the 
classical training scholar-officials exerted great influence on the intellectual world, the 
Qiang’s marriage practices were behaviors of bestiality and sacrilege that should be 
 
but just animals. See Wang, “The Ch’iang of Ancient China through the Han Dynasty,” 101-103. 
37 Ying, Fengsu tongyi jiaozhu, 488. 
38 On the role of female in Qiang society, see Wang, Youmuzhe de jueze, 180-188. 
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denounced since they severely violated the moral standard and social order of the Han 
society.39 The Han literati believed that their moral principles and social customs were 
universal and the differences of the Qiang could only prove that they were uncouth 
barbarians.  
Furthermore, from the Han point of view, the Qiang’s lack of centralized political 
system and divisions of social hierarchy were clear signs of backwardness and barbarism. 
Since the pre-imperial age, the Chinese had already believed that their political system, 
administrative institutions, and social hierarchies were superior to those of their 
neighbors and this belief was strengthened by the establishment and continuation of the 
centralized empire in the Han times. Therefore, the absence of monarchs, officials, social 
hierarchies and the loose political and social organizations of the Qiang clearly defined 
their inferiority.40 On the other hand, the lack of centralized authority and the existence of 
various competing groups made the Qiang a difficult enemy for the Han empires to find a 
consistent strategy to deal with. 
   Both Fan Ye and Ying Shao also mentioned the Qiang’s worship of physical strength 
 
39 In contrast to the pre-imperial period, Chinese marriage and sexual relations and behaviors underwent a 
period of moral stringency in the Han times, for details, see Paul Rakita Goldin, The Culture of Sex in 
Ancient China (Honolulu: University of Hawai’i Press, 2002), 75-109.  
40 Compared with the Xiongnu who established an empire with an emperor-like supreme leader the 
Chanyu and political hierarchy among the leaders as well as an institutionalized political-military 
organization, there should be no doubt that why the Han paid much respect to the Xiongnu as “advanced” 
barbarians and treated the Qiang as “inferior” barbarians. 
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and military prowess in order to depict the Qiang as valiant warriors as other barbarians 
and, most importantly, to emphasize the brutal and belligerent face of the Qiang, a trait 
which distinguished them from the civilized Han. As was pointed out earlier, Fan Ye used 
metaphors of bestiality to describe the Qiang so that one would not be surprised when he 
mocked the Qiang’s capability of enduring extremely cold weather as animals did. Since 
the Qiang were animals or animal-like people, it went without saying that they had a 
different nature from the Han people, and it could explain why they were not the 
members of the Han realm and why they were always in conflict with the Han.41 
   It is clear that Fan Ye’s account has listed out the ways of living and social 
organizations of the Qiang that made them different from the core Han population; 
nevertheless, I would suggest that such cultural differences were prevalent in a general 
sense and especially in the early period of the Later Han but were gradually integrated 
with the factor of political allegiance from the mid-Later Han period onward. Simply put, 
I would say political allegiance played an increasing role in defining the Qiang and the 
Han in the Later Han context. During the chaotic period, the impact of war might change 
people’s ways of living, obscuring a clear distinction between the ethnic groups of Qiang 
 
41 For further discussion on the Han scholars’ view on the nature of non-Han people, see Goldin, “Steppe 
Nomads as a Philosophical Problem in Classical China,” 220-246 
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and Han. As will be shown in the coming sections, over the course of the protracted 
conflicts, the ethnic boundaries between the Han and the Qiang in the northwestern 
region gradually became blurred. Both Han and Qiang united to fight against the empire, 
and ethnic Han people were called Qiang by their imperial adversary. The warlord Dong 
Zhuo, for example, was called a Qiang by his contemporaries since he was close to the 
Qiang chieftains and, most importantly, commanded a military force constituted by a 
large number of Qiang officers and soldiers.42 Also, many local strongmen in Liang 
province in the last decades of Later Han married Qiang women and commanded Qiang 
forces. On the political spectrum of the time, there were no great differences between the 
ethnic Qiang and ethnic Han in the northwest as they were all enemies of the imperial 
state and were “those who are not part of us and live in the west” in the eyes of 
Guandong based scholar-officials. In other words, “Qiang” was a label used to refer to a 
 
42 A modern Chinese historian, Zhu Ziyan 朱子彥, coins the term Qiang Hu hua 羌胡化 (Qiang-Hu-ized) 
to describe the nature of the Liang provincial military forces in the last years of Later Han, see his “Lun 
Han Wei zhiji Qiang Hu hua de Liangzhuo junshi jituan” 論漢魏之際羌胡化的涼州軍事集團, in 
Jilindaxue gujiyanjiusuo 吉林大學古籍研究所 ed., "1-6 Shiji Zhongguo beifang bianjiang, minzu, shehui 
guoji xueshu yantaohui" lunwenji  "1-6 世纪中國北方邊疆・民族・社會國際學術研討會"論文集 
(Beijing: Kexue chubanshe, 2008), 112-125. A Japanese scholar also points out that during the last years of 
Later Han all the military forces in Liang province were constituted by both Han and Qiang peoples, and it 
is hardly possible to distinguish the two groups. See Morimoto Jun 森本淳, “Dong Han monian de 
Qiangzu yu Hanzu” 東漢末年的羌族與漢族, in  Zhongguo Wei Jin Nanbeichao shixuehui 中國魏晉南
北朝史學會 and Wuhandaxue Zhongguo sanzhijiu shiji yanjiusuo 武漢大學中國三至九世紀研究所 
eds., Wei Jin Nanbeichao shi yanjiu: huigu yu tansuo—Zhongguo Wei Jin Nanbeichao shixuehui dijiujie 
nianhui lunwenji 魏晉南北朝史硏究：回顧與探索──中國魏晉南北朝史學會第九屆年會論文集 
(Wuhan: Hubei jiaoyu chubanshe, 2009), 178-185. 
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hostile population living west of the Later Han imperial center. At this point, “Han” and 
“Qiang” are mellable terms that define the people who either swore allegiance to the 
imperial state or did not.43  
 
Han-QIANG Enduring rivalries  
As mentioned before, the military confrontation between the Later Han and the Qiang 
was a “Hundred Years’ War” and its consequences for the Later Han cannot be 
overemphasized. However, it is still an understudied subject.44 From the perspective of 
the history of warfare, there are many battles and campaigns as well as strategy and 
tactics adopted by the two sides that deserve in-depth study, but not much has been done 
on these topics yet. The operational facet of the Qiang wars in particular deserves further 
research as conflict with the Qiang developed a new pattern of warfare and posed an 
unprecedented strategic situation that was drastically different from those that the Later 
Han army accustomed to. The Later Han military found it hard to adapt and adjust 
themselves to the battles with the Qiang, which can partly explain why the Later Han 
made their effort of overcoming the Qiang such a difficult task and could only won a 
 
43 Naomi Standen has shown political loyalty as a means to draw ethnic boundary in a study on the late 
10th century north China, see her Unbounded Loyalty, 64-104.   
44 The three chapters in Rafe de Crespigny’s book on the Later Han’s northern frontiers is probably the 
hitherto most detailed study on the Qiang wars in any language. See his Northern Frontier, Chapters 2-4.  
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Pyrrhic victory. Nevertheless, space prevents me from exploring this fascinating subject 
any further in the present study, and I shall save it for my future research. 
   What concerns us in this chapter is the impact of the Qiang wars on the Later Han 
empire in general and on the northwest in particular, and how the prolonged conflicts 
aggravated the discontent and enmity of the northwesterners towards the imperial center. 
This section will first introduce the bellicose relations between the Former Han and the 
Qiang as a backdrop for understanding the enduring rivalries between the Later Han and 
the Qiang; then sketch the course of the protracted Qiang wars during the Later Han 
dynasty.  
1. The adversarial relations between the Former Han and the Qiang 
Generally speaking, the Qiang were never a main concern in the Former Han imperial 
strategy. The fact that there are no independent accounts for the Qiang in the Shiji and the 
Hanshu tells of the relative insignificance of the Qiang to the Former Han. In the eyes of 
the Former Han policy makers, the Qiang as a group only played a subsidiary role in the 
Former Han’s strategic setting against the Xiongnu.45 As mentioned in Chapter Two, 
 
45 Guan Donggui, “Handai chuli Qiangzu wenti de banfa de jiantao” 漢代處理羌族問題的辦法的檢討, 
Shihuo yuekan 2.3 (1973): 129; Yang Yongjun 楊永俊, “Lun Xi Han de ‘gejue Qiang Hu’ zhengce dui 
liang Han Xi Qiang zhi ‘huo’ de yingxiang” 論西漢的「隔絕羌胡」政策對兩漢西羌之「禍」的影響, in 
Yichun shizhuan xuebao 宜春師專學報 20.4 (1998.8): 27-31. 
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when the Former Han put the Qiang on the strategic agenda it was mostly for the purpose 
of cutting off their contact with the Xiongnu, the prime target of the empire. Nevertheless, 
the Qiang still engaged in military conflicts with the Former Han. 
   The first recorded formal contact between the Qiang and the Former Han happened in 
the reign of Emperor Jing when a Qiang tribe surrendered to the Han. Those Qiang were 
settled in five counties: Didao 狄道, Angu 安故, Lintao 臨洮, Didao 氐道, and 
Qiangdao 羌道.46 Among them, there were three “dao”—special districts for settling 
alien populations. Also, from the biography of the famous “Flying General” Li Guang, 
we know that he once repented of his undue killing of around 800 surrendered Qiang 
rebels when he was the governor of Longxi commandery during the same period.47  
When Emperor Wu initiated the imperial expansionist project, there was an influx of 
Han troops and settlers into the Qiang’s area of activity. Conflicts ensued as the Qiang 
felt threatened and were even expelled by Han encroachment.48 On the other hand, the 
Xiongnu sometimes played the Qiang card to threaten the Former Han’s backdoor—the 
southern part of the northwestern borderlands. This resulted in a collaborative assault 
upon the Han in 112BCE. Various Qiang groups resolved their hatred, formed a 
 
46 HHS, 87: 2876. 
47 SJ, 109: 2874; HHS, 87: 2876. 
48 HHS, 87: 2876. 
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confederation, gathered 100,000 men, and launched an eastward attack on the Han to 
echo a concomitant southward attack from the Xiongnu. Emperor Wu sent the cavalry of 
the northwestern region and the infantry of the interior commanderies in total of 100,000 
to suppress the Qiang.49 Afterwards the emperor set up the official position of Colonel 
Protector of the Qiang, mentioned in Chapter Three, to take charge of the Qiang affairs.50 
In 81BCE, the imperial court of Emperor Zhao divided two counties each from the 
commanderies of Tianshui, Longxi, and Zhangye to form a new commandery called 
Jincheng as means to strengthen control over and defend against the Qiang. The foremost 
general Zhao Chongguo, who would spend his last years dealing with the Qiang, 
probably moved to the new commandery at this time as we have discussed in the 
previous chapter. 
   The Qiang’s offensive in 112BCE was launched not only at the Xiongnu’s instigation 
but also as resistance to Han encroachment. In contrast to the conventional explanation 
given in standard histories that military conflicts between the Chinese regimes and the 
surrounding peoples were initiated by the avaricious barbarians for the purpose of 
plundering Chinese resources, the Qiang were in fact victims of Han territorial expansion 
 
49 HS, 6: 188; HHS, 87: 2876-2877.  
50 HHS, 87: 2877. Also see Gao, “Handai Hu Qiang Xiaowei shulun,” 10-16; Liu, Shizhe yu guanzhi 
yanbian, 291-302. 
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and colonization.51 Accompanying the inroad of the Han power into the northwest was a 
large number of Han garrison soldiers and settlers who competed with the Qiang for the 
limited pasture and arable lands. In the scramble for resources, the Han colonists, backed 
by imperial military, nearly always gained the upper hand and displaced the 
autochthonous peoples from the preferred settlement sites. The state-sponsored 
conversion of pastures into settled agriculturally-productive tax-remitting land or 
government-owned grazing land forced the Qiang people into the rather unproductive 
uplands in the west. One focal point of struggle between the Han and the Qiang was the 
Great and Little Yu Valleys (Daxiao Yugu 大小榆谷), which are principally alluvial 
plains and loess-covered low hills and therefore a major agricultural area in the upper 
Yellow River Valley.52 The area originally provided a desirable site to various Qiang 
groups for their mixed economy. However, with the steady advance of Han settlers, the 
Qiang were forced out of the area and retreated to isolated enclaves. The deprived Qiang 
were certain to fight tooth and nail in attempts to recover their lost land.53   
 
51 To challenge the conventional assumption that raiding is a nomadic phenomenon, Naomi Standen has 
shown in a study that raiding as a means of economic exploitation along the frontier was practiced by both 
nomadic people and the sedentary Chinese, see her “Raiding and Frontier Society in the Five Dynasties,” in 
Nicola Di Cosmo and Don J. Wyatt eds., Political Frontiers, Ethnic Boundaries, and Human Geographies 
in Chinese History, 160-191. 
52 For the natural environment of the area, see Wang, “The Ch’iang of Ancient China through the Han 
Dynasty,” 66-67. 
53 Yang, “Lun Xi Han de ‘gejue Qiang Hu’ zhengce dui liang Han Xi Qiang zhi ‘huo’ de yingxiang,” 
29-31. 
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In the meantime, increasing numbers of surrendered or captured Qiang were resettled 
by the Han state into the northwestern counties. In the new environment, these alien 
new-comers were usually discriminated against, abused and exploited by the Han local 
officials and inhabitants, with magnates in particular, which in turn exacerbated tensions 
and unease between the Han and the Qiang. During the reign of Emperor Yuan, for 
instance, an official named Hou Ying 侯應 (fl. 40s-30s BCE) once reported that the 
Qiang who lived along the frontiers were suffering from Han exploitation as the greedy 
Han officials and people seized their wives, sons, and animals.54 Seeds of hatred were 
thus sowed.  
   After the 112BCE assault, the Qiang launched another large-scale offensive in 61BCE. 
Once again the Xiongnu played a role in abetting the Qiang against the Han, but the 
crucial factor that triggered this offensive was the Han-Qiang conflict over grazing lands. 
Several years before the offensive, when a Han emissary Yiqu Anguo 義渠安國 (His 
surname Yiqu probably reveals that his family was of Yiqu Rong origin, one of the 
western barbarians in the northwest during the Warring States period) visited the Qiang 
area, a Qiang tribe requested permission to move eastward from the barren mountainous 
 
54 HS, 94B: 3804. 
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area they were living to herd their animals in the no-man’s area in the valley of the Huang 
River. When the emissary reported to the court, the Qiang specialist General Zhao 
Chongguo rejected the request. However, the Qiang thought they had already notified the 
Han official and thus led their animals crossed the Huang River. As local authorities were 
unable to handle the situation, conflicts arose. In 63BCE, several Qiang groups formed an 
alliance and swore to fight together. The court again sent Yiqu Anguo to settle the issue. 
Upon his arrival, Yiqu summoned 40 chieftains, had them beheaded, ordered his troops to 
raid the Qiang, and killed over a thousand of them. The massacre provoked uproar among 
the Qiang, and widespread revolts ensued.55 When the situation was out of control, the 
76-year-old General Zhao Chongguo volunteered to command the campaign against the 
Qiang. Unlike his colleagues who supported a heavy-handed policy of attacking the 
Qiang, Zhao installed colonies in the region instead, as he believed it was the most 
effective way to throttle the Qiang.56 Although Zhao managed to suppress the Qiang, his 
victory was but a short-term palliative measure as the Han never reached an optimal way 
to solve the deep-rooted conflict with the Qiang.57 
 
55 HHS, 87: 2877.  
56 There is a detailed record in the Hanshu of the discussions on operational strategy between Zhao 
Chongguo and Emperor Xuan during the campaign, see HS, 69: 2975-2992. For English translation of 
Zhao’s proposal, see Dreyer, “Zhao Chongguo,” 665-725. There is also a discussion among central officials 
over the logistic problems in the campaign, see HS, 78: 3275-3278.  
57 There are opposing views among scholars that whether Zhao Chongguo’s policy of setting farming 
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   The two offensives launched by the Qiang, the appointment of Colonel Protector of 
the Qiang, and the establishment of Jincheng commandery all demonstrate the increasing 
importance of the Qiang in the imperial strategic concerns. Although only sporadic 
revolts of the Qiang occurred in the last forty years of the Former Han,58 the imperial 
state never relaxed its grip on the Qiang,59 especially when it came to preventing the 
Qiang from collaborating with the Xiongnu and protecting the communication lines 
between the imperial center and the Western Regions from being interrupted by the 
Qiang.60 
   Besides textual records that referred above, documents on wooden boards and 
bamboo strips excavated in the northwest also speak of the tensions between the Han and 
the Qiang during the Former Han times. An official document found in the Juyan site 
states that if any staff of government offices were killed by the Qiang, family members of 
the deceased would be granted 30,000 cash for burial.61 Another strip was a letter written 
 
colonies was effective or not. For the supporting views, see Guan, “Handai chuli Qiangzu wenti de banfa de 
jiantao,” 130-131; for the opposing views, see Yang, “Lun Xi Han de ‘gejue Qiang Hu’ zhengce dui liang 
Han Xi Qiang zhi ‘huo’ de yingxiang,” 29-31 and Wang, Youmuzhe de jueze, 174-175.   
58 For example, in 42BCE, see HS 79: 3296-3299. 
59 For example, see HS, 94B: 3804. 
60 Yang, “Lun Xi Han de ‘gejue Qiang Hu’ zhengce dui liang Han Xi Qiang zhi ‘huo’ de yingxiang,” 29-31 
61 See Zhongguo shehuikexueyuan kaoguyanjiusuo 中國社會科學院考古硏究所 ed., Juyan Hanjian: 
jiayi bian 居延漢簡：甲乙編 (Beijing: Zhonghua shuju, 1980), 191.  
For the currency that the Later Han used was probably 5-zhu/wu-zhu 五銖 coins. For an outline of the 
Han monetary system, see Walter Scheidel, “The Monetary Systmes of the Han and Roman Empires,” in 
Scheidel ed., Rome and China, 137-207.   
Unfortunately, we lack clear sources of what unit of currency did the Later Han use 
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by somebody to express his gratitude to his patron who had helped the poor writer 
resettle in the midst of the Qiang area (Qiangzhong 羌中).62 This kind of resettlement 
exemplifies the Han policy of moving poor people into Qiang-populated areas, on one 
hand, provided a new life for the needy yet, on the other, irritated the Qiang people. In 
Xuanquan 懸泉, a recently excavated site of a Han postal relay office near Dunhuang, 
remnants of late Former Han documents concerning the Qiang were discovered, 
including records of the offices of Colonel Protector of the Qiang and other relevant 
postings.63 Furthermore, there were reports of the Han army suppressing Qiang revolts.64 
   The Former Han and the Qiang maintained a fragile peace until the end of the dynasty 
when Wang Mang became the regent of the last Former Han emperor. As mentioned in 
Chapter Two, Wang Mang forced some of the Qiang groups to surrender their lands to 
establish Xihai commandery, a move which eventually backfired as the Qiang attacked 
the new commandery in order to recover their lost territories. Wang Mang’s failure once 
again showed that scramble for land was a deep-rooted source of conflict between the 
two sides. 
 
62 Ibid, 253. Wang Mingke suggests that “Qiangzhong” was a geographic concept with changing territories, 
see his “The Ch’iang of Ancient China through the Han Dynasty,” 129-132. 
63 See Hao Shusheng 郝樹聲 and Zhang Defang 張德芳, Xuanquan Hanjian yanjiu 懸泉漢簡研究
(Lanzhou: Gansu wenhua chubanshe, 2009), 161-166. 
64 Ibid, 167-170. 
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2. The Qiang Wars during the Later Han 
From the standpoint of the Later Han empire, the Qiang who engaged in the so-called 
“Qiang wars” were composed of both foreign invaders and rebels. The Qiang forces were 
constituted not only by the Qiang groups outside the imperial realm who had conflicts 
with the Han over land resources but also by those who lived in the empire and were 
subject to imperial rule. Growing conflicts between the Han and the Qiang within and 
without the empire triggered the protracted military confrontations.  
   For the Qiang people living outside the imperial realm, the Han colonization in the 
northwest meant encroachment upon their lands. Although the Later Han was not as 
aggressive as the Former Han in territorial expansion, competition for grazing and arable 
lands between the Later Han and the Qiang were still intense. In fact, the Later Han never 
stopped setting up colonies in the Qiang’s areas of activity. For example, around 100CE, 
one local official proposed the imperial court to reinstate Xihai commandery, which was 
abolished under the Qiang attack. The imperial court empowered this official to set up 34 
colonies in the area as preparatory measures. Increasing numbers of colonies threatened 
the Qiang’s living space and thus intensified hostility towards the Later Han. As historical 
records show, when the Han colonists invaded the land of the Qiang, various Qiang 
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groups would form alliances and united forces against the Han armies. 
   Within the imperial realm, the availability of large numbers of Qiang was a main 
cause that made the Qiang problem last so long and spread so vast. As mentioned above, 
the Former Han resettled surrendered and/or captured Qiang in the northwestern 
commanderies, and a large Qiang population had stayed within or along the northwestern 
frontier by the end of the dynasty. The civil war ensued the downfall of Wang Mang 
enabled some of the Qiang originally outside the imperial realm to move in and to occupy 
counties in Jincheng commandery. During the civil war, Wei Ao and Dou Rong recruited 
armies from the Qiang and other non-Han peoples.65 Although Dou Rong surrendered to 
the Later Han and Wei Ao was defeated, not all the Qiang groups who originally attached 
to the two men shifted their allegiance to the Later Han. Some of the Qiang were still 
openly hostile towards the Later Han and carried out raids on the Han territories. 
   In dealing with the Qiang, the Later Han followed its predecessor’s practices by 
sending military forces to crush them, reinstating Colonel Protector of the Qiang to 
oversee the restive Qiang in the region, and resettling captured and surrendered Qiang in 
the imperial territory.66 Here are some examples: In 35CE, General Ma Yuan 馬援 
 
65 HHS, 15: 588; 22: 796-797; 87: 2878. 
66 On the resettlement policy during the Later Han, see Kumagai Shigezo 熊谷滋三, “Go-Kan no 
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settled more than 8,000 Qiang in the commanderies of Tianshui, Longxi, and Fufeng 扶
風.67 The first two commanderies were in Liang province but Fufeng was in the erstwhile 
Former Han metropolitan area and it was the first time that the Qiang being settled in a 
non-frontier commandery. Ma’s decision would incur criticism from later generations for 
sowing the seeds of Qiang rebellion in inland areas.68 In 58CE, the Later Han troops 
defeated a Qiang tribe and settled 7,000 of them in the Former Han metropolitan area.69 
Henceforth, the Qiang spread to Guanzhong. In 77CE, a certain number of Qiang in the 
Former Han metropolitan area were moved to Hedong, an interior commandery next to 
the Later Han metropolitan region. In 101CE, the Grand Administrator of Jincheng 
commandery defeated the Qiang and resettled the 6,000-odd surrendered to the 
commanderies of Hanyang, Anding, and Longxi.70 Besides, the commanderies of Beidi, 
Shang, and Xihe all had Qiang population, though no details were given in the sources.   
In terms of resettlement,
er Han state settled some of the Qiang along the frontiers and allowed them to retain 
tribal organization in order to utilize their military strength as frontier garrisons. However, 
 
Kyozoku naishisaku ni tsuite” 後漢の羌族内徙策について, Shiteki 史滴 9 (1988): 49-74. 
67 HHS, 24: 835; 87: 2878-2879. 
68 HHS, 87: 2901. Different from the traditional view, de Crespigny suggests that Ma Yuan’s resettlement 
strategy was successful in weakening the Qiang’s power, see his Northern Frontier, 73-74. 
69 HHS, 87: 2880. 
70 HHS, 87: 2884. 
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spreading along the frontiers gave these groups opportunities to collaborate with their 
counterparts who lived outside the empire; retaining tribal organization enabled them to 
preserve solidarity and autonomy, which would become their weapons in anti-Han 
operations. On the other hand, the Later Han state disbanded the tribal organization of 
some Qiang people, resettled them in counties to live with Han people, where they took 
up duty of paying taxes and corvée labor as common subjects of the empire; some were 
even recruited by the imperial state as special troops; some others were bullied by the 
local officials and magnates and were reduced to being their retainers and slaves. No 
matter whether they were soldiers or slaves in the Han territories, the Qiang generally 
suffered from exploitation which exacerbated their hostility towards the Han. 
Since the wars between the Later Han and the Qiang lasted very long, it 
essary to weary the reader with the details. It will suffice to provide a sketch of the 
military conflicts; I will leave the details for a future study.71 
After General Ma Yuan suppressed the Qiang in 35CE, fi
Han broke out consecutively in 56, 57, and 58CE in the commanderies of Wudu and 
Longxi.72 Although the Han forces managed to defeat the Qiang, the power of the Qiang 
 
71 de Crespigny provides detailed narrative of the Qiang rebellions between 107-150CE, see his Northern 
80. 
Frontier, 90-125. 
72 HHS, 87: 2879-28
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in the northwest was still very strong. When the newly-appointed acting Colonel 
Protector of the Qiang, Guo Xiang 郭襄 (fl. 50s CE), arrived Longxi commandery, he 
was frightened by the fact that the Qiang were prevalent in Liang province and 
immediately retreated to the capital. Guo was then dismissed and the office of Colonel 
Protector of the Qiang was also suspended,73 which reflected the inactive attitude of the 
imperial court. In 76CE, a new round of military conflict with the Qiang broke out; the 
Later Han reinstated the Colonel Protector of the Qiang and spent great efforts in 
suppressing the Qiang.74 The situation was out of control again in 86CE and the Colonel 
Protector was even killed in a battle in the following year. Shortly after, 800 Qiang tribal 
chieftains agreed to make peace with the new Colonel Protector but were all ambushed 
and killed. This aroused widespread anger among the Qiang and trigged another wave of 
Qiang offensives. It lasted until 89CE when a new Colonel Protector managed to pacify 
the Qiang.75 However, military confrontation resumed in 92CE and the Later Han had to 
spend the following six years in making the Qiang surrender.  
In addition to the incidents mentioned above, there were 
rmittently. According to the historical accounts, these conflicts were mainly caused by 
                                   
73 HHS, 87: 2881. 
74 Ibid. 
75 HHS, 87: 2882-2883. 
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the Han mismanagement of the Qiang groups along the frontier. The Colonel Protector of 
the Qiang and other regional and local authorities held prime responsibility for relations 
with the Qiang. When there were Han officials who were capable of maintaining a good 
relationship with the Qiang, the region could enjoy peace and stability without recourse 
to the armed forces.76 Otherwise, when the Han officials mishandled the situation, such 
as killing the surrendered tribal chieftains, widespread discontent and hatred spurred the 
Qiang to fight against the Han. Although the ability of the officials was important in 
managing the Han-Qiang relations, it was neither a stable institutional factor nor a 
long-term method to resolve such deep-rooted antagonism. Depending on capable 
officials was a stopgap measure that could only maintain a fragile balance between the 
two sides at best but could not guarantee long-lasting peace.  
   In the second century CE, three wars broke out between th
and brought devastating effects to the empire. The first began in 107CE and ended in 
118CE. The second lasted from 140 to 145CE. The third was from 159 to 169CE.  
   In 107CE, a Han emissary to the Western Regions forcibly conscripted s
thousand Qiang cavalrymen in the commanderies of Jincheng, Longxi, and Hanyang as 
 
76 Guan, “Handai chuli Qiangzu wenti de banfa de jiantao,” 131-132. 
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his escort. When they arrived at Jiuquan commandery, the unwilling Qiang cavalrymen 
all fled as they were afraid of being deployed in the Western Regions with no return.77 
During the process of catching the Qiang fugitives, the Han troops raided many Qiang 
settlements and caused widespread discontent and fear. Nearly all the Qiang in Liang 
province immediately rose up against the Han authority. They attacked towns and killed 
Han officials. According to the sources, since those Qiang had already been settled in the 
empire for long time, they lived as common subjects and had no armor and weapons; 
therefore, they used bamboo and wooden sticks as spear and halberd, and wooden boards 
as shield. Some of them even wielded bronze mirrors to mislead the Han soldiers into 
thinking that they were holding bronze weapons.78  Even though they were poorly 
equipped, the Qiang repeatedly defeated the Han forces. 
   Facing such a large-scale Qiang revolt, the Later Han
troops under the command of General of Chariots and Cavalry (Juji jiangjun 車騎將軍) 
Deng Zhi 鄧騭 (d. 121CE), who was the brother of the regent Empress Dowager Deng 
and also a descendent of Deng Yu (a founding member of the Later Han and the number 
 
77 For the role the Qiang played in the Later Han’s enterprise in the Western Regions, see Li Zhengzhou 
李正周, “Dong Han ‘sanjue santong’ Xiyu yu ‘Qianghuo’ zhi guanlian”  東漢「三絕三通」西域與「羌
禍」之關聯, Yantai shifan xueyuan xuebao 煙台師範學院學報 21.3 (2004.9) : 24-27. 
78 HHS, 87 : 2886; Qianfulun, 24 : 279. 
252 
 
one of the “Twenty-Eight Generals of the Cloud Terrace”), with the assistance of Ren 
Shang 任尚 (d. 118CE). Appointing such a prestigious person as Deng Zhi as the 
commander-in-chief demonstrated that the Later Han imperial court began the campaign 
with high hopes. However, the results were disappointing. Deng’s army was defeated in 
108CE. Dianlian 滇零 (d. 112CE), a Qiang chieftain, seized the chance to establish a 
regime in Beidi commandery and proclaim himself Son of Heaven, putting himself on 
equal footing with the Han emperor. Dianlian then called upon Qiang groups everywhere, 
invaded the regions of Zhao and Wei (modern northern Henan province and southern 
Hebei province) in the east and Yi province (modern Sichuan province) in the south. 
Guanzhong was at the Qiang’s mercy and its communication with the east was 
interrupted. Corresponding to modern Chinese geography, the provinces of Gansu, 
Qinghai, Ningxia, Shaanxi, Shanxi, southern Hebei, and the northern portion of Sichuan 
were all subject to the Qiang’s military assault. The price of grain in counties in the 
Huangzhong 湟中 area, where the conflict was most intense, skyrocketed. Innumerable 
civilians were killed in chaos. Facing such a difficult situation, the immediate response of 
the imperial court was to call back Deng Zhi in order to protect him from continuous 
defeat, which would undermine the authority of the Deng family, and left Ren Shang to 
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take over the command.79     
   Between 109 to 110CE, the
court then ordered Ren Shang to retreat from the western frontier to Chang’an to 
strengthen the defense of Guanzhong. Meanwhile, at request of local officials, the 
government seats of Jincheng commandery and Colonel Protector of the Qiang were all 
removed from their original sites. The retreat of troops and government seats all 
prefigured the imperial court’s intention of withdrawing from the war-torn region, which 
will be discussed in the next section about the debates over abandoning Liang province.  
   In 111CE, Ren Shang was dismissed for achieving nothing in the campaign.
Meanwhile, the Qiang became stronger. They crossed the Yellow River and attacked the 
interior commanderies, including Hedong, Shangdang, Henei, and even threatened Zhao, 
Wei, and the imperial capital. The imperial court was frightened and immediately 
mobilized all the capital defense troops to hold the chokepoint access to the capital. Over 
600 fortresses were thus built in north China to defens against the Qiang.80 In the 
meantime, the imperial court forcibly evacuated the residents of Longxi, Anding, and 
Shang commanderies eastward to the Former Han metropolitan area. For those who were 
 
79 In fact, once back to the capital, Deng Zhi was appointed the Grand General, the highest status of the 
Han bureaucracy. 
80 HHS, 87 : 2887. 
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reluctant to move, the Han armies reaped all their crops in the fields and demolished their 
houses.81 These measures only fueled apprehension in the people of Liang province and 
finally provoked those homeless into acts of violence against Han authorities. Those 
northwestern residents finally joined Dianlian’s regime, which subsequently transformed 
it into an anti-Han forces with a mixed composition of peoples.  
   Starting from 112CE, the war was a stalemate. In order to m
114CE, the Later Han set up 33 fortresses in the interior commandery Henei to strengthen 
the defense line, replaced the commanders with a new cohort, and summoned the 
Xiongnu cavalry for help.82 It was not until 118CE that the Later Han forces finally 
destroyed the Dianlian regime, though it was ruled by Dianlian’s son by then, and order 
was temporarily reestablished in the affected region. The magnitude of the devastation in 
this ten-year war was unprecedented, which we will return to in the next section. 
   The peace achieved by the Later Han was short-lived. In the following yea
Qiang planned to revolt, although they were quickly suppressed. In 120CE, military 
conflicts between the Later Han and the Qiang broke out again and lasted till 122CE with 
heavy casualties on both sides. It was not until 126CE when a Qiang rebellion in Longxi 
 
81 HHS, 87 : 2888. 
82 HHS, 87 : 2889-2890. 
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was suppressed did Liang province really enjoy a short-term peace again.83  
   During early 130s CE, the Later Han state resumed setting up colo
Huangzhong region, which fueled apprehension of the Qiang living there. In 134CE, 
some Qiang groups raided Han commanderies and began a new round of intermittent 
military conflicts.    
   The cumulative eff
CE). When the war broke out, the Qiang forces attacked Jincheng and the Former Han 
metropolitan region. Ma Xian 馬賢 (d. 141CE), a hero in the previous war, was 
appointed as General Who Conquers the West (Zhengxi jiangjun 征西將軍) with 
100,000 troops to suppress the Qiang. Meanwhile, 300 fortresses were set up as defensive 
measures. In 141CE, however, the 5-6,000 cavalry contingent led by Ma Xian himself 
met a crushing defeat at Mount Yegu 射姑山, and Ma and his two sons were killed and 
the contingent was decimated by the Qiang.84 Ma Xian was the highest ranking official 
ever killed by the Qiang and his demise indeed marked a military disaster for and 
imposed psychological dislocation on the Later Han. Meanwhile, the death of Ma Xian 
encouraged all the Qiang within and beyond the imperial realm to unite against the 
 
83 HHS, 87 : 2892-2893. 
84 HHS, 87: 2895. 
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empire. As historical accounts describe, “the Eastern and Western Qiang therefore 
achieve a great union” 東西羌遂大合.85 The Qiang divided into three armies: one 
advanced eastward to Chang’an and burnt the mausoleums of the Former Han emperors; 
another marched northward to Beidi commandery and defeated the Han defensive forces; 
the third moved northwestward to attack the Hexi Corridor. Consequently, the whole 
Liang province and Guanzhong region were ravaged by the Qiang. The Later Han state 
then resorted to evacuating the government seats of Anding and Beidi eastward.86  
   In 142CE, the imperial court appointed Zhao Chong 趙沖 (d. 144) as Co
Protector of the Qiang. Apart from using military forces, Zhao exploited the disunity of 
Qiang society and the discord among the Qiang chieftains. As a result, some Qiang 
groups surrendered. Although Zhao spent great effort in alleviating the situation, in 
144CE, one of his attachés joined the Qiang forces. When chasing this fugitive, Zhao 
Chong and his men were wiped out in an ambush by the Qiang. It was not until next year, 
when the Han officials managed to bribe some of the Qiang chieftains, thereby 
dismembering the Qiang union, that the war ended.87 
   The third war broke out in 159CE and lasted for te
 
85 HHS, 87: 2896. 
86 HHS, 87: 2896. 
87 HHS, 87: 2896-2897. 
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of the “Three Brilliants of Liang Province,” was appointed Colonel Protector of the 
Qiang. The ruthless Duan was well-known for his iron-hand policy in dealing with the 
Qiang. Once he assumed the new position, Duan defeated several Qiang groups who 
raided Longxi commandery. It was only the beginning of the war. In the following years, 
Duan and the Qiang fought back and forth in the northwest. When Duan was in a 
campaign in 161CE, the Qiang and other non-Han people under his command mutinied 
because of their discontent with overdue services. Duan’s troops collapsed, and he was 
jailed by the imperial court.  
Duan’s successor was una
erial court then appointed Huangfu Gui, one the “Three Brilliants of Liang province,” 
to command the imperial forces in the west. Huangfu managed to alleviate the situation 
for several months. Zhang Huan, another one of the “Three Brilliants,” also participated 
in this war. Both Huangfu and Zhang were different from Duan Jiong as they did not rely 
solely on armed forces but also adopted sympathetic stances in dealing with the Qiang.88 
However, it was not easy to solve the deep-rooted antagonism between the two sides. 
Even though Huangfu and Zhang temporarily restored order in certain areas, there was no 
 
88 For analysis of the different strategy of the “Three Brilliants” in dealing with the Qiang, see Yang 
Yongjun, “Shi bijiao ‘Liangzhou sanming’ de zhi Qiang zhengce” 試比較「涼州三明」的治羌政策, Xibei 
shidi 西北史地 1996.2: 73-80. 
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room for complacency. In 162CE, various Qiang groups united again and launched 
another wave of offensives. All commanderies in the west were ravaged and the Later 
Han “nearly lost Liang province” 涼州幾亡.89 Facing such an uncontrollable situation, 
the imperial court released Duan Joing and appointed him Colonel Protector again. 
After returning to the battlefield, Duan Jiong launched a large-scale counteroffensive
paign. From 164 to 165CE, according to accounts, there was not a single day that 
Duan was not fighting (wuri buzhan 無日不戰).90 As a result of his effort, the Qiang 
were exhausted. Duan was ennobled for his victory. In 167CE, the Qiang in the west rose 
up again but were wiped out by Duan. The history says, “the Western Qiang were thus 
pacified” 西羌於此弭定.91         
   Nevertheless, the Eastern Qiang w
achieved success in the western front, the emperor summoned him to the capital and 
asked his opinion on how to handle the eastern front. Duan said that the Qiang could only 
be dealt with by “putting pikes between their ribs and blades on their necks” 長矛挾
脅，白刃加頸.92 The emperor found Duan’s view persuasive and appointed him to take 
 
89 HHS, 65: 2147. 
 
90 HHS, 65: 2147. 
91 HHS, 65: 2148. 
92 HHS, 65: 2148. 
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The imperial court then granted him the title of General who Crushes the Qiang. In order 
to keep his promise to the emperor and end the war quickly, Duan continued his offensive 
strategy and even carried out widespread genocide, wiping out the Qiang groups he 
encountered. As a result, the Qiang who faced Duan either died or surrendered. In the end 
of the biography of Duan Jiong in Hou Hanshu, the compiler Fan Ye praised Duan’s 
victory as making “the valley quiet and the mountain vacant” (gujing shankong 谷靜山
空),93 which clearly reflected the result of mass killings. However, it was definitely a 
Pyrrhic victory as the protracted warfare had already drawn the Later Han to the verge of 
bankruptcy and, most importantly, deeply undermined the imperial authority in the 
northwest. 
 
The m
Han history, and in the history of ea
resulted in tremendous loss of life and property but also unleashed a maelstrom of unrest 
in the northwest, which finally turned the northwesterners hostile towards the imperial 
center. After winning the Qiang wars, ironically, the imperial center had lost control of 
                             
93 HHS, 65: 2154. 
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e first fifty years of Later Han had already 
orthwest and required heavy maintenance costs. 
 (107-118CE) “cost over 24 
bill
                                                
the northwest and it was the northwestern warlord Dong Zhuo who gave the final blow to 
the Later Han imperial authority and triggered the dismemberment of the empire. 
 
The sporadic conflicts with the Qiang during th
necessitated large garrison forces in the n
From 100s CE onward, the prolonged Qiang wars even left the Later Han on the brink of 
bankruptcy and took a heavy toll on both belligerent sides.  
According to the accounts of Hou Hanshu, military spending, including feeding the 
troops and other logistical expenses, in the first Qiang war
ion cash and emptied the state’s coffers.”94 用二百四十餘億，府帑空竭. In 111CE, 
when the war “spread to the interior commanderies, innumerable people on the frontier 
died; the provinces of Bing and Liang were consequently exhausted.”95 延及內郡，邊民
死者不可勝數，并、涼二州，遂至虛耗. Although the historical records did no give the 
exact number of casualties, it would not be baseless to say that the death toll of the Later 
Han soldiers was high, not to mention that of civilians. For example, when Ren Shang 
met a devastating defeat in a battle in 108CE, over 8,000 of his soldiers died. Also, from 
 
94 HHS, 87: 2891. 
95 Ibid. 
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the “Stele for Zhao Kuan,” which I have analyzed in the previous chapter, we know that 
around 108 and 109CE Zhao Kuan was the Deputy Major of the Colonel Protector of the 
Qiang and was engaged in a battle, in which the Later Han army was decimated; Zhao 
Kuan himself barely survived but lost his four sons who were troops.96 Furthermore, 
when the Qiang forces invaded the interior commanderies, which had enjoyed a long 
period of peace and prosperity, it caused panic in those areas. A great number of 
fortresses were built in the interior and residents were forced to evacuate. A Later Han 
stele dating to 117CE called Si Sangong shan bei 祀三公山碑, which was inscribed for 
commemorating an offering to a local deity carried out by local officials, used the phrase 
“suffered from the Qiang’s raid” 遭離羌寇 to describe the context behind erecting the 
stele.97 It is noteworthy because the stele was located originally in Changshan Guo 常山
國 (in modern Hebei province), an enfeoffed kingdom in the interior of the empire, and 
thus shows the Qiang war’s impact on the area beyond the Northwest.  
The threat of war, pillage, and the subsequent hyperinflation in grain prices all caused 
large-scale dislocation of population in the northwest.98 Once again, Zha
                                            
96 Gao, Hanbei jishi, 433; Nagata, Kandai sekkoku shūsei, v.1: 225-229 and v.2: 226-227. 
97 For the full inscription, see Gao, Hanbei jishi, 32-33; Nagata, Kandai sekkoku shūsei, v.1: 34-36 and v.2: 
ang zhou liumin wenti” 試論東漢涼州流民問題, Gansu shehui kexue 甘肅社會科學 2006.2: 
56-57. 
98 On the refugees of Liang province, see Zhang Shuang 張爽 and Xue Haibo 薛海波, “Shilun Dong 
Han Li
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it still 
a real case of dislocation as he followed the refugees who moved to Guanzhong after the 
catastrophic defeat, which we have seen in the last chapter. Moreover, a comparison 
between census data that was carried out by the Later Han in 140CE and by the Former 
Han in 2CE, both listed in Chapter Two, shows clearly that the northwestern 
commanderies experienced a drastic drop in population in the first one hundred years of 
Later Han. For example, the percentage of registered household in Longxi and Jincheng 
commanderies was only 10% of the Former Han’s and Beidi commandery was even only 
5%. The apparent population decrease in northwest could have resulted from various 
reasons, but the first Qiang war (107-118CE) was undoubtedly a significant one. Many 
people were killed in the war and even more fled and disappeared from the government 
household registers to shirk their onerous duties and avoid military service as much as 
possible. As a result, while the Later Han state had to throw enormous resources into the 
Qiang wars, the taxable northwestern households were shrinking quickly; in order to 
compensate for the loss, local governments squeezed the remaining residents, which in 
turn forced them to evade the burden even more. A vicious circle was thus formed. 
Although the second Qiang war (140-145CE) was shorter than the first one, 
                                                                                                                                                 
77-80; Luo, Handai de liumin wenti, 77-80. 
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ulatively cost over 8 billion Later Han currency.99 The death toll of soldiers was no 
less than during the previous war. For instance, General Ma Xian, his two sons, and 
several thousand cavalrymen were wiped out in the battle of Mount Yegu; most of the 
100,000 men originally under Ma’s command finally died in battle in the subsequent 
years. The history summarizes that “the bones of the soldiers who did not attain a proper 
death were widely seen in the countryside.”100 士卒不得其死者，白骨相望於野. 
The third Qiang war (159-169) lasted ten years and incurred enormous costs. D
lack of details about all the expenses and casualties of this war, there is a record of 
Duan Jiong’s military achievements which could give us a glimpse of the scale of the war. 
According to his biography, Duan Jiong fought 180 battles, killed 38,600-odd Qiang, and 
captured 427,500 livestock from them. In total, Duan spent 4.4 billion cash. 101  
Surprisingly, only 400-odd of his soldiers were killed in battle, though we do not have 
corroborating evidence of the authenticity of that number. These were only the statistical 
data related to Duan Jiong, without counting the expenses and casualties under other 
commanders in the ten years. 
Although the Qiang wars 
 
99 HHS, 87: 2897. 
100 Ibid. 
101 HHS, 65: 2153. 
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 already exhausted the imperial coffer and left a trail of desolation across the 
northwest. Worse still, the northwestern region was also suffering from natural disasters 
during the protracted military confrontation. Civilians died in the greatest numbers when 
war coincided with natural disasters. Natural disasters further dislocated the people who 
survived and produced a large number of refugees, which caused social disorder not only 
in Liang province but also other regions where the refugees spread. Some scholars 
suggest that the influx of the northwestern refugees to the interior of the empire brought 
discontent and conflict to other regions and finally underlay the widespread popular 
uprising such as the Yellow Turbans Rebellion in the last years of Later Han.102  
Based on the historical records, we can make a brief list of serious natural d
pened in Liang province during the Later Han period as follows: 
93CE Earthquake in Longxi commandery.103 
97CE Earthquake in Longxi commandery.104 
109CE Great famine in the whole province, can
138CE Earthquake in Jincheng and Longxi commanderies.106 
 
102 Zhang and Xue, “Shilun Dong Han Liang zhou liumin wenti,” 77-80. 
: 214. 
. 
103 HHSZ, 16: 3328. 
104 Ibid. 
105 HHS, 5
106 HHSZ, 16: 3330
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161CE 
mmandery.109 
this is not limpse of the situation in Liang 
relief; they could have also seized the opportunity to attack the empire when the Han 
                  
144CE Earthquake in six commanderies of Liang province. 
eight months, there were in total 180 earthquakes in the area.107  
Earthquake in the whole province.108 
180CE Earthquake and flooding in Jiuquan co
183CE Flooding in Jincheng commandery.110 
Though  a complete one, it can still give us a g
province during the period in question.111 It seems that from the late first century to the 
mid-second century the northwestern region had entered a period of frequent earthquake, 
especially in Longxi and Jincheng commanderies. Hence, it might not be coincidental 
that the two commanderies were subject to most frequent attacks from the Qiang. 
Historical records reveal that the entry of the 138CE earthquake was immediately 
followed by a report of the Qiang attacking the fortresses of Jincheng; after the 144CE 
earthquake was another Qiang assault, which killed the Colonel Protector of the Qiang.112 
The Qiang were probably affected by the earthquake and resorted to raiding as a way of 
                               
107 Ibid. 
108 HHSZ, 16: 3331. 
109 HHSZ, 16: 3332. 
110 HHSZ, 15: 3312. 
111 For further information on the natural disasters happened in Liang province and the ensuing problems, 
see Zhang and Xue, “Shilun Dong Han Liang zhou liumin wenti,” 77-80. 
112 HHSZ, 16: 3330. 
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es, but the northwestern writer Wang 
eople were exploited by regional and local officials, which 
cau
                                                
local officials were preoccupied with relief work.  
   The combined effects of prolonged warfare and natural disasters indeed devastated 
the war-torn areas and deeply disrupted people’s liv
Fu complained repeatedly in his essays that if the regional and local officials were more 
concerned with the welfare of northwestern people and if the imperial army were more 
efficient, the Qiang wars could have ended earlier and the devastating effects of the wars 
could have been alleviated.113 In other words, from Wang Fu’s point of view, poor 
management and mishandling of the situation were the cause of the long lasting suffering 
of the northwestern people.  
Wang Fu’s criticism was supported by the evidence given in the historical sources. As 
mentioned before, the Qiang p
sed riots. Even in times of peace, official corruption and embezzlement prevailed in 
Liang province, and both the Han and non-Han peoples suffered. The malfeasance of 
officials in Liang province became especially serious in the middle of the dynasty. During 
the late 150s CE, according to the wooden strips excavated in a family vault of imperial 
kinsmen at Gangu 甘谷 prefecture in modern Gansu province (which belonged to 
 
113 Wang Fu mentioned this point several times in his works, see Qianfulun Chapters 21-24. 
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even earned respect from Qiang adversaries was their 
righ
                                                
Hanyang commandery in the Later Han times), there were cases where local officials of 
Liang province even dared to infringe upon privileges of members of the imperial clan 
who lived in their jurisdiction by encroaching on their lands and forcing them to render 
levies, from which they were supposed to be exempt because of their royal 
kinsmenship.114 If even the privileges of imperial kinsmen (though distant) were violated, 
it would not be difficult to imagine that the commoners of Liang province were all at the 
mercy of local officials.115 
Therefore, one reason why both Huangfu Gui and Zhang Huan had good reputations 
in Liang province and 
teousness and denunciation of official corruption. After General Ma Xian’s 
catastrophic defeat in 141CE, Huangfu Gui submitted a petition to the imperial court in 
which he sharply pointed out that the Qiang revolts were mainly caused by the 
mismanagement of frontier commanders, that it was their exploitation that forced the 
Qiang’s military resistance, and that it was their inefficiency and incapability of dealing 
 
114 For details, see Xiao Kangda 肖亢達, “Gangu Hanjian yu dong Han houqi shehui zhengzhi” 甘谷漢簡
與東漢後期社會政治, Kaogu yu wenwu 考古與文物 1989.6: 78-85; Zhang Xuezheng 張學正, “Gangu 
Hanjian kaoshi” 甘谷漢簡考釋, in Gansusheng wenwugongzuodui 甘肅省文物工作隊 and Gansusheng 
baowuguan 甘 肅 省 博 物 館  eds., Hanjian yanjiu wenji 漢 簡 研 究 文 集  (Lanzhou: Gansu renmin 
chubanshe, 1984), 85-140. 
115  Besides the corruption and malfeasance of local officials, the violations of imperial kinsmen’s 
privileges in Liang province may also reflect the chaotic situation that under the turmoil of warfare and 
natural disasters members of imperial clan were deprived of any real protection.  
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ars aggravated the chaotic situation 
                                                
with the situation and their attempts to cover up defeats that delayed the opportunities of 
pacifying the Qiang in the early stages.116 Later, when Huangfu Gui was appointed to 
command imperial troops in the northwest, he exercised his plenary authority to cashier 
corrupt regional and local officials as a necessary measure to pacify the Qiang;117 in the 
same manner, when Zhang Huan was in charge of the Qiang affairs in the northwest, he 
promoted incorrupt behavior, which earned him the trust of Qiang tribal leaders.118 The 
admirable behavior of both Huangfu and Zhang, on the other hand, reflected the 
prevailing corruption among officials in the northwest. However, what Zhang and 
Huangfu did was not an institutional mechanism for dealing with the Qiang questions. 
Therefore, when both of them were removed by their political opponents for their 
anti-corruption campaigns and other reasons, the relations between the Qiang and the 
Han regional and local officials deteriorated again.  
   Apart from malfeasance and corruption, the fact that quite a few officials advocated 
withdrawal from Liang province during the Qiang w
even further. Moreover, the imperial army sent to the battlefront was criticized as 
inefficient and incompetent, which finally fostered the rise of the non-imperial controlled 
 
116 HHS, 65: 2129. 
117 HHS, 65: 2132. 
118 HHS, 65: 2138. 
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acing incessant armed conflicts with the Qiang, especially after military setbacks, the 
e officials. The most revealing 
northwestern military forces. Withdrawal and the military balance between the imperial 
troops and the northwestern forces will be discussed in the following two subsections.     
 
2. Abandoning the Northwest and forcible Withdrawals  
F
idea of abandoning the northwest arose among som
expressions of the idea were three debates over abandoning the region. The proponents 
insisted that it was the best way to solve the Qiang problem once and for all. Such an idea 
found wide support among central officials as well as their regional and local colleagues 
in Liang province. For the northwesterners, on the contrary, such an idea meant 
abandoning them and was unacceptable. Although the proposals of abandonment were 
never formally put into practice, the imperial court adopted an alternative way of 
evacuating the regional and local government seats and forcibly removing the residents, 
which provoked large-scale discontent among the northwesterners. The idea of giving up 
Liang province not only showed the estrangement between the imperial center and the 
northwest but also deepened the distrust between the two sides. 
   The idea of giving up the northwestern territories first emerged in the early years of 
270 
 
ted the Qiang who had 
 
n e area, pointed out that the walled 
                                                
the Later Han. About 35CE, when General Ma Yuan defea
occupied a significant number of counties in Jincheng commandery since the last years 
of Wang Mang’s regime, some courtiers suggested giving up the land west of Poqiang 
county in Jincheng as the territory was distant and dominated by adversaries. 119  
Although no details of the courtiers were given in the history, it might be reasonable to 
say that that was the voice of easterners. As already explained in the preceding chapter, 
from its establishment onwards, the Later Han imperial court was dominated by officials 
based on the eastern part of the empire. Hence, the suggestion of abandoning some 
western counties might represent the eastern-based officials’ concerns and interests of 
not wasting resources on the far western borderlands. 
  In response to this, General Ma Yuan, a man from Guanzhong and an expert on 
orthwestern affairs, with his firsthand knowledge of th
towns located west of Poqiang county were all in good condition and provided favorable 
circumstances for defense, and it would be a mistake to leave the land to the Qiang, who 
would in turn take this advantage to strengthen themselves and cause further harm to the 
Later Han. Emperor Guangwu accepted Ma Yuan’s strategic evaluations and decided to 
 
119 HHS, 24: 835. 
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l-scale conflicts with 
the 
is son 
                                                
retain the territories.120 The emperor’s decision was probably based on the consideration 
that giving up the land recently taken from the defeated adversary Wei Ao would 
undermine the authority and stability of the newly-founded empire. 
Although the imperial court retained the territories of western Jincheng commandery, 
the emergence of the suggestion of cession when facing only smal
Qiang (which was rather easily suppressed by Ma Yuan) indeed presaged the idea of 
giving up the whole province when large-scale and protracted warfare broke out.  
   In 107CE when General Deng Zhi was sent to Liang province to command the Qiang 
campaign, a jailed ex-official named Pang Can 龐參 (fl. 100s-130sCE) had h
submit a petition to the imperial court, urging that the imperial court halt the troops in 
Guanzhong region and temporarily put Liang province aside in order to give people relief 
from the burdens of extra taxes and labor service as a means to save energy and resources 
for future action against the Qiang rebels.121 In the meantime, a senior official named Fan 
Zhun 樊準 (d. 118CE) recommended Pang Can as a suitable person to be entrusted the 
northwestern affairs. Empress Dowager Deng accepted Fan’s suggestion, then released 
Pang and appointed him to command the garrisons in Guanzhong region.122  
 
120 Ibid. 
1: 1687. 121 HHS, 5
122 Ibid. 
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in 
t. Pang 
the Former Han dynasty) and move the residents of frontier commanderies to the 
   Pang Can’s main concerns were the social well-being of the people, especially the 
people of the eastern sector as he was strongly against the practice of “sending gra
across ten-thousand li” (wanli yunliang 萬里運糧) to Liang province, which deeply 
disturbed the normal lives of farming households. Pang did not propose giving up Liang 
province permanently but only as a short-term palliative measure of dealing with the 
problem until the empire regained enough resources and energy. The policy makers’ 
appreciation of Pang’s proposal reflected that they basically shared his view and preferred 
to take no immediate action with respect to Liang province. Pang Can was a native of 
Henan commandery, which was located in the vicinity of the Later Han capital Luoyang, 
and entered government service by being recommended as a “filial and incorrupt.” Hence, 
his view might represent some other Guandong-based scholar-officials like him.  
   In the Spring of 110CE, the Qiang grew stronger, while the imperial army suffered a 
series of defeats. Natural disasters further deteriorated the situation in the northwes
Can submitted another proposal to Deng Zhi, who was now the Grand General and the 
most powerful official, suggesting that the empire concentrate its defensive efforts on 
consolidating the region of Chang’an and its vicinity (that is, the metropolitan region of 
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is staff who has been mentioned in the previous chapter, was strongly against it. 
Yu 
                                                
region.123 Pang Can stressed that it was the best way to protect the empire and not to 
harm the living standards of most people. Deng Zhi was worried about the enormous 
expense of warfare in Liang province and was inclined to give up the province so that the 
empire could focus on the northern frontier against the Xiongnu; hence, Pang’s plan was 
convincing to him. Deng then clearly manifested his intention to abandon Liang province 
in a court meeting with all senior officials, and the attendees unanimously agreed with 
him.124 
However, when the Grand Commandant (Taiwei 太尉, ranked as Chancellor) Li Xiu 
李脩 (fl. 110s CE) told his staff about the decision shortly after the court meeting, Yu Xu, 
one of h
pointed out that, firstly, the preceding emperors had put in great effort to conquer the 
northwestern region, and it was inappropriate to give up the territory for the sake of 
saving money; secondly, if Liang province were abandoned, Chang’an and its vicinity 
would become the frontier and all the Former Han imperial mausoleums located nearby 
Chang’an would be exposed to enemies, which would be totally unacceptable for the 
Later Han, a dynasty that claimed itself as the successor of the Former Han; thirdly, 
 
123 HHS, 51: 1688. 
124 HHS, 58: 1866. 
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rners. In order to harness such a strong force, Yu suggested 
                                                
Liang province was famous for producing good fighters that were sturdier and braver 
than their counterparts in other provinces; they were a strong force that deterred the 
Qiang from leaving them behind and going directly to Chang’an and its vicinity. Yu 
further explained that if the northwesterners were still loyal to the Han, they would be 
willing to fight for the empire, but if the state abandoned the northwest and moved them 
from their homeland, they would definitely turn against the state, and nobody could resist 
such a formidable force.125 
   Li Xiu was terrified by the picture drawn by Yu Xu and asked for a solution. Yu 
emphasized that the imperial court should pay serious attention to the attitudes and 
allegiance of the northweste
that the senior officials of the central government should each recruit several 
northwesterners to serve in their office. Also, the male family members of incumbent 
regional and local administrators of Liang province should be granted honorary official 
titles. By doing this, the imperial court could reward the efforts of the northwesterners 
and the regional and local officials on one hand, and hold hostages to rein the two groups 
of people on the other.126 It was Yu’s plan of killing two birds with one stone. Li Xiu 
 
125 Ibid. 
126 Ibid. 
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e empire from the turmoil in the northwest. That he secured a unanimous 
                                  
immediately called for a court meeting and explained Yu’s proposal to everybody. They 
finally turned the table and put Yu’s plan into action. Liang province was thus kept in the 
imperial realm. However, Yu Xu earned no merit as he was hated by Deng Zhi and his 
brothers for his opposing views; later on, Yu was demoted to the rank of a local 
official.127  
   Although Yu Xu frustrated Deng Zhi’s plan, neither of them was really concerned 
about the interests of the northwesterners. Deng Zhi insisted on giving up Liang province 
for saving th
support for his plan in the first place was probably mainly due to his powerful status, but 
it might also reflect the view of the majority of senior central officials, the bulk of whom 
were Guandong scholar-officials. Yu Xu was capable of turning the table because his 
arguments touched the core concerns of the policy makers by emphasizing the 
importance of keeping Liang province to the legitimacy and security of the Later Han 
dynasty. His argument that abandoning the northwest would provoke the unruly 
northwestern forces against the imperial center especially invoked the nightmare of the 
senior central officials. Yu Xu’s suggestion of using northwesterners in central 
               
127 HHS, 58: 1867. 
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es and energy into suppressing the Yellow Turbans, 
                                                
government was in fact for the benefit of the imperial center but not wholeheartedly for 
the well-being of the northwesterners. 
   The third debate took place in 185CE. In the previous year, the Yellow Turbans 
uprising broke out and swept quickly across the eastern part of the empire.128 While the 
imperial court had to put all its resourc
Liang province was at war again. Although the Qiang wars nominally ended in 169CE 
with Duan Jiong’s mass killing, the region was never restored to peace. In the general 
population of Liang province, the issue was far from resolved. With the deteriorating 
political, social, and economic conditions that resulted from the protracted Qiang wars in 
the northwest, discontent among the Han settlers, the Qiang, and other non-Han peoples 
in the region towards the Later Han grew stronger and stronger. Finally, they launched a 
large-scale offensive in 184CE. The people of Fuhan 枹罕 and Heguan 河關 counties 
revolted against the local governments and had the “voluntary Hu followers from the 
Huangzhong area” (Huangzhong yicong Hu 湟中義從胡, which is a group of alien 
origins counted by Zheng Tai in Dong Zhuo’s troops; see Zheng’s speech cited in Chapter 
One) Beigong Boyu 北宮伯玉 and a man called Li Wenhou 李文侯 (probably an 
 
128 For detailed analysis, see Michaud, “The Yellow Turbans,” 41-127; Mansvelt Beck, “The Fall of Han,” 
334-341. 
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e Masses (Situ 司徒; ranked as Chancellor) Cui Lie 崔烈 (d. 
                                                
ethnic Han according to his name) as their leaders.129 They then joined the Qiang forces 
in Beidi commandery to attack Jincheng commandery. In Jincheng, two local strongmen, 
Bian Zhang 邊章 (d. 185CE) and Han Sui 韓遂 (d. 215CE), echoing the rebels, 
organized their own forces, killed the Grand Administrator, and controlled the 
commandery. The united force then turned to other commanderies in Liang province and 
even made an inroad on Chang’an and its vicinity in the following year. Facing the 
formidable forces of Bian and Han and their allies, the imperial court appointed Huangfu 
Song (nephew of Huangfu Gui) and Dong Zhuo to be responsible for restoring order in 
the northwest. Shortly afterwards, Huangfu Song was dismissed for having achieved 
nothing, and a senior official Zhang Wen 張 溫  (d. 191CE) was appointed as 
commander-in-chief of the western front, with over 100,000 troops under his 
command.130 However, no matter how large his forces, Zhang Wen was still unable to 
defeat his adversaries. 
   The Later Han was suffering from a multi-frontal war, with the Yellow Turbans in 
particular critically threatening the imperial center and the eastern sector of the empire, 
the Excellency over th
 
129 HHS, 72: 2320. 
130 Ibid. 
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192CE), a man from a prestigious Guandong scholar-official family, held a court meeting 
with all senior central officials and advocated giving up Liang province so that the empire 
could focus solely on the eastern front. Fu Xie (no. 22 on the list of northwestern elite in 
Chapter Three) immediately shouted out, “only beheading the Excellency over the 
Masses would all under Heaven be pacified”131 斬司徒，天下乃安. Fu Xie was thus 
censured for his lacking respect to senior officials and was summoned by Emperor Ling 
to giving an explanation for his actions. Fu told the emperor that Cui Lie was wrong for 
suggesting the abandonment of Liang province. Fu explained that Liang province was of 
utmost strategic importance in defending the western flank of the empire, and it would be 
a catastrophe to leave such a vast land and its strong soldiers to the “barbarians who fold 
their robes to the left” (zuoren zhi lu 左衽之虜).132 Fu Xie’s emphasis on the strategic 
buffering function of Liang province earned the emperor’s agreement. Once again, Liang 
province was kept in the imperial realm. One point meriting our attention is that Fu Xie 
used the phrase zuoren zhi lu to describes all the adversaries in Liang province, no matter 
who they were and whether they really folded their robes to the left. It provides 
corroborating evidence that the term zuoren had became a metonymy for barbarism, and 
 
131 HHS, 58: 1875. 
132 HHS, 58: 1875-1876. 
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itself from getting involved with any further trouble and thus save 
its 
the ethnicity between Han and barbarian in the northwest was in large extent determined 
by political allegiance. 
   By summarizing the three debates over abandoning Liang province, I will suggest 
that what lay at the heart of the debates were two different visions of empire among the 
Later Han officials.  
It was mainly the Guandong scholar-officials who put forward the plan of giving up 
Liang province. Their central argument was that by cutting off the chaotic northwest, the 
empire could protect 
energy and resources. It was an eastern-centered point of view and a lesser-empire 
vision that by preserving the resources and energy of the eastern sector, the Later Han 
could be a self-contained and self-sufficient empire. The significance of the idea of 
giving up the northwest can never be overemphasized. Since the establishment of the Qin 
empire in 221BCE, abandonment of imperial territory happened only once in the history 
of early imperial China. It was in 46BCE that Emperor Yuan of the Former Han 
(interestingly enough, his reign was also the period that the classical-training 
scholar-officials started flourishing in the imperial court) accepted an official named Jia 
Juanzhi‘s 賈捐之 suggestion of abandoning the far southern commandery Zhuya 珠崖 
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d the rule of avoidance, namely 
“Ru
                                                
(modern-day Hainan 海南 island), which was annexed by Emperor Wu in 110BCE, 
because of the intermittent rebellions of the aboriginal people.133 However, Zhuya was 
only a commandery in the administrative hierarchy and, most importantly, was much 
smaller and farther from the imperial center than Liang province. To abandon a whole 
province was something unprecedented. In fact, behind such a view lay the political 
message that “they were not part of us.” It was only when the eastern scholar-officials did 
not regard Liang province as an inseparable part of the empire that they could decide to 
give up the whole territory. The triumphalism that accompanied the conquest of the 
northwest prevailing in the reign of Emperor Wu of Former Han dynasty had long 
dissipated during the Later Han. Among the Later Han political elites, there were lesser 
expectations and hopes of the northwest frontier region.  
According to Wang Fu’s essays, the view of giving up Liang province was not only 
advocated by central officials but also widely shared by regional and local officials in 
Liang province. Since the Later Han bureaucracy practice
le of the three mutual [exclusions]” (Sanhu fa 三互法), by which “no regional 
authority was nominated to govern his region of origin: no prefect, nor his adjuncts 
 
133 HS, 9: 283; HS, 64B: 2830. 
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governed his home county, no grand administrator nor his aides governed his 
commandery of origin, no regional inspector exercised control in the region where his 
prefecture was situated,”134 generally speaking, the regional and local officials who 
governed Liang province were non-native people. As mentioned in the preceding chapter, 
the mainstay of the Later Han bureaucracy consisted of eastern-based scholar-officials, a 
great proportion of officials dispatched to Liang province would doubtlessly be men of 
eastern background.135 Some of them might even have various relations to the officials at 
the imperial center. Therefore, according to Wang Fu, these officials would not have the 
patience and determination to protect the territory. When riots broke out, they just wanted 
to escape from the chaotic northwest as soon as possible. That was why they echoed the 
voice of abandoning Liang province at the imperial center. That might also partly explain 
the prevailing corruption and malfeasance of the officials in Liang province. In addition, 
when Yu Xu suggested granting honorary titles to the male family members of those 
incumbent regional and local officials in Liang province, he was aiming to encourage 
those officials to fulfill their duties. To criticize the eastern-centered mindset of the 
 
134 Anthony Hulsewé, “Law as One of the Foundations of State Power in Early Imperial China,” in S. R. 
Schram ed., Foundations and Limits of State Power in China (London: School of Oriental and African 
Studies, 1987), 25. 
135 Yan Gengwang has pieced together fragments of historical data to make a list of Grand Administrators 
of Liang province in the Later Han period, see his Liang Han taishou cishi biao 兩漢太守刺史表 
(Shanghai: Shangwu yinshuguan, 1948), 236-251. 
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eritance from the Former Han 
and
                                                
officials, Wang Fu mocked those officials that if their male family members were under 
the menace of the Qiang as those people on the frontier were, then those officials would 
unanimously support the campaigns against the Qiang.136 
On the other hand, the opposite side included officials with northwestern backgrounds 
like Fu Xie and like Yu Xu, who, while of eastern background, had a different view than 
his colleagues. They emphasized Liang province as an inh
 its strategic position, especially its role in protecting the western flank of the empire. 
This view of greater-empire was used to uphold the integrity of the imperial territory. 
Wang Fu also criticized the officials who supported giving up Liang province as unwise 
since no country could sustain itself without frontiers.137 Both Yu Xu and Fu Xie 
succeeded in preserving Liang province due to their strong arguments of imperial grand 
strategy, which touched the core concern and fear of the imperial court. They emphasized 
the strategic importance of Liang province and in particular the potential hostility of the 
northwestern military forces, which would be a nightmare to the empire if they turned 
against the imperial center. 
   Despite the fact that Yu Xu had succeeded in persuading the decision makers to keep 
 
136 Qianfulun, 22: 262. 
137 Qianfulun, 22: 258. 
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the northwest, thereby giving up Liang province, though 
nd the office of Colonel Protector of the Qiang from Jincheng 
                                                
Liang province in the imperial realm, the Later Han state in fact adopted an alternative 
way of withdrawal from 
temporarily.  
   In 110CE, after a series of defeats to the imperial army, the imperial court relocated 
the government seat of Jincheng commandery to Xiangwu 襄武 county in Longxi 
commandery a
commandery to Zhangye commandery in order to avert from the Qiang attack. In the 
following year, “as the Qiang grew stronger, the regional and local officials, who were 
mainly from interior commanderies, had no commitment to defense and fight, and all sent 
memorials to [the imperial court to] strive to be first to move their commanderies and 
counties away from the menace of the adversary.”138 羌既轉盛，而二千石、令、長多
內郡人，並無戰守意，皆爭上徙郡縣以避寇難. The imperial court agreed with them and 
moved the government seats of Longxi commandery from Didao to Xiangwu county of 
the same commandery, Anding commandery to Meiyang 美陽 county of Fufeng, Beidi 
commandery to Chiyang 池陽 county of Pingyi 馮翊, and Shang commandery to Ya 
衙 county of Pingyi.139 Both Fufeng and Pingyi were commanderies in Guanzhong 
 
138 HHS, 87: 2887. 
139 HHS, 87: 2888. 
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ensive facilities, 
and
                     
region and next to Chang’an. These government seats of commanderies were moved 
eastward or southward in order to escape from the Qiang. In addition to moving the 
government seats, the state ordered the people belonging to the respective commanderies 
to follow suit. The ordering of people to move confirmed what I have stated in Chapter 
Two that the imperial state defined the imperial sovereignty over its subjects more than 
over the territories, and the regional and local administrative units were based on 
governing registered population rather than clearly delineated territories. 
However, most of the residents of Liang province were attached to their homeland 
and were unwilling to move. As a result, the officials carried out forcible movement by 
“cutting crops in their fields, demolishing their houses, leveling their def
 destroying their storage.”140 刈其禾稼，發徹室屋，夷營壁，破積聚. These actions 
provoked great discontent among the affected residents. In the meantime, drought and 
locusts plagued Liang province, which worsened the situation of the people. The 
historical records depict a tragic picture under which many people who were forced to 
move either died on the way or become refugees. The elderly and the weak were 
abandoned and many of those who survived were forced to be servants or slaves of local 
                            
140 Ibid. 
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aba
, the Later Han found no way to suppress the Qiang and therefore resorted to 
the 
                                                
magnates.141 The direct consequence was a popular uprising led by the residents of 
Hanyang commandery Du Qi 杜琦 (d. 111CE), Du Jigong 杜季貢 (d. 117CE), and 
Wang Xin 王信 (d. 112CE). Du’s force then allied with the Qiang chieftain Dianlian.  
In 129CE, when the order in Liang province was temporarily restored, Yu Xu urged 
the emperor to move back the commanderies-in-exile. In his memorial, Yu criticized the 
myopic officials who ignored the strategic value of Liang province and for readil
ndoning the strategic defensive positions.142 The emperor accepted Yu’s proposal and 
ordered the reestablishment of commanderies of Anding, Beidi, Shang, Longxi, and 
Jincheng.  
In 141CE, however, the situation turned for the worse. After General Ma Xian’s death 
in battle, the Qiang’s plundering in Guanzhong and burning of Former Han imperial 
mausoleums
evacuation of commanderies again. Anding commandery was relocated to Fufeng and 
Beidi to Pingyi, both were next to Chang’an.143 The defensive frontline was contracted 
and retreated to Chang’an and its vicinity.144  
 
142 HHS, 87: 2893. 
143 HHS, 87: 2896. 
144 For detailed information of the back and forth movements of all the aforementioned commanderies, see 
 李曉杰, Dong Han zhengqu dili 東漢政區地理 (Jinan: Shandong jiaoyu chubanshe, 1999), 
141 Ibid. 
Li Xiaojie
136-137, 139-153.  
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cible movement of residents exacerbated 
tens
As briefly mentioned in the preceding chapters, the Qin state instituted a top-down 
Although the Later Han state never openly abandoned Liang province, the evacuation 
of government seats and the concomitant for
ions between the people of Liang province and the imperial center. The relocation of 
government seats and of residents corroborated the northwesterners’ perception that the 
officials as well as the imperial court had no determination or ability to defend and 
protect the land and people of the northwest; the forcible movement especially bred 
hatred among the northwesterners towards the imperial state. The Qiang wars as well as 
the ensuing withdrawals discredited the imperial authority among the northwesterners. As 
the imperial state was no longer reliable, the people of Liang province could expect little 
from the state and had to arm themselves for self-protection. The growing discontent with 
the imperial state engendered unrest among the northwestern military forces and turned 
them against the empire. This finally realized the prophecy of Yu Xu when he warned the 
imperial court about the worst consequences of abandonment.     
 
3. Spontaneous Militarization flourished in Liang province 
sanctioned militarization program, with universal military service as the most crucial 
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com upplemented by the system of ranks of merit, which provided the Qin with a 
Chinese history. The practice of 
ponent s
formidable military force to establish the first empire in 
sanctioned militarization was inherited by the Former Han dynasty. However, the role of 
sanctioned militarization diminished with time during the Former Han and was finally 
renounced by the Later Han: universal military service was abolished by the founding 
emperor Guangwu; the value of ranks of merit gradually diminished and transformed 
from a mechanism for rewarding service to the state, particularly in combat, to a 
perfunctory practice of giving titles without real respect and privileges.145 The extent of 
adoption of sanctioned militarization shows a notable difference between the two Han 
dynasties, which confirms the comparison between the zeitgeist of them in the previous 
chapter. Since there have been many discussions on the military systems of the two Han 
dynasties, universal military service in particular, I shall not repeat them here.146 The foci 
                                                 
145 For the decline of the system and the devaluation of the ranks of merit in the Later Han period, see Zhu, 
 There are numerous studies of the military systems of the two Han dynasties, to name a few will suffice. 
In Chinese scholarship, see Sun Yutang 孫毓棠, “Xi Han de bingzhi” 西漢的兵制 and “Dong Han 
Zhonghua shuju, 1995), 269-327 and 328-355, respectively; Li Yufu 李玉福, “Qin Han shidai de bingyi 
zhidu” 秦漢時代的兵役制度 and “Qin Han shidai de junshi jianzhi” 秦漢時代的軍事建制, in idem, Qin 
respectively; Huang Jinyan 黃今言, Qin Han junzhi shilun 秦漢軍制史論 (Nanchang: Jiangxi renmin 
Jungong juezhi kaolun, 133-164. 
146
bingzhi de yanbian” 東漢兵制的演變 in idem, Sun Yutang xueshu luwenji 孫毓棠學術論文集 (Beijing: 
Han zhidu shilu 秦漢制度史論 (Jinan: Shandong daixue chubanshe, 2003), 215-270 and 271-245, 
chubanshe, 1993), esp. Ch. 2-5; for Japanese research, see Hamaguchi Shigekuni 濱口重國, “Kōbutei no 
gunbi shukushō to sono eikyō” 光武帝の軍備縮小と其の影響, in idem, Shin Kan Zui Tō shi no kenkyū 
an Army: Organization, Leadership, and Operation,” in Di Cosmo ed., 
秦漢隋唐史の研究 (Tokyo: Tōkyō Daigaku shubankai, 1966), 291-325; in Western scholarship, see 
Michael Loewe, “The Western H
Military Culture in Imperial China, 65-89; Rafe de Crespigny, “The Military Culture of Later Han,” in Di 
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military factors in Chinese culture and thereby made some of his claims exaggerated, he 
of this subsection are the impact of the abolition of universal military service on the 
flourishing of bottom-up spontaneous militarization in Liang province and how the 
imperial court lost control of the northwest.  
   For the Later Han’s abolition of universal military service, Lei Haizong 雷海宗 was 
arguably the best-known as well as its first modern critic. In his 1940 essay, Lei blamed 
Emperor Guangwu’s decision as unwise as it not only incapacitated the military power of 
the Later Han but also destroyed the martial spirit of succeeding generations of Chinese 
people, which transformed Chinese culture into what he called an “amilitary” or a 
“demilitarized” culture (wubing de wenhua 無兵的文化); Chinese people were therefore 
suffering from foreign invasions.147 Despite the fact that nationalist sentiments during the 
War of Resistance against Japan (1937-1945) deeply influenced Lei’s perception of 
did really point out the abolition had deeply undermined the overall military might of the 
Later Han dynasty. In his recent study on the topic, Mark Edward Lewis regards Emperor 
Guangwu’s decision as a product of rational calculation with the nature of “abandoning 
                                                                                                                                                 
Cosmo ed., Military Culture in Imperial China, 90-111. For the background of the initiation of universal 
military service, see Tu, Bianhu qimin, Ch. 2 and 9; Lewis, Sanctioned Violence in Early China, Ch.2 and 
3.   
147 Lei Haizong 雷海宗, Zhongguo wenhua yu Zhongguo de bing 中國文化與中國的兵 (Shanghai: 
Shangwu yinshuguan, 1940), especially 44-61 and 125-159.  
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reliance on conscripts to form the elite forces and halting regular training while reserving 
the power to conscript in emergencies.”148 Lewis argues that the reasons for the abolition 
were due to three considerations: economy—the Later Han state could save money from 
holding the annual inspection ceremony and maintaining a large standing commandery 
troops; loyalty—the imperial court could reduce the chances of munity, since during the 
last years of Wang Mang the annual assembly of commandery troops had provided 
opportunities for the power contenders to launch rebellions, and even the future Emperor 
Guangwu once made a failed attempt; and efficacy—a streamlined and professional army 
would replace the bulky farmer-conscripted army without disturbing most people’s daily 
lives.149 In short, the intention of Emperor Guangwu was to secure his regime by means 
of demilitarizing most of the population and minimizing military expenditure.  
With most of society theoretically unarmed and untrained in warfare, the standing 
imperial army would be the only military power in the empire and the emperor would be 
the sole possessor of military forces. During most of the Later Han, standing forces 
consisting of recruits were mainly stationed in the imperial capital and several p
ps at key points in the empire. To deal with threats from different directions, the Later 
 
148 Mark Edward Lewis, “The Han Abolition of Universal Military Service,” in Hans van de Ven ed., 
Warfare in Chinese History (Leiden and Boston: Brill, 2000), 39.   
149 Ibid, 39-48; also Sun, “Dong Han bingzhi de yanbian,” 330-332. 
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 reserve troops that were composed mainly of the untrained 
com
                                                
Han set up, for example, Liyang camp 黎陽營, Duliao camp 度遼營, and Yuyang camp 
漁陽營 in the north; Yong camp 雍營 and Chang’an camp 長安營 in the west; and 
Xianglin camp 象林營 and Fuli camp 扶黎營 in the south. However, these were 
mainly for the interior of the empire, and people along the frontiers were still required to 
provide certain military services for the frontier defense. Also, in order to have adequate 
men to defend the frontiers, an increasing number of convicts reprieved from death 
sentences were deployed to serve garrisons, as mentioned in the preceding chapter, and 
various non-Han people such as the Xiongnu and the Qiang were recruited and organized 
in frontier troops.  
However, for such a vast empire as the Later Han, a handful of military camps only 
located at strategic points would not be sufficient to meet multi-frontal, protracted 
external or internal military conflicts. Hence, during times of emergency, the Later Han 
needed to call up
moners.150 Needless to say, they would only provide reinforcement in terms of 
quantity but not in quality. Since the common people were undertrained and 
undisciplined, a minor or partial defeat would throw the whole army into panic and chaos, 
 
150 See the examples listed by Lewis in “The Han Abolition of Universal Military Service,” 36-37. 
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which would then create a snowball effect and result in the collapse of the army, which 
was what happened in the Qiang wars. Furthermore, since the commandery troops were 
disabled, when the Qiang succeeded in penetrating the frontier defenses and invaded the 
interior commanderies, there were no significant or capable troops to oppose the 
adversary; the Qiang were therefore able to roam those regions at will. As we have seen 
before, the only method the state could adopt was to set up a large number of fortresses in 
the interior as a means of passive defense. Based on these facts, we may be able to 
understand why Wang Fu complained in his work that the imperial army’s incapacity to 
fight was one of the important reasons why the Qiang wars lasting so long.151 
Ying Shao, whose Fengsu tongyi I have cited in the discussion on the Qiang, made a 
harsh and yet revealing retrospective comment in his work entitled Han Guan 漢官 
(The Han Institutions) on the failure of the Later Han military system. Ying m
ught on military affairs in the beginning of the passage by quoting words from the 
classic Zuo Zhuan 左傳 (The Zuo Commentary of the Spring and Autumn Annals):  
Heaven produces the five materials, and the people utilize all of them. Since none [of 
the five elements] could be discarded, who could give up using weapons [or 
violence]?  
 
151 Qianfulun, 21: 250-253, 22: 267. 
152 It is originally from Zuo Zhuan, see Yang Bojun 楊伯峻 annotated, Chunqiu Zuozhuan zhu 春秋左傳
 Shao’s 
, 28: 3622. 
注 v. 3, the 27th year of the Duke Xiang 襄公 (Beijing: Zhonghua shuju, 1981), 113. For Ying
comments in the Han Guan, see HHSZ
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to the f
hed infantry and cavalry, the state 
e in uproar. Without sufficient training in archery 
sciplines and doctrines, the people are 
the ab
insufficient and incapable of protecting the empire. Mobilizing the common people who 
had no military training only aggravated the situation further. Ying quoted a saying from 
Confucius, “To send the common people to war without prior training is equal to 
throwing them away.”154 以不教民戰，是謂棄之. It is Ying Shao’s diagnosis of the 
天生五材，民並用之，廢一不可，誰能去兵？ 
Ying then argued that the abolition of universal military service of the Later Han led 
ollowing results: 
Since the commanderies and fief-states have abolis
lacks safety precautions, which really incites the rebels. When turmoil happens in one 
direction, [it needs forces from] other three directions come to rescue it… all the 
requisitions make the common peopl
and horsemanship or enough learning of di
suddenly forced to face strong adversaries… Therefore the imperial troops perform 
poorly and are defeated in every battle… As a result, [the state] recruits soldiers from 
the three frontiers with distinct customs who are not our kind… by tracing the failure 
of the imperial troops, the saying “to fight without prior training is equal to throwing 
them away” is not vacuous!153 
自郡國罷材官騎士之後，官無警備，實啟寇心。一方有難，三面救之……一切取
辦，黔首囂然。不及講其射御，用其戒誓，一旦驅之以即強敵……是以每戰常負，
王旅不振……爾乃遠徵三邊殊俗之兵，非我族類……不教而戰，是謂棄之，跡其
禍敗，豈虛也哉！ 
Ying Shao blamed the abolition of commandery troops, which was a direct result of 
andonment of universal military service, causing the imperial forces to become 
                                                 
153 HHSZ, 28: 3622. 
154 Yang Bojun 楊伯峻 annotated, Lunyu yizhu 論語譯注 (Hong Kong: Chunghwa Book, 1994), 13.30: 
144. 
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nasties can be traced back to at least the reign of Emperor 
We
                                                
failure of the Later Han imperial troops. In fact, Zheng Tai also quoted the same saying in 
his analysis of the weaknesses of the eastern alliance to Dong Zhuo, which I have cited in 
the beginning of Chapter One. 
Moreover, Ying Shao pointed out a very important feature of the Later Han military 
system—employing non-Han troops. The imperial tradition of recruiting non-Han 
soldiers during the two Han dy
n of the Former Han.155 Chao Cuo, the statesman who proposed the project of 
resettling people along the northern frontier and of setting up farming colonies, 
championed the benefits of using surrendered non-Han peoples as frontier garrisons to 
resist Xiongnu invasions.156  During the reign of Emperor Wu, the employment of 
non-Han soldiers went hand in hand with the large-scale external warfare and territorial 
expansion. Such a tradition was inherited by the Later Han and became an economical 
way of settling the increasing number of surrendered non-Han people such as the Qiang 
and the Xiongnu.157  With the abolition of universal military service and the poor 
 
 the civil war ensued the fall of the Qin dynasty. According to the sources, there were Loufan 樓煩 
ixue xuebao 國立政治大學學報 
155 Non-Han soldiers might probably been used by Emperor Gao, the founding emperor of Former Han, 
during
cavalrymen in the Han army and Loufan was a name of a northern tribe of the time. See SJ, 7: 328-329. 
However, we have no details about whether the cavalrymen called Loufan were alien people or not, nor do 
we know whether they were recruited on individual basis or tribal basis. 
156 HS, 49: 2282-2283.  
157 Hsing I-tien, “Dong Han de Hu bing” 東漢的胡兵, Guoli zhengzhida
28 (1973): 143-166. 
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sinc
Nevertheless, the fatal drawback of employing foreign troops was the question of 
                    
performance of the imperial army, the Later Han empire came to rely increasingly on 
barbarian recruits to fill the ranks of its army along the frontiers.158 For example, the 
troops under the command of Colonel Protector of the Qiang were, to a large extent, 
composed of the Qiang and other non-Han peoples.159 Duan Jiong’s mass killing of the 
Qiang rebels was in fact carried out by his Qiang soldiers. 
Needless to say, non-Han troops served a good purpose to the imperial military 
machine with several advantages, particularly in external warfare. Recruiting non-Han 
soldiers minimized the laborious process of recruiting an
e, comparatively speaking, the barbarian soldiers were tough fighters, and were 
familiar with the frontier terrain and climate. Another advantage was that the barbarian 
tribesmen could be brought into the army in groups, with their own tribal organization 
and existing structure of command and coordination—an efficient army could easily be 
formed. More than that, it was an ideal policy developed by the imperial rulers in that by 
using barbarian against barbarian, the empire could rein the alien people without 
exhausting its own resources.  
                             
158 Ibid. 
159 Ibid; Liu, “Lun Handai xizhi bianjiang minzu yu saini zhi zhengce,” 299-300. 
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r those non-Han peoples who were allowed to retain their 
trib
 
Qia
political allegiance. There was no guarantee of their loyalty to the emperor or his empire. 
The non-Han troops would easily turn against the Han empire when they were not 
satisfied with their treatment. Fo
al organization, such as the Qiang groups who were settled by the Later Han along its 
northwestern frontier, the preserved tribal solidarity, network, and command structure 
critically hindered their loyalty to the imperial center but provided motives of collective 
action and mechanism for mobilization against the empire. As we have seen, the trigger 
for the First Qiang War in 107CE was the mutiny of Qiang cavalrymen who were afraid 
of the possibility of a long-term stationing in the Western Regions.  
Even though they were nominally under imperial command, the political allegiance of 
the non-Han troops depended upon patron-client relations with the imperial commander. 
It was a highly personal relationship rather than a well-regulated institution. As 
mentioned above, a great number of the troops under Duan Jiong’s command were the
ng. During the last years of the second century CE when Duan Jiong was called back 
to the capital, as a means to discharge him from his army, and was later put to death as 
implicated in a eunuch factional struggle, many of his former officers and their followers 
became rebels. A central official named Liu Tao 劉陶 (d. 185CE) sharply pointed out 
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that since those former subordinates of Duan Jiong were skilled at fighting and were 
knowledgeable about the geography of the northwest, they were very hard to defeat.160 
The Qiang and other non-Han peoples also constituted the backbone of the military 
forces of the warlord Dong Zhuo, as Zheng Tai counted in his speech cited in Chapter 
One. Dong Zhuo grew up in Liang province and had established very close relationships 
with some of the Qiang tribal leaders since his early age.161 It was for these reasons that 
Dong was appointed to deal with the Qiang problem in the last years of the Later Han. 
Dong shrewdly exploited his networks with the Han and non-Han peoples in Liang 
province and the imperial court’s reliance on him to establish his own forces in the 
northwest. The overwhelming high number of non-Han members of his army earned 
Dong’s troops the name of “Qiang-Hu” army from the eastern based scholar-officials,162 
and Dong himself was called a “Qiang-Hu” by his contemporaries.163 Dong’s troops, as 
he claimed, only followed his direction and would not under the command of other 
imperial generals. Therefore, it became a force which Dong could rely on to challenge the 
 
160 HHS, 57: 1850. 
Zhu, “Lun Han Wei zhiji Qiang Hu hua de Liangzhuo junshi jituan,” 113; Morimoto, 
161 HHS, 72: 2319. 
162 HHS, 84: 2801. 
“Dong Han monian de Qiangzu yu Hanzu,” 183; Wang Xien 王希恩, “Hanmo Liangzhou junfa jituan 
jianlun” 漢末涼州軍閥集團簡論, Gansu shehui kexue 甘肅社會科學 1991.2: 72-73. 
163 HHS, 84: 2798. 
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s in Liang province into turning against the Later Han state. As 
ana
                     
imperial authority.164 
Various factors such as protracted warfare, natural disasters, official corruption and 
exploitation contributed to the difficult situation that provoked not only non-Han troops 
but also Han resident
lyzed in the preceding chapters, Liang province was a highly militarized region and 
was well-known for producing formidable military talents and tough fighters. Since the 
imperial army from the east was incapable of restoring order in the northwest during the 
Qiang wars, the northwesterners had to rely upon themselves for self-protection. Those 
who were discontented even joined the rebels. When the imperial court decided to give 
up Liang province and carried out forcible evacuations, it aggravated the fear and 
discontent of the northwesterners. For the people of Liang province, the imperial court’s 
proposal of giving up the province was no different from a proposal of abandoning 
them.165 The northwesterners’ distrust toward the imperial center thus reached the peak. 
In order to protect their regional interests, various local forces arose and united, 
regardless of whether or not they were Han or non-Han people. One Japanese scholar 
called the united front of anti-Later Han forces in Liang province as a multi-racial and 
                            
164 Wang, “Hanmo Liangzhou junfa jituan jianlun,” 71-72. 
165 Morimoto, “Dong Han monian de Qiangzu yu Hanzu,” 178. 
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last years of the Later Han, it was 
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multi-ethnic “United regime of Liang province.”166  
In fact, during the long course of living together in the region, the Han and non-Han 
inhabitants gradually developed close relationships and adapted and accommodated each 
other, though intermittent conflicts happened. In the 
icult to differentiate between the Han and the Qiang.167 Dong Zhuo was called a 
Qiang by his contemporaries; many of his subordinates were of mixed Han-Qiang family 
background; Ma Teng 馬騰 (d. 212CE), one of the most important military strongmen in 
Liang province and an ally of the aforementioned Han Sui, had a Han father who was an 
ex-local military officer and a Qiang mother;168 both Ma Teng and his son Ma Chao 馬
超 (176-222CE) were said to have earned wide support among the Qiang and the Hu. 
Those rebel leaders or military strongmen such as Bian Zhang, Han Sui, Ma Teng, and 
Wang Guo all commanded multi-ethnic forces like Dong Zhuo’s.169  
The threat of facing a common enemy—the Later Han state—gradually helped all the 
northwestern military men forge a regional identity as people of Liang province 
(Liangzhou ren 涼州人). As the historical records show, this iden
 
166 Morimoto, “Dong Han monian de Qiangzu yu Hanzu,” 183. 
167 Wang, “Hanmo Liangzhou junfa jituan jianlun,” 73. 
168 Chen Shou 陳壽, comp., Sanguo zhi 三國志 (Beijing: Zhonghua shuju, 1997) 36: 945. 
169 Yang Yongjun, “Lüelun Handai Longyou difang shili de xingqi jiqi yu Qiang Hu de guanxi” 略論漢代
隴右地方勢力的興起及其與羌胡的關係, Dunhuang xue jikan 敦煌學輯刊 2000.2: 107-108. 
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te was still struggling to restore order in the northwest, a mutiny broke out 
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hasized by the military leaders in the last years of the Later Han. Rebel leaders such 
as Ma Teng and Han Sui as well as subordinates of Dong Zhuo such as Li Jue 李傕 (d. 
198CE) and Guo Si 郭汜 (fl. 190s CE), all declared themselves as people of Liang 
province. Even in 192CE when there were factional struggles over the succession of 
Dong Zhuo among his subordinates after the warlord’s death, Li Jue and Guo Si, both 
from Liang province, temporarily put aside their conflicts and promoted the regional 
identity of people of Liang province to resist the attack launched by anti-Dong eastern 
scholar-officials. They were also regarded by their adversaries as people of Liang 
province.170 The identity of people of Liang province was superimposed on internal 
differences among the northwestern military men in response to conflict with the eastern 
adversaries. 
With the flowering of the regional identity of the people of Liang province, the 
imperial rule over the province ended before the empire’s collapse. In 187 CE, while the 
Later Han sta
ng the people of six commanderies of Liang province who were conscripted in the 
army under the command of the Inspector of Liang province (Liang zhou cishi 涼州刺史) 
 
170 HHS, 66: 2176. Chen Yong has provided a detailed study of the emphasis of Liangzhou identity among 
northwestern military men after the death of Dong Zhuo, see his “Dong Zhuo jinjing shulun” 董卓進京述
論, Zhongguoshi yanjiu 中國史研究 1995.4: 112-121. 
300 
 
   To recap, the chaotic situation in Liang province caused by natural disasters and 
protracted warfare furthered the estrangement between the imperial court and the 
northwesterners; the poor performance of the imperial army in the Qiang wars revealed a 
Geng Bi 耿鄙 (d. 187CE). The mutiny was said to have been caused by Inspector 
Geng’s corruption and exploitation. The mutineers killed Geng and his associates, and 
then attacked other towns that were still under imperial control. Ma Teng, originally an 
aide-de-camp of Inspector Geng, quickly grasped the opportunity and became the leader 
of the mutineers. With the outbreak of mutiny, the imperial power was wiped out in Liang 
province. In 189CE, Ma Teng and Han Sui allied and became the dominant power in 
Liang province. On the other hand, although the imperial court ordered Dong Zhuo to 
suppress the rebels in Liang province, he established himself as a semi-independent 
power without obeying the imperial order and manipulated the situation between the 
northwestern rebels and the imperial court. Dong maintained connections with Ma and 
Han, and the two strongmen also wanted to benefit themselves by collaborating with 
Dong. Even though Liang province was still nominally a regional administrative unit of 
the empire, the imperial center found itself no longer able to control the region, which 
was already in the hands of warlords.  
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sed ability of the imperial center to protect its territory and subjects from horrors of 
warfare; the intention of giving up Liang province and the ensuing forcible evacuation 
further discredited the imperial center to the northwesterners. The disappointing 
performance of the empire in political and military terms left the people of Liang 
province no choice but to rely on themselves for self-protection. While the soldiers from 
other sectors of the empire generally performed badly, the military forces in the northwest 
retained a comparatively high strength as evidenced by Yu Xu, Fu Xie, and Zheng Tai, 
who were mentioned in different contexts.  
   The people of Liang province became less willing to support an imperial center that 
was unable to provide them with security and prosperity. They joined the rebels or 
formed self-armed forces, pushing them away from the imperial authority. During the 
Qiang wars and afterwards, the respect and support for the imperial center among the 
northwesterners diminished quickly, and the imperial court finally realized that it was no 
longer able to rule the northwest.  
The lack of respect and support was a major cause of the fall of the empire. Certain 
elites of Liang province had foreseen or tried to trigger the downfall of the empire. In 
187CE when Inspector Geng Bi was killed and the rebels were attacking the towns in 
decrea
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ng province; Fu Xie, the northwestern statesman who successfully kept Liang 
province in the imperial realm in the 185CE debate, was the Grand Administrator of 
Hanyang commandery in Liang province. Besieged by the rebels, Fu Xie’s son proffered 
advice to his father that all under Heaven had betrayed the imperial court and it was no 
longer worth defending for the dynasty.171 Fu agreed with his son but insisted that he had 
to die for his duty. The rebels also sent a messenger to Fu Xie and persuaded him that the 
Later Han dynasty had lost its mandate.172 After entrusting a confidant to take his son out 
of the siege, Fu Xie chose to die in battle. Fu’s story reveals that people in Liang province, 
no matter which side they were on, had a feeling that the Later Han dynasty was going to 
end. About the same time, an ex-official and Hanyang native Yan Zhong 閻忠 (d. 
189CE) told General Huangfu Song, the hero who suppressed the Yellow Turbans and the 
nephew of the famous Huangfu Gui, that the Later Han was falling and nobody was able 
to save it. As the most prestigious military leader of his time, Yan said, that Huangfu 
Song should lead his army to march to the imperial capital, wipe out the corrupt imperial 
court, and take the Mandate of Heaven himself.173 Huangfu Song was terrified after 
hearing this and insisted that he would follow the principle of loyalty to the dynasty. 
 
171 HHS, 58: 1878. 
1: 2303. 
172 Ibid. 
173 HHS, 7
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Although both Fu Xie and Huangfu Song recognized the deterioration of the empire, they 
refused to betray the Later Han. It was probably because they were “centralized” and 
“civilianized” by the imperial court and the dominant Guandong scholar-official culture. 
As mentioned in the preceding chapter, Huangfu Song’s uncle Huangfu Gui had made a 
great effort to be recognized by the eastern scholar-officials. Such a family background 
and education might have influenced Huangfu Song to be a staunch supporter of the 
dynasty.174 However, other northwestern elites like Fu Xie’s son and Yan Zhong did not 
hold the principle of loyalty to the empire. They manifested clearly that the Later Han 
was near its end. It was Dong Zhuo, an uncouth Liujun liangjiazi who dared to desecrate 
the imperial authority, and led the northwestern troops to storm the imperial capital, 
deposed the emperor, killed the Empress Dowager and hammered the last nail into the 
empire’s coffin.175 
                            
174 Chen Yong discusses the scholar-officials of the late Later Han period were bound by the principle of 
loyalty and dared not to directly challenge the throne, see his “Liangzhou sanming lun,” 72-74. 
175 For a detailed analysis of Dong Zhuo’s political actions after controlling Louyang, see Chen, “Dong 
Zhuo jinjing shulun”, 109-112. 
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Epilogue: 
The Beginning of the End 
 
In his magnum opus Dushi fangyu jiyao 讀史方輿紀要 (Essentials of Geography for 
Reading History), Gu Zuyu 顧祖禹 (1631-92CE) made a comment about the role 
played by the northwestern region in the toppling of the Later Han dynasty, 
As I have observed that since the ancient times, he who wreaked havoc throughout the 
empire always originated from Shaanxi.1 While the Eastern Han dynasty was enjoying 
peace and prosperity, the Qiang and Hu launched revolt in the western frontier. 
Therefore, brilliant generals and vigorous soldiers all gathered in the region between 
the Yellow River and Long Mountain. As the situation unfolded to the worst end, [the 
northwestern rebels] were as avaricious as big swine and as venomous as serpents; 
[They] desecrated the imperial palace, thereby throwing the empire into turmoil.2 
吾觀自古以來，為天下禍者，往往起於陝西。東漢當承平之際，而羌、胡搆亂於
西垂，故良將勁卒盡在河、隴之間。迨其末也，封豕長蛇，憑陵宮闕，遂成板蕩
之禍。 
Gu sharply pointed out the militarized nature of the northwestern region during the 
Later Han period and traced the causal relationship between the concentration of military 
 
1 For Gu, Shaanxi was not confined to modern Shaanxi province but referred to the whole northwestern 
area.    
2 Gu Zuyu 顧祖禹, Dushi fangyu jiyao 讀史方輿紀要. He Cijun 賀次君 and Shi Hejin 施和金 
annotated. (Beijing: Zhonghua shuju, 2005) v.5, 52: 2451. 
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forces in the northwest and the downfall of the dynasty. These are associated with the 
main thread running through the present study that the highly militarized northwestern 
region was the harbinger of the disintegration of the Later Han empire.  
   In this project, I adopted a regional perspective by focusing on the role of the 
northwestern frontier region vis-à-vis the imperial center to explain the collapse of the 
Later Han empire. I emphasized the role that regional conflicts played in the decline and 
fall of the dynasty, and paid particular attention to the incompatibility between the 
militarized culture of the northwest and the civil values promoted by the imperial center, 
which was dominated by the eastern-based scholar-officials. Through this analysis, I have 
provided a case study of the relationship between the imperial center and the regions with 
different cultures and identities, and the variations of the conception of such a 
relationship in the period of early imperial China. 
   As a frontier region of the Qin-Han empire, the northwest was a new territory to the 
Chinese realm. Until the Later Han times, some portions of the northwestern region had 
only been part of imperial soil for one hundred years. Its coalescence into the Chinese 
empire was a product of long-term expansion and conquest, which arguably defined the 
region’s military nature. Furthermore, in the harsh natural environment of the region, 
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only tough people could survive, and unsurprisingly, the region fostered vigorous 
warriors. Mixed culture and multi-ethnicity featured prominently in this highly 
militarized frontier society, which contrasted sharply with the imperial center that 
promoted unified cultural values and stood in the way of a greater degree of transregional 
integration. 
When the Former Han empire was enthusiastic about marching to Inner Asia, the 
northwest played a crucial role in serving as a bridgehead, and the northwesterners, with 
the Linjun Liangjiazi in particular, contributed enormous efforts to the imperial enterprise. 
At that time, the northwestern region was deemed a military and political core of the 
empire, though it was in the periphery in a geographic sense. In short, it was the process 
of shaping the empire in the northwest that permitted the rise of military elites from the 
comparatively culturally backward Liang province. However, the Later Han rulers had a 
different vision of empire from their Former Han predecessors. When the Later Han 
adopted a retrenchment policy, the strategic value of the northwestern region changed 
accordingly. The region lost the importance it once enjoyed in the expansionist era of the 
Former Han. It was reduced to a land that was disdained for its cultural backwardness and 
was considered a region that could be readily given up in the eyes of the eastern-based 
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scholar-officials. At that time, the northwest was not only a geographic periphery but also 
a political periphery. In other words, the northwestern region and its inhabitants went 
through a process of political peripheralization during the Later Han. 
When its strategic value was high, the imperial center was willing to spend enormous 
resources on the northwest; when its strategic value decreased, the imperial center would 
not give any patient and resources to the region. What determined the calculation of 
strategic costs and benefits was greatly influenced by the political culture that prevailed 
among the imperial policy makers.  
Facing the prevailing political culture of the Later Han, which emphasized civil 
values and honored knowledge of classical studies, the northwesterners found themselves 
receiving lower political and social status than their eastern counterparts. For the 
northwestern military elites, the new political culture, which upheld the prominence of 
civil values, hindered their career advancement; for the common northwesterners, the 
eastern-based scholar-officials’ ideas and actions of giving up the northwest showed that 
they were being abandoned by the imperial center. While the imperial center cared little 
about the welfare of the northwesterners, prolonged warfare and natural disasters 
exacerbated the hardship of the northwesterners. It was the disaffected northwesterners 
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who finally played the role of harbingers in the process of disintegration of the empire. 
Although the Later Han imperial center had already suffered from and was weakened by 
various problems, such as political infighting at the imperial court, popular rebellions, 
invasions launched by foreign peoples such as the Xianbei and Wuhuan along the 
northern frontier, and the massacre of the eunuchs at the capital unleashed by the 
official-scholars in 189CE especially brought the imperial center to a chaotic situation, 
the empire was still staggering. It was the warlord Dong Zhuo and his northwestern 
troops who entered the capital, as the outsiders, deposed and installed emperors according 
to their will, murdered the Empress Dowager, and thus desecrated the imperial authority. 
These actions gave the regional governors legitimate opportunities to establish their own 
semi-autonomous regional regimes in name of opposing Dong Zhuo and the rebels from 
Liang province, and thus dismembered the empire. Therefore, Dong Zhuo’s march to the 
capital in 190CE marked the beginning of the end of the Later Han dynasty and also the 
breakdown of the early imperial system in Chinese history; a period of great disunion 
ensued. 
As I have stated in Chapter One, this study is the first step of my study on the 
transformation of Chinese society and development of Chinese history during the period 
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before and after the fall of the Later Han, and the present study only provides the 
background of the collapse of the empire, for the process and result of collapse will wait 
for further studies.3  
Lastly, I would like to point out two trends took place during the Later Han, though I 
cannot discuss in depth about them in the present study. They are “Regionalism” and 
“Confucianization.”  
As I have elaborated in this study, under the façade of a unified empire, there were a 
multitude of regional variations and conflicts in the vast expanse of the Qin-Han empire. 
Regional cultures and customs persistently existed in Chinese history and hindered the 
empire from achieving cultural unification. For example, the Qin state established Nan 
南 commandery on a newly conquered land in 278BCE, however, in 227BCE, which 
was over 50 years after the conquest, the Grand Administrator of Nan commandery still 
lamented and criticized in an announcement that regional culture harmed the interests of 
the imperial state.4 As mentioned in Chapter One, the Later Han dynasty was a time when 
the powerful families exerted great influence on both the imperial center and various 
 
3 As what Yoffee said, “what happens after collapse is as important as the process of collapse itself,” and 
classified the studies of collapse into three aspects: background of collapse, process of collapse, and result 
of collapse. See idem, “Orienting Collapse,” 7. 
4 Shuihudi Qinmu zhujian zhengli xiaozu 睡虎地秦墓竹簡整理小組, Shuihudi Qinmu zhujian 睡虎地秦
墓竹簡 (Beijing: Wenwu chubanshe, 1977), 15. 
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regions. The growth of powerful family and regionalism went hand in hand during the 
Later Han. By the end of the dynasty, regionalism had already become a strong force that 
undermined the empire, and narrow parochial interests had predominated over the 
imperial interests.5 What came with this trend was the devolution of military power to the 
regional governors, which provided them means and resources against Dong Zhuo in 
190CE. The present study is only one of the stories of regionalism in the Later Han times, 
though it is the most important one. 
The “Confcuianized” political culture that dominated the Later Han imperial center 
played a crucial role in the scholar-officials’ perceptions of the northwest and its people. 
This political culture gradually formed in the last years of the Former Han and reached its 
pinnacle in the Later Han, and it was but the political revelation of a multi-faceted great 
tide of “Confucianization” occurred at the time.6 How “Confucianization” as a political, 
social, and intellectual movement influenced the civil and military values of the empire 
and the interactive relationship between the “Confucian state” and frontier societies 
deserve further study. Furthermore, after the fall of the Later Han dynasty, there was a 
tendency for some eastern-based Confucianized scholar-official families to actively 
 
5 Hsu, “The Roles of the Literati and of Regionalism in the Fall of the Han dynasty,” 176-195; de 
Crespigny, “Provincial Gentry and the End of Later Han,” 533-558. 
6 Paul Goldin has provided a case of “Confucianization” of the Han law, see his “Han Law and the 
Regulation of Interpersonal Relations: ‘The Confucianization of the Law’ Revisited,” 1-32. 
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militarize themselves as a response to the incessant warfare. This phenomenon compels 
us to consider the relationship between “Confucianization” and “Militarization.” 
However, to pursue these problems in detail would take us beyond the concerns of this 
work. 
As I have said, this study is just a beginning of the end.  
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